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SHOULD HISTORY LOCK IN LOCK-IN?

Larry E. Ribstein*

ABSTRACT

The corporation does not allow owners, at least by default, to cash out their interests. This feature of “capital lock-in” facilitates durable and centralized management of corporate assets. It has been argued that capital lock-in is what has made the corporation the dominant business form and has enabled the modern firm. This argument for the historical significance of capital lock-in is intended to provide a rationale for rejecting reforms that would compromise lock-in. However, lock-in has costs including inhibiting effective monitoring of managers. Moreover, the historical argument is inaccurate because lock-in has always been available in the partnership form. Lock-in should be viewed as just one of many features of firms that evolve to meet business needs—not frozen in place by a dubious account of the past.

I. INTRODUCTION

In a series of articles about the history of the corporation, Margaret Blair argues that the Industrial Revolution created a need for a reliable and sustainable business entity form that would protect the various investments of the participants in the firm.¹ The corporation crucially filled, and still fills, that need. The story is enlivened by historical anecdotes of how particular firms had to solve the continuity problem in order to become successful.

In Blair’s account, the business forms that preceded the corporation, mainly the sole proprietorship and partnership, did not work because they were destabilized by owners’ ability to withdraw their shares. The sole proprietorship is vulnerable to everything that might happen to the proprietor, including death and inheritance. The partnership form was inadequate because a partner could dissolve the firm at will. A variant on the partnership, the joint stock company, also was not a complete solution because of its default aggregate features. Only the corporate form prevented the cash-out

* Mildred van Voorhees Jones Chair, University of Illinois College of Law.


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of owners' interests, thereby facilitating the creation of large-scale business enterprises.

This story has an important policy implication. The fact that recognition of a durable corporate entity enabled the Industrial Revolution indicates that the corporate feature of capital lock-in was necessary to the growth of modern business and continues to be an essential feature of the corporation.

While this makes an interesting story, it is questionable law, history, and economics. First, Blair has not precisely identified the economic problem for which capital lock-in supposedly is a solution. This is important because capital lock-in may have significant costs in some contexts that must be balanced against any economic benefits. The cost-benefit tradeoff depends on the circumstances of particular firms and may vary over time.

Second, Blair assumes that capital lock-in was not available in the partnership, thereby necessitating use of the corporation. However, partners have always been able to contract to prevent liquidation through the partnership agreement, as well as to deter partner exit by contracting for buyout rights. This undermines Blair's theory that the corporate form was necessary for capital lock-in. Moreover, the joint stock company, a variant on partnership, offered any continuity that the standard-form partnership lacked.

Third, even if the corporation offered stronger default entity features than partnership, this still does not demonstrate the need for the corporate form. Partnership law was already developing continuity and other entity features by the early nineteenth century, the period Blair discusses. The fact that partnerships now can have all of the entity aspects of corporations indicates that these features never were inherently inconsistent with partnership. The partnership form clearly could have developed entity features had the corporation never been invented.

This does not mean that the development of the corporate form was anomalous or unnecessary. There is some value to offering different sets of features in distinct standard forms because the development of the alternative corporate form theoretically economized on contracting by firms.\(^2\) Blair is wrong, not in concluding that corporate features were important, but in suggesting that the creation of the modern corporate form was necessary for the development of modern business. In fact, like other aspects of business association standard forms,\(^3\) these features are only contingently important in responding to the business needs that exist for any particular form.

Blair's use of capital lock-in to explain the corporation matters for two reasons. First, even if the same basic features have always been available in partnerships and corporations, there is an important distinction between the two forms: in this country, creation of a corporation historically required state intervention and, therefore, could be considered a sort of concession of state power.\(^4\) Thus, any argument that the corporate form was necessary to enable the modern firm implicitly supports the significant role of the state that necessarily accompanies the corporate form. Conversely, relying more on

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4. See infra n. 88 and accompanying text.
the contractual partnership form might diminish the state’s role in regulating business associations.

Second, characterizing capital lock-in as the corporation’s central feature suggests that it should be preserved against any tinkering by courts or legislatures. Blair’s history, therefore, would shore up the normative justification found in Blair’s work with her co-author Lynn Stout. They argue for the role of the board as “mediating hierarchs” who act on behalf of all groups that contribute resources to the firm rather than just the shareholders.5 Empowering investors to cash out of the firm would weaken managers’ ability to control corporate assets for the benefit of non-shareholder constituencies. It arguably follows that all corporate constituencies would want to mandate capital lock-in as a way to effectuate the strong role of managers Blair and Stout envision.

The problem with this justification of capital lock-in is that it is not clear that shareholders will always want capital lock-in even though lock-ins encourage contributions by other constituencies. The power to withdraw capital may be a necessary way to control agency costs by managers or opportunism by majority shareholders. Moreover, relationships between other constituencies and the corporation may be adequately covered by contracts rather than by firm-type fiat, particularly as markets develop. Accordingly, capital lock-in may not be essential to attract investments by these constituencies. In short, the costs of lock-in may sometimes exceed the benefits. Reducing the case for corporate lock-in to historical inevitability bypasses these details.

Part II of this article identifies the economic problem that justifies the capital lock-in solution. Unlike in Blair’s explanation, the problem does not directly concern the multifarious contributions made by the parties to corporate contracts. These contributions may give rise to shirking because of the difficulty of measuring each party’s contribution to the entity’s surplus. Shirking might be addressed by monitoring, including by the firm’s managers. Lock-in addresses the separate problem of opportunism, which may arise because of a contributor’s ability to, in effect, appropriate more than its share of the firm’s surplus by withdrawing a resource that helps produce that surplus. Whether that is a problem depends on several factors, including the nature of the contribution and the effect of withdrawal on the enterprise. Moreover, lock-in may have costs, including inhibiting monitoring of managers by preventing dissatisfied owners from removing their investments.

Part III shows that lock-in, even if efficient, has always been available in the partnership form. Not only has partnership law permitted contracting around liquidation at will, but it has also allowed the partners to contract around any obligation to return to the partners the full value of their investments in the firm. Moreover, the joint stock company variant on partnership provides any continuity the standard form partnership lacks. To be sure, the partners might be able to hold up the firm by withdrawing their human capital, but neither partnership nor corporate law has ever been able to fully prevent this. This simple legal fact casts significant doubt on Blair’s capital lock-in account of the rise of the corporation.

Part IV discusses the policy implications of Blair’s historical account and, therefore, the significance of its flaws. If the corporate form is not essential to modern business, neither are the corporation’s specific attributes, particularly its regulatory nature. The partnership approach to lock-in would have better enabled firms to balance the costs and benefits of lock-in in particular situations and to choose alternatives to strong-form corporate-type lock-in as they became more viable. Corporate lock-in is not essential to the theory of the firm, but rather to Blair and Stout’s particular normative vision of corporate managers as mediating hierarchs. History cannot save Blair the effort of normatively defending this view.

Part V offers concluding remarks.

II. CAPITAL LOCK-IN AND THE THEORY OF THE FIRM

This Part discusses the economic role of capital lock-in. Subpart A reviews the role of lock-in in the economic theory of the firm, focusing on the distinct problems of shirking and opportunism. Subpart B casts doubt on whether the benefits of lock-in were ever as clear as Blair suggests. Subpart C discusses the significant potential costs of lock-in in impeding monitoring.

A. The Theory: Lock-in, Shirking, and Opportunism

Blair attributes the need for capital lock-in to what she and Stout refer to as the “team production” problem—that is, “the problem of assembling and coordinating the use of complex inputs for long-term or continuous production.” But Blair has identified not one, but two, quite distinct problems—shirking and opportunism. She also ignores an important problem that lock-in creates—the “agency cost” problem.

The shirking problem arises when production in the typical large firm requires various inputs from several sources whose outputs cannot easily be identified with specific members of the corporate “team.” The difficulty of determining whether suppliers are providing optimal performance complicates contracting in the firm. Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz theorize that participants in a firm have an incentive to “shirk,” hoping that their colleagues will pick up the slack and that no one will notice who is doing what. For example, a group of furniture movers might earn more money by doing more moves than each could individually, but because the profit cannot be isolated to specific movers, each has an incentive to free ride on the others’ efforts. Blair cites Alchian and Demsetz as a source of the team production concept in her work alone and with Stout.

A solution to this version of the team production problem is to hire a monitor who can observe the behavior of the team members and mete out appropriate rewards and

8. As this example suggests, the shirking problem does not depend on the existence of distinct types of inputs.
9. See Blair, Locking in Capital, supra n. 1, at 399 n. 31.
10. See Blair & Stout, supra n. 5, at 265.
punishments to encourage optimal behavior, including through *ex ante* contracts.\(^{11}\) However, this creates the agency cost problem inherent in delegating power to a non-owner manager.

In the second, or opportunism, version of the team production problem, the inseparability of inputs permits individual members to appropriate part of the surplus created by the other team members by threatening to withdraw their resources.\(^{12}\) For example, if a daily newspaper depends on a printer to give timely service to its readers and advertisers, the printer might “hold up” the newspaper for more money by threatening to suspend operations and thereby delay publication.\(^{13}\) The problem in this situation is one of enforcement rather than of monitoring. The parties may have been able to agree on how much of the joint product should be allocated to each contributor in order to maximize the joint surplus, but they have no easy way to hold their partners to this deal when one or more of the parties can pull his resources out.

The parties might reduce opportunism by locking their resources into a jointly owned firm. Once the parties have traded their resources for ownership interests in the firm, they cannot easily appropriate the joint surplus by withdrawing their resources if the parties own and directly control only their ownership interests and not the resources themselves. They might sell these interests to third parties or leave them to their heirs, but this would leave the firm and its resources intact. Lock-in may, however, exacerbate the costs of delegating control to non-owner agents because the parties’ ability to take their investments out of the firm is an important way to discipline the firm’s managers.\(^{14}\) Thus, while lock-in addresses the opportunism problem, it complicates the solution to the shirking problem.

The analysis so far has relied on the economic theory of the firm rather than the legal concept of the business association. Blair reasons that the Chandlerian firm created a need for a legal entity form that was “reliable and sustainable.”\(^{15}\) Stability and continuity would reassure resource contributors that their investments would be protected from opportunistic withdrawal by investors. Most importantly, under Blair’s theory, this corporate-type continuity would enable managers to develop and implement the broad and long-term strategies necessary to the creation of the modern firm.

Blair bases her analysis on anecdotes about the growth of early large enterprises in the nineteenth-century U.S. For example, Blair discusses Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company, in which several individuals combined to form companies to produce and

\(^{11}\) See Alchian & Demsetz, supra n. 7, at 781–83.


\(^{13}\) See Klein, Crawford & Alchian, supra n. 12, at 300.

\(^{14}\) See *infra* n. 29 and accompanying text.

\(^{15}\) Blair, *Locking in Capital*, supra n. 1, at 412.
transport coal.16 Neither branch of the business was viable without the other, thereby raising a potential opportunism problem. Under Blair’s theory, the partnership form could not bind the parties into a sustainable unit that would resist an individual party’s ability to withdraw resources from the entity. Part III, below, critically analyzes Blair’s claims about the relative continuity of the corporate and partnership forms.

According to Blair, having locked the assets into the strong corporate entity, functional control could be given to a board of directors, thereby separating control from the ownership of the resources.17 The board would mediate among the various resource contributors. Blair states that “when decisionmaking authority is allocated to a board of directors, individual team members relinquish some of the ability they might otherwise have had to hold up other members.”18 In other words, the mediating hierarchy solves the opportunism problem. But she does not address lock-in’s effect on agency costs; therefore, she is inconclusive on whether the benefits of capital lock-in outweigh the costs.

B. The Uncertain Benefits of Capital Lock-in

Blair’s account of the need for capital lock-in is based on a few examples rather than the sort of comprehensive review of nineteenth-century business that would justify Blair’s explanation of the rise of the corporate form. This is evident from studying the work of the progenitor of the theory of the firm, Ronald Coase.

Douglas Baird, in a paper based on Coase’s notebooks,19 discusses Coase’s analysis of the reasons for the integration into single firms of General Motors and Fisher Body, on the one hand, and Ford Motor and Keim Mills, on the other. Based on interviews with key personnel, Coase observed that GM and Fisher Body were primarily concerned with closely coordinating their assembly operations. Fisher Body shipped sheets of stamped metal to specially built GM assembly plants and then coordinated welding the sheets into car bodies with Chevrolet’s production team. This combined operation was the sort of work usually done in a single factory. Similarly, Ford and Keim Mills were concerned with keeping intact the production team that initially worked for Keim Mills and helped design the Model T.

The interdependence of the body and assembly operations in GM, and among the production team members in Ford, enabled one party to appropriate part of the entity’s surplus by threatening to pull out. For example, GM could hardly have continued making cars without Fisher Body. This suggests that these firms, like those Blair discusses, needed the capital lock-in feature of the strong corporate entity. Baird, however, shows that formal legal integration was in both cases merely an afterthought to physical integration of processes rather than something the parties evidently considered vital to the transaction.20

16. Id. at 399–404.
17. Id. at 433–34.
18. Id. at 434.
20. Id.
Indeed, in the case of Ford, it is not clear how legal integration or organizational form could have helped the parties, whatever the sequence of events. Employment contracts might mitigate the problem, but these contracts also do not depend on organizational form. Similarly, in Blair's own Lehigh example, the supposed opportunism problem of the need to keep the engineer associated with the team also involves a human capital issue that cannot be resolved by organizational form.

These observations are also supported by a study of early American partnerships, that notes partners' ability to act opportunistically by withdrawing and appropriating firm-specific assets. The study shows how partners minimized the hold-up problem by allying with their equals in age, productivity, and capital, so that the partners could credibly commit to refrain from opportunistic conduct. Again, organizational form and capital lock-in were irrelevant.

These questions about the role of business form in solving opportunism problems have an important implication. To the extent that integration depends on such factors as physical logistics, it would not have the sort of fundamental importance to the modern firm that Blair attributes to it. As Baird points out, echoing Coase, integration of operations depends on the relative costs of doing business within firms and in markets. As markets develop, firms become less important. For example, firms like Dell contract with multiple suppliers for components that once would have been made in the manufacturing plants owned by the branded firm. This suggests that Blair's story may have little relevance to today's firms even if she was right concerning why the corporate form initially arose.

C. Monitoring and the Costs of Lock-in

Even if capital lock-in has significant value for many large firms, there is an additional question whether the benefits of lock-in exceed the costs. Capital liquidity enables owners to discipline or minimize the costs imposed by shirking, misappropriating managers, or controlling owners. This point is particularly relevant in light of the fact that many of the corporations Blair discusses were closely held, or at least did not have developed markets for their shares. For perspective, consider that the New York Stock Exchange did not even have a building until 1865 and in 1830 traded as little as thirty-one shares a day. Thus, even if firms derived significant benefits from continuity, lock-in might also have imposed significant costs on owners who could not trade their shares.

21. See supra nn. 16–18 and accompanying text.
23. Id.
25. Id. at 14.
28. Blair, in fact, sees the ability to trade as the antidote to lock-in. See infra n. 30 and accompanying text.
The value of capital liquidity should be assessed in light of other potential monitoring and incentive mechanisms. Owner voting rights may involve a significant free-rider problem because each owner would incur costs of being informed and coordinating with other owners while sharing the governance benefits with all other owners. Owners may be able to transfer voting and economic rights to other owners, but changing the identity of the owner does not necessarily put pressure on the managers. The purchaser may acquire enough shares to overcome the free-rider problem and to make meaningful changes, but this tactic may be costly and risky, particularly because incumbent managers with broad agency powers usually can impede control transfers. Finally, courts can supervise fiduciary breaches, but this judicial power must be limited by the business judgment rule because of the costs of courts' meddling in business decisions and of placing the burden of business risks on agents.

The standard mechanisms of controlling agents, therefore, all have significant gaps. Empowering owners to cash out of or dissolve the firm can effectively complement or replace these devices. This power permits each owner to express a judgment about the opportunity costs of an investment in the firm. If that judgment is negative, the managers lose control over some of the firm’s cash. Because each owner benefits by being able to redeploy his capital, this device does not involve a free-rider problem comparable to that of shareholder voting. And the device does not invite a court to second-guess managerial decisions. Rather, exiting shareholders implicitly decide how the collective output of all of the managers’ decisions compares with alternative uses of their money.

It is important to emphasize that the ability to cash out of the firm differs from the power corporate shareholders have to sell their interests to third parties. This power to sell only enables shareholders to obtain the value of their interests in the firm less any discount the market applies because of current management. Moreover, the sale does not remove capital from managers’ control but simply shifts it to other powerless owners. Although the power to trade shares reduces the costs of lock-in, Blair is wrong when she indicates that shareholders are not locked in merely because they can sell their shares.

In short, the benefits of lock-in may not outweigh the costs for many firms. This casts doubt on Blair’s conclusion that capital lock-in was pervasively important for firms generally, either in the nineteenth century or today.

III. LOCK-IN AND THE CORPORATE FORM

Even if capital lock-in was important for large nineteenth-century firms, Blair’s theory raises the additional question of whether the corporate form was necessary to achieve this objective. Blair argues that partnership law during the relevant period provided by default that each partner had the power to dissolve a partnership or seek a buyout by the firm and partnerships were dissolved by a partner’s death, subjecting the

30. Blair, History, supra n. 1, at 29–30 (stating that the “provisions of corporate law... do not lock in particular investors, since individual investors can sell their shares to other investors”).
firm to the uncertainty of litigation over the estate.\textsuperscript{32} Corporations, by contrast, could be dissolved only by action of the board of directors followed by a vote of a majority of the owners. Thus, according to Blair, the corporate form was necessary to ensure that the controlling shareholder’s estate would not break up the business.\textsuperscript{33}

The problem with this explanation is that partners have always been able to contract for significant continuity.\textsuperscript{34} Partners at one time could prevent dissolution without cause just by agreeing to a definite term.\textsuperscript{35} Even where the partnership entity was dissolved upon partner dissociation, partners could agree to continue the partnership business.\textsuperscript{36} Although partners, like other agents, had an absolute power to terminate their association with the firm, they did not have an absolute power either to compel termination of the firm or to receive the value of their interests during the period Blair discusses. The courts for centuries have enforced contracts providing for continuation of the firm after partner retirement or death and payment of amounts provided for in the partnership agreement.\textsuperscript{37} Under such an agreement, a member could dissociate himself from further obligations to the firm but would not necessarily be able to take any cash with him. Although a partner might opportunistically use the power to exit, such as when the member had skills that were important to the firm, neither the corporate nor the partnership form bound a partner’s human capital to the firm. Deterring opportunism was left to contract, including non-competition agreements and agreements regarding payoff of exiting members.

Partners actually effectively provided for continuity, including in some of the situations that Blair relies on to illustrate the instability of the partnership form. For example, although Blair offers Baldwin Locomotive as an example of how corporate continuity would have benefited the partners, the partnership agreement in that case provided for continuity through slow payoff of the estate.\textsuperscript{38} Andrew Carnegie’s “iron clad” continuity provisions provided that partners could buy out a deceased or retired partner’s share of the business at book value, payable by installments.\textsuperscript{39} Blair notes that this arrangement worked so well that a locked-in partner caused trouble, illustrating the trade-off between continuity and the need to give members a suitable exit route.\textsuperscript{40}

\textsuperscript{32} Id. at 420–21.
\textsuperscript{33} Id. at 446.
\textsuperscript{36} See Bromberg & Ribstein, supra n. 35, at § 7.11(e).
\textsuperscript{37} Niel Gow, Practical Treatise on the Law of Partnership 341–42, 435 (2d ed., Thomas Davison 1825) (discussing agreements for continuation after partner death or retirement); Story, supra n. 35, at §§ 199, 320–321 (discussing clauses for continuation notwithstanding partner death in order to be sure that the business is “steadily carried on”); id. at §§ 207, 331 (discussing clause providing for purchase of other partner “at a valuation” if “express stipulation” (footnote omitted)); Percy F. Wheeler, Partnership and Companies: A Manual of Practical Law 87 (Adam & Charles Black 1892) (discussing enforcement of buyout agreements under English partnership law).
\textsuperscript{38} Blair, Locking in Capital, supra n. 1, at 453–54.
\textsuperscript{39} Id. at 451–52.
\textsuperscript{40} Id. at 452.
Blair makes much of the need for corporate-type continuity to protect firms from claims of partners' heirs.41 However, partnership law gives partners' heirs no interest in partnership property.42 Although the partnership dissolves by default on a partner's death, as with other partner dissociation, the partners can agree to continue the firm and pay off the estate. The heirs might fight over equity shares in a partnership, as in a corporation, but they cannot threaten either the firm's capital or the surviving partners' control over the assets. Edward Warren's leading early treatise on choice of form confirms that, despite default dissolution of the partnership entity on dissociation of a member, partners can contractually avoid liquidation.44

Blair argues that the corporate form reinforces capital lock-in through other entity features, including those restricting owners from transferring specific firm property.45 However, the partnership form had many entity characteristics by the time of the Industrial Revolution. Although there is authority that partners at one time could transfer specific partnership property without co-partner consent,46 any such right always conflicted with partners' power to co-manage the firm and the ancient partnership principle of _delectus personae_, or choice of associates. At least by the nineteenth century, these principles had been accommodated in much the same way that they are in modern partnerships—and not much differently from modern corporations, by holding that a partner could not unilaterally transfer control over partnership property. Thus, the 1850 _Appeal of Horton_47 held that a partner's attempted transfer of all of his right in partnership assets did not give the purchaser any right over any of the firm's assets. Instead, the transfer caused a dissociation of the selling partner and, therefore, dissolution of the firm, after which the remaining partner possessed the assets for the purpose of winding up the business and paying off the debts.

By the nineteenth century, partnership law in the U.S. and Britain had similarly recognized, consistent with modern partnership and corporate law, that individual partners could not bind partnership assets on individual debts.48 Thus, in 1810, _Pierce v. Jackson_49 held:

> At common law, a partnership stock belongs to the partnership, and one partner has no interest in it, but his share of what is remaining after all the partnership debts are paid, he also accounting for what he may owe to the firm. Consequently, all the debts due from the joint fund must first be discharged, before any partner can appropriate any part of it to his own use, or pay any of his private debts; and a creditor to one of the partners cannot claim any interest, but what belongs to his debtor, whether his claim be founded on any contract

41. _Id._ at 446.
43. See Mark Maremont, _Court Documents Present Insight into Breakup of Pritzker Empire_, Wall St. J. A3 (Jan. 11, 2006) (discussing squabbling over estate among various factions of the Pritzker family).
44. See Edward H. Warren, _Corporate Advantages without Incorporation_ 33 (Baker, Voorhis & Co. 1929).
45. See Blair, _Locking in Capital, supra_ n. 1, at 423–25.
47. 13 Pa. 67 (1850).
49. 6 Mass. 242 (1810).
made with his debtor, or on a seizing of the goods on execution. There are several cases, by which these principles, so reasonable and equitable, are recognized and confirmed.50

*Pierce*, accordingly, held an attachment of partnership property by a creditor of one of the partners was not valid against a later attachment by a partnership creditor.

Blair also cites creditor-protection features such as the owners’ commitment to maintain a capital investment in the firm through statutory legal capital provisions and the “trust fund” doctrine.51 But these rules deal with a problem different from the opportunism that capital lock-in addresses—agency costs and moral hazard between corporate shareholders and creditors. Limited liability shareholders with little invested in the firm have an incentive to commit the firm to risky actions because the shareholders get much of the benefit of success while creditors bear the brunt of failure.

While owners’ perverse incentives may be reduced to some extent by requiring shareholders to commit substantial personal assets to the firm, such a requirement may significantly reduce firms’ flexibility and may only minimally protect creditors over fraudulent conveyance statutes.52 In any event, because shareholders alone can decide where to incorporate, creditors have little power to impose rules that shareholders do not want. Accordingly, minimum capital requirements and other creditor protection rules have long played only a vestigial role in corporate law.53 Any such rules that still exist are an aspect of limited liability rather than specifically of the corporate form. Thus, many limited liability partnership-type statutes have creditor protection provisions similar to those in corporate statutes.54 In short, these rules cannot help explain the dominance of the corporate form.

Even if a traditional standard-form partnership could be deemed to lack some corporate-like continuity or entity features, this is clearly not the case for joint stock companies and business trusts, forms that existed throughout the period Blair discusses. Warren demonstrates through a lengthy analysis that the joint stock company, which he refers to as a “species of partnership” to which partnership rules were generally applicable except as modified by agreement,55 had all of the six “corporate” features Warren identifies except limited liability.56 Moreover, during this period the parties had available the “Massachusetts Business Trust,” still widely used today for mutual funds, which had all of the features of a joint stock company plus limited liability and a greater potential for concentrating management power.57

Most importantly for present purposes, Warren emphasizes that a joint stock company did not have the partnership disadvantage of impermanence.58 Warren discusses a case that demonstrated that the parties could agree to full continuation of the

50. *Id.* at 243 (citations omitted).
51. See Blair, *Neglected*, *supra* n. 1, at 56–57.
56. *Id.* at 327–52.
57. *Id.* at 328; see also *id.* at 352 (referring to the business trust as a “superior means” of obtaining corporate advantages as compared to the joint stock company).
58. *Id.* at 334.
firm on partner death, noting the court’s reasoning that parties sought to “imitate a corporation.” The joint stock company also solves Blair’s other criticisms of the partnership form. Because of its combination with the trust device, property can be placed in a separate entity and, therefore, is not subject to the partnership’s aggregate ownership features. Management power can be concentrated in trustees, who have powers comparable to those of corporate directors. Even Blair notes that joint stock companies “became increasingly sophisticated” between 1760 and 1810 in the U.S. and were a model for the earliest corporate laws.

Given the availability of the joint stock company, what is left of Blair’s argument that the corporate form was necessary to enable capital lock-in? She notes that joint stock companies were subject to partnership law except to the extent that they adopted corporate features. But “linkage” with existing forms may involve benefits as well as costs because of the valuable legal predictability that comes with the application of existing precedents. Even if there was English authority denying entity treatment, and even assuming that the Bubble Act denied transferability in England, there is no evidence that these problems crossed the ocean.

Finally, Blair supports her theory by attempting to refute the argument that it was limited liability rather than continuity that accounted for the rise of the corporation. This matters for Blair because she is less concerned with the corporation than with the lock-in feature of corporate law. As evidence that limited liability was not an important reason for incorporation, Blair quotes a joint stock company’s stated rationale for incorporating, noting that it emphasized continuity rather than limited liability. However, Blair also notes that these requests for incorporation were “controversial,” so it is understandable that this public document would underlay a potentially unpopular reason for incorporation.

On the other side, Warren argues:

[L]imitation or elimination of liability of the shareholders is not merely the chief single advantage of a business corporation but it is the advantage which in the estimation of legislatures and also in the estimation of the public is of more importance than all the other advantages put together. It is the main thing.

This makes sense in light of the above analysis. In contrast to lock-in and other corporate features, limited liability was the only feature that firms could not fully

60. Id. at 336 (citing Phillips, 137 Mass. at 515).
61. Id. at 338–40.
62. See Blair, Locking in Capital, supra n. 1, at 419.
63. See Blair, supra n. 44, at 419–20, 422.
65. See Blair, supra n. 1, at 422.
66. It is not clear that the act denied transferability. See Warren, supra n. 44, at 330–31 (discussing minimal enforcement of the Bubble Act and questions concerning whether it made transferable shares illegal).
67. See id. at 333 (noting that the Bubble Act was not commonly regarded as a feature of U.S. law, so transferable shares were clearly legal here).
68. See Blair, supra n. 1, at 420–21.
69. Id. at 420.
70. See Warren, supra n. 44, at 399.
duplicate by contract alone without statutory assistance.71 To be sure, limited liability alone might not have been particularly important to firms before enterprise liability and the demise of contractual privity rules at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century. But it could account for the rise and persistence of the corporate form when combined with the corporation's default continuity feature.

Blair, along with other commentators, 72 may have missed the availability of continuity through the partnership form by paying insufficient attention to the nuances of how business law can develop. To begin with, commentators often assume that law evolves in discrete statutory leaps, ignoring the development that occurs through contracts between statutory changes. This is analogous to assuming that all of evolution is in the fossil record. These authors have focused on the fact that continuity provisions were not adopted in formal U.S. statutes until the Uniform Partnership Act ("UPA") in 1914, and then further extended in the Revised Uniform Partnership Act ("RUPA") in 1994. But, the drafters of the original UPA sought only to clarify, and not radically alter, partnership law. That was the reason, bolstered by detailed case law support, drafter William Draper Lewis gave for adopting the "tenancy in partnership" in UPA.73 More recently, these features were well-recognized in Georgia prior to its adoption of UPA in 1985.74

Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman, and Richard Squire carry this under-appreciation of the entity features of partnership law beyond UPA and into the adoption of RUPA in the late twentieth century.75 They claim that RUPA increased partnership's continuity by, for example, barring a wrongfully dissociating partner from being bought out until completion of an agreed term or undertaking unless he could show that immediate buyout would not cause "undue hardship to the business."76 This would support their theory that stronger continuity had to await development of better valuation technology. But RUPA's changes cut both for and against continuity. For example, RUPA merely substituted a deferred payout of the wrongful partner77 for the

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71. See Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability and Theories of the Corporation, 50 Md. L. Rev. 80 (1991) (discussing importance of ability to contract to entity choice).
73. See William Draper Lewis, The Uniform Partnership Act—A Reply to Mr. Crane's Criticism, 29 Harv. L. Rev. 158, 172 (1915).
74. See Larry E. Ribstein, An Analysis of Georgia's New Partnership Law, 36 Mercer L. Rev. 443 (1985) (showing the relationship of the charging order to Georgia's pre-UPA law).
75. See Hansmann, Kraakman & Squire, supra n. 72, at 1391.
76. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
77. See RUPA § 701(h).
infrequently used UPA duty to post a bond to avoid immediate payment of an exiting partner’s interest.\textsuperscript{78} RUPA actually reduced continuity by eliminating the non-payment of goodwill that had discouraged departure under UPA.\textsuperscript{79} Also, RUPA, but not UPA, requires payment of goodwill to wrongfully dissolving partners,\textsuperscript{80} a move that actually reduces the firm’s continuity by requiring the members to come up with more cash for wrongfully departing members.

Blair and other commentators also make questionable assumptions about the importance of legal default rules. What corporate shareholders got by default, partners were able to get by agreement, including agreements restricting buyout of dissociating partners. The costs of making such agreements may have mattered for smaller firms whose costs of contracting around defaults are high per dollar of capitalization. But it is not clear why these costs would impede adoption by the larger firms that are the focus of Blair’s analysis.

Even if there is a persistent difference between the corporate and partnership forms regarding lock-in, the difference could be attributed to limited liability and not any inherent inability of the partnership form to accommodate lock-in. Indeed, Lewis indicated that he would have accepted the decision of his predecessor, UPA-drafter James Barr Ames, to apply forthright entity characterization were it not for what he believed was the inconsistency between entity treatment and personal liability of the members.\textsuperscript{81} This bolsters the argument that limited liability, and not lock-in, is the main corporate characteristic.\textsuperscript{82}

Thus, even in the nineteenth century, there was no inherent inconsistency between the partnership and corporate forms regarding continuity. Whether or not the differences between the standard forms are significant, there was at least no impediment to developing corporate-type continuity through a partnership-type form rather than turning to the corporation. Even if there is value to having distinct standard forms to serve distinct types of firms,\textsuperscript{83} these distinct forms could be offshoots of partnership, such as the joint stock company. The long history of the close corporation indicates that the corporate form was not specific to the large publicly held firm of Blair’s focus. The costs of moving to a brand new form like the corporation are not clearly lower than evolving variations on the partnership.\textsuperscript{84}

\textsuperscript{78} See UPA § 38(2)(b).
\textsuperscript{79} UPA § 38(2)(b); RUPA § 701.
\textsuperscript{80} Id.
\textsuperscript{81} See Lewis, supra n. 73, at 165–66.
\textsuperscript{82} Lewis’s concern was based on the highly conceptual distinction between “aggregates” and “entities” rather than on practical considerations. Id. The RUPA drafters opted for entity characterization seventy years later, as did several cases even under UPA, even with the owners’ personal liability. Even with personal liability, entity features arguably predominate over aggregate in the partnership. See Bromberg & Ribstein, supra n. 35, at § 1.03 (discussing cases concerning the aggregate-entity distinction). To be sure, personally liable members need to be able to sever their membership in the firm and, therefore, their liability for future debts. But they can do this without being given a right to pull their investments out of the firm.
\textsuperscript{83} See supra n. 2 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{84} See Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, Choice of Form and Network Externalities, 43 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 79 (2001) (discussing tradeoffs between these strategies).
Finally, Blair appears to concede all this when she states in a footnote that she does not want to debate whether lock-in might have developed outside the corporate form.\textsuperscript{85} This suggests that Blair is concerned only about the lock-in feature and not with particular business forms. But this concession is inconsistent with Blair’s emphasis on the special role of the corporate form.\textsuperscript{86} The importance of that claim is discussed in the next Part.

IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE HISTORICAL ACCOUNT

Blair’s account of corporate history is questionable economics and history. Strong continuity has costs as well as benefits. And even if lock-in is as important as Blair asserts to the history of business, the partnership, as well as the corporation, could have provided it. The explanation for the mix of forms we observe today lies in a much richer set of business, regulatory, and tax considerations than Blair’s simplistic lock-in story.\textsuperscript{87}

But why should Blair’s story and, therefore, the problems with the story matter? Plainly lock-in is an important feature of modern business. Even if lock-in might have developed in the partnership form, it would still have been important in that form. What difference does it make whether lock-in was responsible for the development and persistence of the corporation?

First, Blair’s story provides a defense of the corporate form. This is important because the contractually-based partnership is not well suited to Blair’s purpose. If lock-in is essential to maintaining the mediating hierarchy, it should not be subject to contractual variation. The corporation brings with it the concession theory—the theory that corporate power is derived from the state.\textsuperscript{88} This supports a presumption favoring legal restrictions on contracts,\textsuperscript{89} including contracts that could erode lock-in.

Second, Blair is concerned with defending lock-in against modern assaults and not simply with the development of the corporation. If lock-in is just another feature of the firm that evolved to meet business needs, it could just as easily fade into history. On the other hand, if lock-in is the essential core of the corporate form, as Blair suggests,\textsuperscript{90} it obviously cannot be dealt with so lightly. This weightiness of lock-in matters to Blair’s theory of the corporation because the power of her mediating hierarchy depends on this rigid foundation.

Blair argues that an important implication of the central role of lock-in is that we should not tinker with the corporation in a way that threatens this feature, as by significantly weakening managers’ ability to defend against takeovers.\textsuperscript{91} Blair supports this approach with a contractual argument: Given the contrast between the corporation

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{85} See Blair, Locking in Capital, supra n. 1, at 422 n. 128.
\item \textsuperscript{86} See Blair, History, supra n. 1.
\item \textsuperscript{87} See Ribstein, supra n. 3.
\item \textsuperscript{88} See Larry E. Ribstein, The Constitutional Conception of the Corporation, 4 S. Ct. Econ. Rev. 95 (1995).
\item \textsuperscript{90} See Blair, History, supra n. 1.
\item \textsuperscript{91} Id. at 32–42.
\end{itemize}
and the partnership regarding lock-in, the parties to the corporation necessarily have indicated a preference for lock-in by incorporating.\textsuperscript{92} Thus, Blair states:

If equity investors in corporations had wanted the same rights of control over corporate assets as partners in a partnership have over partnership assets, then they should have invested in partnership-type organizations rather than in corporations.\textsuperscript{93}

Even if Blair were right about the significance of lock-in in the corporate form, she would be wrong about the implications. To be sure, investors' ability to choose among partnership and corporate forms may be valuable for investors because it enables them to escape the form of capital lock-in that currently exists in the corporate form.\textsuperscript{94} Moreover, the ability to escape through choice of form arguably supports the existence of alternative rules. However, contrary to Blair's argument, the availability of choice of form does not support any particular menu of choices. More importantly, the fact that parties can choose among different forms does not mean that particular rules in a given form should be mandatory.

If lock-in does not account for the rise of the corporation, what does? In other words, if lock-in could just as easily have been accommodated within the partnership form, why did corporations become so important? Limited liability is, at least, part of the answer.\textsuperscript{95} Capital lock-in also played a role but not, as Blair supposes, because it is inherent in and essential to the corporation. Rather, lock-in was backed by politically influential corporate managers because of its role in underpinning managers' power. Empowering owners to cash out of the firm would have the significant effect of loosening managers' control over the corporate cash. Thus, lock-in matters not as a business necessity but as a regulatory objective. Corporate managers have reason to like the control over corporate cash that lock-in enables. They would, accordingly, favor laws that maintain this control, including laws associated with the corporate form. For example, the corporate tax has the effect of reducing owners' incentives to insist on a right to distributions.\textsuperscript{96}

Although Blair purports to embrace choice of form,\textsuperscript{97} her theory implies that firms should be compelled to accept capital lock-in. If lock-in is as important as Blair suggests, it follows that courts and regulators should suspect contracts and business associations that purport to reject it. Legal pressures toward lock-in will become more significant as the business and political stories diverge. Business considerations

\textsuperscript{92} Id. at 19–26.

\textsuperscript{93} Id. at 38.

\textsuperscript{94} See Ribstein, supra n. 29; Ribstein, supra n. 26. Blair oddly disputes this argument on the basis that "passive investors in limited partnerships may have even less ability to withdraw their contribution or influence management to make distributions than shareholders have, especially if the limited partnership shares are publicly traded." Blair, History, supra n. 1, at 38 n. 142. This seems to suggest that limited partners are more like corporate shareholders than actual corporate shareholders are, thereby undercutting Blair's claim that lock-in is an essential difference between the forms.

\textsuperscript{95} See Ribstein, supra n. 88 (showing how the corporate entity provided the conceptual basis for limited liability).

\textsuperscript{96} See Steven A. Bank, A Capital Lock-in Theory of the Corporate Income Tax, 94 Geo. L. J. 889 (2006); Ribstein, supra n. 29.

\textsuperscript{97} See supra n. 92 and accompanying text.
increasingly favor a different sort of firm—one that relies on contracts and markets rather than ownership of far-flung assets.98 As Douglas Baird has observed: “No longer are the entities providing the goods or services long-lived, atomistic firms with a readily identifiable governance structure.”99 Thus, rules that favor the traditional corporate entity can be expected to get increasingly out of step with business reality.

V. CONCLUDING REMARKS

Blair theorizes that capital lock-in is both the essential nature of the corporation and the reason why corporations dominate the business landscape today. This confers stature on capital lock-in that it does not deserve, given the varying costs and benefits of lock-in depending on the particular context and firm. Moreover, lock-in has never been unique to the corporate form and did not make the rise of the corporation inevitable. Thus, the lock-in feature should not be frozen in place by this dubious historical account. Rather, the business forms should be free to evolve to meet changing business needs.

98. See Ribstein, supra n. 26.
99. See Baird, supra n. 19, at 14.