Section 522(f): A Proposal for the Survival of Purchase Money Security Interests Following Refinancing

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NOTES AND COMMENTS

SECTION 522(f): A PROPOSAL FOR THE
SURVIVAL OF PURCHASE MONEY
SECURITY INTERESTS FOLLOWING
REFINANCING

I. INTRODUCTION

Refinancing is an everyday occurrence that can dramatically affect the treatment of consumer debt in bankruptcy proceedings. Traditionally, courts have held that refinancing transforms a purchase money security interest into a nonpurchase money security interest. 2

1. Refinancing arises when a sequence of loans is made by a vendor or lender to a buyer. When the creditor takes a security interest in the property of the debtor to secure the first loan, a total repayment amount and a time frame for repayment are fixed. Two broad types of refinancing arrangements exist. The first type consists of “add-on” or future advances contracts which secure several items under a single, ongoing instrument. In re Conn, 16 Bankr. 454, 459 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982). The second type is primarily “consolidation loans, which involve two or more separate loan instruments.” Id. In consolidation loans, three events occur: (1) the time for repayment of the initial debt is extended, (2) the balance due on the initial debt is consolidated or carried forward to be included with a new loan of money; this new loan can vary from the first in either the total repayment amount, the property encumbered by the creditor’s security interest, or both, and (3) the initial debt is marked “paid by renewal,” at which time it is considered refinanced. See, e.g., Averhoff v. Peoples Fin. Co. (In re Averhoff), 18 Bankr. 198 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1982) (nonpurchase money loan, then purchase money loan, with new collateral taken and new debt issued); In re Conn, 16 Bankr. 454 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982) (purchase money loan, then nonpurchase money loan, with new debt issued and new collateral taken); In re Haus, 33 U.C.C. REP. SERV. (CALLAGHAN) 695 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1982) (a charge-all or add-on clause in a seller’s contract, which allows the seller to retain a purchase money security interest in merchandise until total indebtedness corresponding to merchandise is paid in full, allows a series of purchase money loans with new debt issued and new collateral taken); Credithrift of Amer. v. Littlejohn (In re Littlejohn), 20 Bankr. 695 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982) (original purchase money loan refinanced to extend time for repayment; no new collateral taken but new debt issued); In re Jones, 5 Bankr. 655 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1980) (future advance clause in seller’s contract whereby collateral served to secure any future advance made; new debt issued and new collateral taken). See generally, McLaughlin, “Add-On” Clauses in Equipment Purchase Money Financing: Too Much of a Good Thing, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 661 (1981) (thorough analysis of three general circumstances in which purchase money financing can occur); B. CLARK, THE LAW OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 12.2, at 12-8 to -10 (1980) (discussing development of case law; arguing that under U.C.C. § 9-107(a)(1978) language, a vendor can retain security interest to secure debt arising out of past or future purchases); Donaldson, An Analysis of Retail Sales Legislation, 19 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 135, 148 (1947) (discussing add-on clauses as method of obtaining additional security in installment sales contracts).

2. See Roberts Furniture Co. v. Pierce (In re Manuel), 507 F.2d 990 (5th Cir. 1975); In re
The recharacterization of a purchase money security interest\(^3\) into a nonpurchase money security interest\(^4\) allows a debtor in bankruptcy to avoid creditors' claims in certain household goods.\(^5\)

This approach, however, has recently been rejected by an increasing number of courts which hold that a security interest retains its purchase money character following refinancing.\(^6\) This approach pre-

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\(^3\) The requirements for a purchase money security interest are delineated in U.C.C. § 9-107 (1978). See generally B. CLARK, supra note 1, ¶ 3.9[2], at 3-55 to -57, ¶ 2.7[1]-[2], at 2-18 to -21 (discussing purchase money security interests); CREDIT MANUAL OF COMMERCIAL LAWS (L. Nelson ed. 1981) (discussing purchase money security interests); 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 29.2, at 779-84 (1965) (discussion of purchase money security interests); W. DAVENPORT & D. MURRAY, SECURED TRANSACTIONS § 2.05, at 32-34 (1978) (discussing purchase money security interests).

\(^4\) Nonpurchase money security interest is not defined in the U.C.C. or the Bankruptcy Code. However, since this is the opposite of purchase money security interest, the term appears to exclude those transactions which secure an obligation that finances the acquisition of the collateral, whether taken by a vendor or lender.


> Notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions, the debtor may avoid the fixing of a lien on an interest of the debtor in property to the extent that such lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled under subsection (b) of this section, if such lien is—

\(\ldots\)

\((2)\) a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest in any—

(A) household furnishings, household goods, wearing apparel, appliances, books, animals, crops, musical instruments, or jewelry that are held primarily for the personal, family or household use of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor.

vents the debtor from avoiding the creditor’s purchase money security interest pursuant to section 522(f)(2)(A)\textsuperscript{7} of the Bankruptcy Code and leaves the creditor with a stake in the debtor’s bankrupt estate.\textsuperscript{8}

The original transaction is made when credit is extended by a vendor\textsuperscript{9} or a loan is made by a lender\textsuperscript{10} to the debtor to enable the purchase of household goods. To insure repayment, both vendors and lenders take purchase money security interests in the goods purchased. These purchase money loans can be refinanced in three ways:\textsuperscript{11} when the original collateral secures additional debt or credit,\textsuperscript{12} when additional collateral\textsuperscript{13} is secured,\textsuperscript{14} or when additional debt and collateral, or credit and collateral, are taken.\textsuperscript{15}

This Comment examines the characterization of refinanced purchase money security interests in household goods. First, pertinent sections of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) and the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (Bankruptcy Code)\textsuperscript{16} are examined. Next, a historical development of the characterization of purchase money security interests following refinancing is summarized, followed by analysis of the policies behind section 522(f)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code and section 9-107 of the U.C.C. Finally, this Comment suggests that the correct view is the more recent one that a purchase money security interest in household goods retains its purchase money character following refinancing.


\textsuperscript{8} Id. § 541 provides that the bankruptcy estate is created upon the filing of the debtor's bankruptcy petition. If a debtor defaults, four identifiable classes compete for the collateral: (1) unsecured creditors, (2) purchasers, (3) secured creditors, and (4) the debtor's trustee.

\textsuperscript{12} U.C.C. § 9-107(a)(1978) (applies to sales on credit).

\textsuperscript{13} See McLaughlin, supra note 1, at 663.


\textsuperscript{15} U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(c) (1978) defines collateral as the property encumbered by the security interest.


\textsuperscript{17} See Roberts Furniture Co. v. Pierce (In re Manuel), 507 F.2d 990 (5th Cir. 1975).
II. THE BACKGROUND OF THE CONTROVERSY

Prior to the adoption of the U.C.C., and its provision for purchase money security interests, conditional sales and chattel mortgages existed. A conditional sale was used when a vendor, desiring to insure payment of an installment sales price, retained title in the goods until full repayment. A chattel mortgage was used by a lender who took a security interest in the goods purchased with the proceeds of the loan. Conditional sales and chattel mortgages were replaced by the U.C.C. provisions for purchase money security interests, which are created by satisfying one of the two-pronged definitional requirements of section 9-107. These two prongs specify different requirements for

19. Conditional sales, in which title is reserved in the vendor until the purchase price has been paid in full, were desirable at common law because the vendor retained the title without the necessity of filing a lien. See, e.g., First State Bank v. Harter, 30 Ill. App. 2d, 22 N.E.2d 393 (1939). See generally H. Bailey, Secured Transactions in a Nutshell 46-47 (1976) (discussing general characteristics of conditional sale); W. Davenport & D. Murray, supra note 3, § 2.05, at 32 n.96 (conditional sale contract was pre-U.C.C. security device used by sellers).
20. A general assumption was that “the only obligation which could be secured was the purchase price of the goods plus expenses connected with, or incidental to, the sale or the financing transaction.” 1 G. Gilmore, supra note 18, at 71.
21. See generally W. Davenport & D. Murray, supra note 3, § 2.05, at 32 n.95 (chattel mortgage was pre-U.C.C. security device). Two cases illustrating this position are Lonoke Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Bohannon, 379 S.W.2d 17 (Ark. 1964), and Western United Dairy Co. v. Continental Mortgage Co., 28 Ill. App. 2d 132, 170 N.E.2d 650 (1960).
22. See generally E. Reiley, supra note 18, § 1.2(b), at 1-9 to -10 (discussing chattel mortgages).
23. U.C.C. § 9-102(2) (1978) states that Article Nine “applies to security interests created by contract including pledge, assignment, chattel mortgage . . . conditional sale . . . intended as security.” Comment 1 to U.C.C. § 9-102 states, “The Article does not . . . abolish existing security devices.” However, “even though [they are] used, the rules of [Article Nine] govern.” These pre-Code devices are preserved by U.C.C. § 9-105(f) (1978) which broadly defines a security agreement as “an agreement which creates or provides for a security interest.” Some of the concepts behind conditional sales and chattel mortgages have been retained in the U.C.C.’s purchase money security interest; for example, U.C.C. § 9-302(2) (1978) permits perfection of a purchase money security interest in consumer goods without filing.
24. U.C.C. § 9-107 (1978) provides:

A security interest is a “purchase money security interest” to the extent that it is (a) taken or retained by the seller of the collateral to secure all or part of its price; or (b) taken by a person who by making advances or incurring an obligation gives value to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of collateral if such value is in fact so used.
vendors and lenders.

Under the U.C.C., a purchase money security interest arises in favor of a vendor or his assignee upon a sale of goods on credit. A vendor's security interest will be characterized as purchase money "to the extent that it is [1] taken or retained by the seller of the collateral [2] to secure all or part of the price." This language limits the purchase money character of the vendor's security interest to all or part of the price of the collateral.

A purchase money security interest also arises when proceeds of a loan are subsequently used by the borrower to purchase goods. A lender's purchase money security interest will be a purchase money security interest "to the extent that [1] taken by a person who by making advances or incurring an obligation gives value [2] to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of the collateral [3] if such value is in fact so used.

To preserve the purchase money character of a security interest, the lender must insure that the loan enables the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of the collateral. Comment two to section 9-107 points out that if a purchase money security interest is claimed by a lender, the language excludes security interests taken in satisfaction of, or as security for, a pre-existing claim or an antecedent debt. Although the

To create a security interest under Article Nine, the debtor must have rights in the collateral, there must be a security agreement, and value must be given. U.C.C. § 9-203 (1978).

25. Id. § 9-107(a).
26. Id. § 9-107(b).
27. Id. § 9-107.
28. The continuity of a purchase money security interest is assumed after assignment. See, e.g., In re King-Porter Co., 446 F.2d 722, 726 n.4 (5th Cir. 1971).
29. U.C.C. § 9-107(a) (emphasis added).
30. Id. § 9-107(b) (emphasis added).
32. U.C.C. § 9-107 comment two (1978) provides:

When a purchase money security interest is claimed by a secured party who is not a seller, he must of course have given present consideration. . . . [T]he purchase money party must be one who gives value "by making advances or incurring obligation": [this] language excludes from the purchase money category any security interest taken as security for or in satisfaction of a pre-existing claim or antecedent debt.

33. See, e.g., In re Culp, 18 Bankr. 621 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1982) (security interest in refrigerator granted to creditor in return for loan proceeds, which debtor used to pay balance owed to seller of appliances, was not purchase money security interest because refrigerator was in debtor's possession prior to the loan transaction); In re Dameron, 5 Bankr. 357 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1980) (take-
U.C.C. does not define "antecedent debt," section 9-107(b) and its comments indicate that a security interest will not be in satisfaction of an antecedent debt if the loan and purchase of the collateral are closely related.\textsuperscript{34} In addition, the collateral must be purchased with the funds advanced; i.e., there must be an actual sale in which the borrower acquires new goods with the funds.\textsuperscript{35}

To determine if a purchase money security interest retains its purchase money character after refinancing, one must look to the law of the state in which the security interest is created.\textsuperscript{36} Once the security interest is characterized as either purchase money or nonpurchase money under state law, federal bankruptcy law determines if the security interest can be enforced.\textsuperscript{37}

\footnotesize{34. 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 3, § 29.2, at 782. Professor Gilmore comments:

No doubt the language of paragraph (b) [of § 9-107] assumes the sequence of loan first and acquisition second or assumes that the loan and acquisition take place simultaneously. Suppose, however, that debtor acquires goods on Monday (on unsecured credit from his seller) and secured party advances the price on Tuesday. Let us assume that there is no question about the money being "in fact so used"; the question would be whether a loan made after acquisition could be fairly described as one made "to enable" the acquisition. Or, to make the case harder, assume that the buyer pays the price (or writes a check) on Monday and borrows that amount from the second party on Tuesday. Now there is trouble both on the "to enable" side and on the "in fact so used" side. Nevertheless, it is suggested that in both the hypothetical cases just put a court could reasonably find that the secured party had acquired a purchase-money interest. If the loan transaction appears to be closely allied to the purchase transaction, that should suffice. The evident intent of paragraph (b) is to free the purchase-money concept from artificial limitations; rigid adherence to particular formalities and sequences should not be required.

\textit{Id.} (footnote omitted).

35. \textit{Id.} at 783. Professor Gilmore states that U.C.C. § 9-107 is restricted to property acquired by the debtor with the purchase money loan.

36. \textit{See In re Manuel, 507 F.2d 990, 992-93 (5th Cir. 1975) (state law applies in bankruptcy court to allocate priorities among creditors); In re Conn, 16 Bankr. 454 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982). The Conn court found that "the precondition [to a § 522(f)(2)(A)] lien avoidance, nonpurchase money status, derives from state statute. State courts, however, have seldom addressed the issue." \textit{Id.} at 456. The Conn opinion stated that the "single state court addressing the issue . . . in a single paragraph, citing no authority, found that a second financing that did not supply additional funds to the debtor did not extinguish a purchase money security interest." \textit{Id.} n.4 (citations omitted); \textit{see also In re Culp, 18 Bankr. 621 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1982) (character of security interest in household goods determined by state U.C.C. law); In re Manuel, 18 Bankr. 403, 405 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1981) (court looked to state U.C.C. law to determine if creditor had purchase money or nonpurchase money security interest in household goods).

37. \textit{See Lewis v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank of Detroit, 364 U.S. 603 (1960) (state law determines priority of creditors' claims, then federal bankruptcy law applies to enable trustee to avoid certain security interest claims); In re Conn, 16 Bankr. 454 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982) (under state U.C.C. law, purchase money security interest retained its purchase money character following refinancing, then the debtor avoided the security interest by federal bankruptcy law); Booker v. Commercial Credit Corp. (\textit{In re} Booker), 9 Bankr. 710 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1981) (under state}
III. SECTION 522(f)(2)(A) OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE

The Bankruptcy Code has two key objectives. As a creditor's remedy, the act marshalls the debtor's assets and provides a mechanism for distribution of the debtor's estate to creditors. As a debtor's remedy, it provides the debtor with a "fresh start" in his economic affairs by discharging his debts. Historically, bankruptcy law exempted certain debtor property from attachment by creditors. Under section six of the Bankruptcy Act of 1889, exemptions were determined by state law. Recognizing the unsatisfactory results of this diverse system of exemptions, which had become disparate and antiquated, Congress prescribed a uniform set of federal exemptions by enacting section 522 (b) and (d) of the Bankruptcy Code. The report from the House Committee on the Judiciary describes the reasons behind these sections.

Most [state exemption laws] are outmoded, designed for more rural times, and hopelessly inadequate to serve the needs of and provide a fresh start for modern urban debtors. The historical purpose of these exemption laws has been to protect a debtor from his creditors, to provide him with the basic necessities of life so that even if his creditors levy on all of his non-exempt property, the debtor will not be left destitute and a

U.C.C. law, creditor had nonpurchase money security interest which was avoided by application of federal bankruptcy law).

38. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 provides that Congress has the power to establish uniform laws "on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States." The Supreme Court has held that, "The subject of bankruptcies includes the power to discharge the debtor from his contracts and legal liabilities, as well as to distribute his property." Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 188 (1902).

39. The Bankruptcy Code does not use the term "bankrupt" but instead uses the term "debtor" to mean the person or municipality for whom bankruptcy relief is at issue. 11 U.S.C. § 101(12) (Supp. IV 1980). The use of "debtor" was felt to carry less of a stigma. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 310 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6267.

40. Debtors have historically been given a fresh start.

One of the primary purposes of the bankruptcy act is to "relieve the honest debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness and permit him to start afresh free from the obligations and responsibilities consequent upon business misfortunes" . . . [The debtor should be provided a fresh start with] a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt.

Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).

41. See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 522.01, at 522-7 to -9 (15th ed. 1981) (citations omitted).


43. Exemptions are defined as "a right given by law to a debtor to retain a portion of his personal property free from seizure and sale by his creditors under judicial process." 31 AM. JUR. 2d Exemptions ¶ 1, at 329 (1967) (citations omitted).

44. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b), (d) (Supp. IV 1980).
public charge. The purpose has not changed, but neither have the level of exemptions in many States. Thus, the purpose has largely been defeated.\footnote{At the same time, Congress recognized that “circumstances do vary in different parts of the country”\footnote{Id.} and allowed debtors to elect between state exemptions or federal exemptions. Under section 522(b),\footnote{11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A) (Supp. IV 1980).} the debtor can elect exemptions allowed under the law of the state of his domicile,\footnote{State bankruptcy laws range from liberal to conservative in their exemptions. See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 522.22, at 522-60 (15th ed. 1981); 31 AM. JUR. 2d Exemptions § 37, at 361 (1967).} and non-bankruptcy federal law,\footnote{See 1 BANKR. SERV. (L. ED.) §§ 4-99, 4-100 (1979). Some items that may be exempted under federal non-bankruptcy law are civil service retirement benefits, social security payments, and veterans’ benefits.} or he may take advantage of the more liberal uniform federal exemptions;\footnote{Id. § 522(d).} the debtor, however, is not permitted to combine state and federal exemptions.\footnote{3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 522.02, at 522-22 (15th ed. 1981) (citations omitted).}

Although federal bankruptcy law is supreme,\footnote{When Congress exercises the bankruptcy power, it is “unlimited and supreme.” Sturges v. Crowinshield, 14 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 192 (1819).} a state may “opt out” of the federal exemptions.\footnote{Under 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1980), a state may proscribe the availability of § 522(d) (Supp. IV 1980) federal exemptions.} If a state opts out, however, the debtor retains certain exemptions.\footnote{3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 522.29, at 522-68 to -69 (15th ed. 1981) (citations omitted); see, e.g., Pickard, The New Bankruptcy Code, Part II: The Interests of Secured Creditors Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 10 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 215, 224-29 (1980) (section 522(f) is an example of an exemption the debtor retains when a state opts out).}
Section 522(f) allows the debtor to avoid certain security interests which would otherwise impair his exemptions. The debtor can avoid security interests to the extent that they impair the exemptions he would have been entitled to under section 522(b). Specifically, section 522(f)(2)(A) allows a consumer-debtor to avoid a nonpurchase money nonpossessory lien on otherwise exempt household goods and personal items. This lien avoidance provision preserves the exemptions provided by section 522(b) against certain creditor interests in consumer goods. The legislative history indicates that the purpose of this section is to protect the unsuspecting consumer-debtor from over-reaching by creditors.


58. Section 522(f)(2)(A) provides that a debtor can avoid a security interest in any household furnishings, household goods, and appliances held primarily for personal, family, or household use.


60. Specifically, the legislative history states,

Frequently, creditors lending money to a consumer debtor take a security interest in all of the debtor's belongings, and obtain a waiver by the debtor of his exemptions. In most of these cases, the debtor is unaware of the consequences of the form he signs . . .

The exemption provision allows the debtor, after bankruptcy has been filed, . . . to undo the consequences of a contract of adhesion, signed in ignorance, by permitting the invalidation of nonpurchase money security interests in household goods. Such security interests have too often been used by over-reaching creditors. The bill eliminates any unfair advantage creditors have.

Section 522(f) comports with the exemption scheme provided in section 522(b) for a debtor's "fresh start." Only if the creditor shows that his right to reclaim is based on a purchase money security interest will he prevail over the debtor's exemption claim. Without the ability to avoid certain encumbrances on exempt property, the debtor would be denied a fresh start. A Tennessee federal court found that section 522(f)(2)(A) was enacted by Congress to allow consumer debtors to avoid nonpurchase money security interests taken by creditors in household goods owned and used by debtors. The court emphasized that section 522(f)(2)(A) was not enacted to avoid security interests in collateral purchased with advanced money. The court also found that one policy behind avoidance of nonpurchase money security interests in consumer goods is to release the debtor's property from worthless security interests.

IV. JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT

A. Judicial Treatment Prior to the Bankruptcy Code

Prior to the Bankruptcy Code, the significance of the characterization of purchase money security interests in consumer goods and farm equipment, following refinancing, depended solely on whether filing was required for perfection. The majority of pre-Bankruptcy Code cases denied purchase money status to refinanced purchase money security interests and required filing for perfection.

63. Id.
64. Id.
68. One consequence of the purchase money loan being transformed by refinancing was subordination of the creditor's security interest, unperfected for lack of filing, to the interest of the bankruptcy trustee. If the loan was not a purchase money loan in consumer goods, it could not perfect automatically under U.C.C. § 9-302(1)(d) (1978). Filing by the creditor was thus required to maintain purchase money status.
The pivotal case interpreting U.C.C. section 9-107 and comment two in relation to the issue of purchase money survival is *In re Simpson*, decided shortly after the enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code. In *Simpson*, the vendor attempted to create a purchase money security interest by executing a security agreement containing a future advance clause. Upon the debtor's bankruptcy, the court denied the lender's claim to priority, finding that the future advance clause precluded the lender from having a purchase money security interest. The court noted that when a security agreement contains a future advance clause, the agreement can remain in effect even after the purchase price of the original collateral has been fully paid. Finding no distinction between the prohibition in comment two against a purchase money security interest taken as security for an antecedent debt and one taken for a future advance, the *Simpson* court resolved the issue by stating that "the obligation in a purchase money security interest must be in the purchase price alone." Although this statement was dictum, subsequent courts have followed it. A case in point is *In re Manuel*, in which a vendor made two sales under a

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71. The vendor initially characterized his security interest as purchase money and relied on U.C.C. § 9-302(1)(c) to automatically perfect his security interest in farm equipment, but the court held that the security interest was not a purchase money security interest and therefore the automatic perfection provisions of this section did not apply. The basis for the court's finding that the security interest was of a nonpurchase money character stems from the fact that the collateral secured a debt greater than its price. 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 247.

72. 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 246. The security agreement stated that the security interest in the farm equipment secured not only the payment of the purchase price, but also "any future indebtedness not to exceed the sum of $1,200,000." *Id.*

73. Before the debtor filed for bankruptcy, the seller assigned his purchase money security interest to a lender. *Id.* See *supra* note 28.


75. 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 247.

76. The *Simpson* court denied automatic perfection under U.C.C. § 9-302(1)(c), but ultimately held that a purchase money security interest existed because the lender perfected by taking possession of the secured collateral. 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 247.

77. See *supra* note 2.

78. 507 F.2d 990 (5th Cir. 1975).
"charge-all" agreement. In the first sale, the vendor took a purchase money security interest in household furniture; in the second sale, the vendor took a purchase money security interest in a television set and household furniture from the previous sale. After the buyer filed for bankruptcy, the court resolved the priority claims of the creditors by utilizing the Simpson rationale that a purchase money security interest is limited to the purchase price of the collateral.80

Another basis for the court's decision in In re Manuel was the presence of the charge-all clause. The court focused on the fact that the security agreement failed to indicate the order in which payments were to be applied in paying off the purchases. Because the vendor's purchase money security interest had a likelihood of being greater than the price of the collateral, the court held that the automatic perfection provision did not apply and that the vendor lacked a perfected security interest.81 Other courts have applied this reasoning in the charge-all context.82

In situations where it is possible to determine the extent of purchase money status, several courts have rejected the Simpson rationale. The court in In re Brouse83 held that purchases made after the effective date of Michigan's Retail Installment Act84 retained their

79. A "charge-all" agreement ensures that title to all goods purchased by the debtor does not pass to him until all the outstanding indebtedness has been paid to the creditor. "[A charge-all agreement ensures that] title to nothing passed until title to all passed." Id. at 992; cf. Kawasho Internat'l (U.S.A.), Inc. v. Alper (In re Mid-Atlantic Flange Co.), 26 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 203, 204 (E.D. Pa. 1979).

80. The court noted, A plain reading of the statutory requirements would indicate that they require a security interest to be in the item purchased, and that . . . purchase money security interest[s] cannot exceed the price of what is purchased in the transaction wherein the security interest is created, if the vendor is to be protected . . .

507 F.2d at 993. Courts have referred to this as a situation in which the "debt secures more than its price."

81. Id.

82. See, e.g., In re Jackson, 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1152 (W.D. Mo. 1971) (charge-all agreement was held unconscionable and enforcement denied).

83. 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 471 (W.D. Mich. 1969). The debtor made a series of purchases ("string purchases"). Among the first items purchased was a stereo and one of the last items purchased was a cupboard. The court held that since the stereo acted as security not only for its purchase price, but also for future indebtedness, the seller did not have a purchase money security interest. However, the cupboard, purchased after the enactment of the Retail Installment Act, retained its purchase money character because the Act provided a method for allocation of the debt. Id. at 474-76.

84. MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 445.851-872 (1970). The Act provided, When subsequent purchases are made, if the seller has retained title or taken a lien or other security interest in any of the goods purchased under any 1 of the contracts included in the consolidation, the entire amount of all payments made prior to such subsequent purchases shall be deemed to have been applied to the unpaid time balances of the

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purchase money character. The court reasoned that since the pro rata allocation provisions\(^{85}\) of that Act were part of the security agreement, the extent to which payments were applied to prior purchase money security interests could be determined.\(^{86}\) Applying the same rationale, the court in \textit{In re Staley}\(^{87}\) held that purchase money status was not lost following refinancing. In \textit{Staley}, after purchasing a stereo, the debtor bought a freezer under the same security agreement, which provided a method for apportionment of payments.\(^{88}\) The court reasoned that because a method was provided to determine when the security interest in each item of collateral terminated by full payment, the collateral secured its price.\(^{89}\) The same rationale was applied in \textit{In re Mid-Atlantic Flange Co.}\(^{90}\) which concerned a charge-all clause in a commercial context. The court implied that the first-in-first-out method of payment could be employed to determine the extent of purchase money status.\(^{91}\) The court also stated “we cannot conclude that the presence of the ‘add-on’ clause [charge-all clause] alone can prevent the security interest in question from being ‘taken or retained by the seller of the collateral to secure all or part of its price.’”\(^{92}\)

Courts have disregarded the \textit{Simpson} rule in other situations. In \textit{Index Store Fixture Co. v. Farmers' Trust Co.},\(^{93}\) the court advanced a

\begin{itemize}
  \item previous purchases; and each payment after the subsequent purchase made on the consolidated contract shall be deemed to have been allocated to all of the various purchases in the same ratio as the original cash sale prices of the various purchases bear to the total of all. Where the amount of each installment payment is increased in connection with subsequent purchases, at the seller's option, the subsequent payments may be deemed to be allocated as follows: an amount equal to the original periodic payment to the previous purchase, the balance to the subsequent purchase. However, the amount of any down payment on the subsequent purchase shall be allocated in its entirety to the subsequent purchase. The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to cases where such previous and subsequent purchases involve equipment, parts or other goods attached or affixed goods previously purchased and not fully paid, or to services in connection therewith rendered by the seller at the buyer's request.
  \item \textit{Id.} \S 445.861(c). The effective date of the Act was Mar. 10, 1967.
  \item \textit{Id.} at 438.
  \item \textit{Id.} at 208-09.
  \item \textit{Id.} at 208 (citation omitted). The court left open the issue of whether the actual extension of credit under the charge-all agreement would totally prohibit the characterization of the security interest as a purchase money security interest or whether this would merely limit the purchase money character of the security interest to the portion taken to secure the purchase price of the collateral. \textit{Id.}
\end{itemize}
renewal argument. There the vendor, after taking a purchase money security interest in new collateral, sold additional equipment to the buyer and executed a new purchase money security interest, which included the balance due from the original note. The court found that the addition of the balance due to the new purchase money agreement did not realistically change the character of the transaction; therefore, the subsequent "new" note did not extinguish the prior security interest. Similarly, when renewal notes were executed and additional collateral given, or additional credit or cash advances made, the court in Bank of Austin v. Barnett held that "the giving of a new note for a debt evidenced by a former note does not extinguish the original indebtedness unless such is the intention of the parties."

B. Judicial Treatment Under the Bankruptcy Code

Under the Bankruptcy Code, the importance of purchase money status has increased because section 522(f)(2)(A) gives the debtor power to avoid nonpurchase money nonpossessory security interests in household goods. Therefore, if the creditor's purchase money security interest in such goods is transformed into a nonpurchase money security interest following refinancing, the debtor can avoid the creditor's security interest.

Post-Bankruptcy Act cases continued to rely on the Simpson rationale that a purchase money security agreement is transformed into a nonpurchase money security agreement after refinancing when the collateral secures a debt other than the purchase price of the collateral. In one case, the vendor executed a purchase money security agreement with a future advance clause, but upon each refinancing, an additional sum of money was advanced to the debtor and the prior loan stamped "paid by renewal." The court ruled that the presence of the future

94. Id. at 291.
96. 549 S.W.2d at 430 (citing Schwab v. Schlumberger Well Surveying Corp., 145 Tex. 379, 198 S.W.2d 79 (1946)).
97. See supra note 65.
98. The debtor has the power to avoid nonpurchase money security interests in household goods to the extent that such a security interest impairs the § 522(b) exemption.
100. The initial purchase money security interest was refinanced several times in order to cure delinquency and bring the account current. Refinancing which cures a delinquency has been termed "flipped." See In re Ellis, 1 BANKR. CR. DEC. (CRR) 798, 800 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1975). Each refinancing note contained variations from the prior note in amounts financed, payment amounts, finance rates, and total number of payments.
advance clause extinguished the purchase money character. The court quoted the policy argument of Simpson.

One of the purposes of the Code is to “simplify, clarify, and modernize the law governing commercial transactions.” One of the few exceptions to the requirement that notice by filing be a prerequisite to perfection of a security agreement is the purchase money security interest under certain conditions. If a vendor or lender desires to take advantage of this non-filing requirement, the burden should be on him to prepare a simple instrument which shall be a pure purchase money security agreement without attempting to burden it with complicated and ambiguous impedimenta. Much of the litigation which filled our courts under pre-code law was due to the effort of adroit drafters to determine how far they could go in concocting instruments that would give maximum rights to vendors and lenders while still qualifying as conditional sales contracts and thus avoiding the necessity of filing. It is to be hoped that such antics will not occur under the Code. 101

Almost as an afterthought, the court relied on U.C.C. section 9-107(b) and comment two to make an alternative argument for the loss of purchase money status.

It is unnecessary . . . to hold that the future advance clause destroys the purchase money character of the security interest since the refinancing alone extinguishes the purchase money character . . . [N]either the cash advances nor the renewal note enabled the Debtor to acquire rights in the collateral. The purpose of the renewal note was to payoff the original note, an antecedent debt. The purchase money character of the security interest was extinguished when the proceeds from the first renewal note were used to satisfy the original note.

. . .

. . . Therefore, the security interest held under the renewal note is nonpurchase money . . . and is avoidable under 11 U.S.C. § 522(f). 102

The antecedent debt argument for transformation of purchase money security interests following refinancing was extended to lenders

101. 5 Bankr. at 657 (citing In re Simpson, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 248 (citations omitted)).
in *In re Mulcahy*.

The court noted that there was no justification for applying a different rule to lenders as opposed to sellers as either situation creates the same problem, an "inability to determine when any one item is paid off and freed of the security agreement."  

*In re Coomer,* however, rejected the Simpson rationale on two bases. First, U.C.C. section 9-107 does not require transformation of a purchase money security interest upon refinancing. The court interpreted the "to the extent that" language of section 9-107 as creating a security interest which is characterized as purchase money to the extent that the security interest meets the requirements of section 9-107. The court found that section 9-107 allows a security interest to have two parts: a purchase money part to the extent that it is secured by collateral and a nonpurchase money part.

Second, the court looked to the practical effects of transformation following refinancing. If purchase money status in household goods was lost following refinancing, the debtor would keep exempt property

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104. *Id.* at 457. The court noted that U.C.C. § 9-107 (1978) comment 2 may be more properly applicable to a lender than to a seller. *Id.* (citing Kawasho Int'1 (U.S.A.), Inc. v. Alper (*In re Mid-Atlantic Flange Co.*), 26 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 203 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1979).


106. *Cf. In re Slay*, 8 Bankr. 355 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1980), a companion case to Coomer, holding that when a purchase money and nonpurchase money loan were consolidated and no subsequent payments made, then regardless of whether contractual or statutory apportionment methods were present, a purchase money security interest existed. Since no payments were made after the consolidation, the court could determine the extent of purchase money and nonpurchase money debt. *Id.* at 358. *Contra* Rosen v. Associates Fin. Serv. Co. (*In re Rosen*), 18 Bankr. 723 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1981), *aff'd on rehearing*, 17 Bankr. 436, 438 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1982) ("Regardless of whether the purchase money and nonpurchase money facets of the second loan can be disentangled, 'the refinancing alone extinguishes the purchase money character of the security interest.' ") (citing *In re Jones*, 5 Bankr. 655, 657 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1980)).

107. 8 Bankr. at 354. The court reviewed the purpose of § 522(f)(2).

The Commission took the view that non-purchase-money security interests in household goods generally have no value to the creditor, except as a means of coercing payment by threatening repossession. The Commission concluded that debtors should not be denied the benefit of their exemptions in household goods because of valueless security interests. That idea led to § 522(f) . . . .

The main reason [for § 522(f)(2)] was that household goods securing nonpurchase money debts generally have no substantial market value. That conclusion is most appropriate when the debtor . . . [put up as collateral] used household goods. The conclusion is less appropriate for new or used goods bought . . . . with the proceeds of a purchase money loan . . . .

... [T]he purpose of § 522(f)(2)(A) generally is to avoid security interests that debtors grant in their already owned, used household goods.

108. *Id.* at 353-54.

109. *Id.* at 354.
free of the creditor's claim. In contrast, if the court enforced the purchase money security interest, the debt would consist of two parts, purchase money and nonpurchase money. A method was needed, absent statutory or contractual provisions, for apportioning the security interest between these two parts and for applying the payments to each part. The court expressed its reluctance to follow prior case law based on U.C.C. section 9-107, as prior decisions may not always properly reflect the policy behind section 522(f)(2)(A). However, it concluded that prior decisions must be followed unless some method existed for determining the extent to which each item of collateral secured its own purchase price. The court refused to judicially determine the extent of purchase money status, stating, "[T]he administration of bankruptcy cases demands a workable and clear rule. Without some guidelines, legislative or contractual, the court should not be required to distill from a mass of transactions the extent to which a security interest is purchase money.

Numerous courts have advanced a renewal-novation argument. Renewal includes,

the idea that an obligation is renewed when the same obligation is carried forward by the new paper . . . . There may be a change of parties. There may be an increase of security, but there is no renewal unless the obligation is the same. What makes the renewal is an extension of time in which to discharge the obligation. If the obligation changes, there can be no renewal, because there can be no such thing as the reestablishment of an old obligation by the creation of a new obligation different in character.

110. Id. at 355.
111. Id. at 353.
112. Cf. In re Booker, 31 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 285 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1981). Basing its refusal to make a judicial determination of the extent of purchase money status on policy grounds, the court held that recognition of U.C.C. § 9-107 "to the extent that" language would unduly complicate the application of the relevant code provisions. The allocation of the debt between purchase money and nonpurchase money status would be violative of one of the stated purposes of the code, "to simplify, clarify, and modernize the law governing commercial transactions." Id. at 290-91.
113. 8 Bankr. at 355.
Some courts have held a renewal occurs upon refinancing. The court held in In re All-Brite Sign Service Co. that when a note was paid by renewal, the new note did not constitute payment of the prior note agreeing that “it is a narrow and mistaken view to regard the [chattel] mortgage as a transaction independent of the prior mortgage . . . .” Other courts have held that “the giving of a new note for a debt evidenced by a former note does not extinguish the original indebtedness unless such is the intention of the parties.”

In contrast to renewal, novation is the “substitution of a new obligation for an old one, with the intent to extinguish the old one, or . . . a new debtor . . . with the intent to release [the old one], or a new creditor, with the intent to transfer the rights of the old one to him.” Some courts have held that a novation occurs upon refinancing of a purchase money security interest. For example, in In re Calloway, the court held that each consolidation was not only characterized as satisfaction of an antecedent debt, but could also be characterized as “an entirely new loan.” The court reinforced this novation argument by stating that even though each prior loan was stamped “made again,” no reference was made to the original financing statement. Novation of a purchase money security interest has been held to occur upon refinancing when state statute a new obligation is deemed to arise.

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116. See, e.g., Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. Southwest Pa. Nat’l Resources (In re Southwest Pa. Nat’l Resources), 11 Bankr. 501 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1981). The court stated, “Even where the parties originally contemplate a single debt, secured by a single item . . . or . . . group of items, the secured party and the debtor may enter into further transactions whereby the debtor obtains additional credit and the secured party is granted more security. The validity of such agreements as against creditors, trustees in bankruptcy and other secured parties has been widely recognized . . . .” Id. at 903 (quoting James Falcott, Inc. v. Franklin Nat’l Bank, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 11, 25 (Minn. 1972)).


121. See infra notes 125 & 129.


123. Id. at 215.

124. Id.

125. E.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 31.08.170(4) (1974) which provides, “Upon payment of the loan in full, mark indelibly every obligation signed by the borrower with the word “paid” or “cancelled” and release any mortgage and restore all notes and collateral which no longer secures a loan and to which the borrower may be lawfully entitled: Provided, however, That in case any such document or obligation is in custodia legis these requirements shall not be applicable . . . .” See Aalgaard v. Public Fin. Co. (In re Aalgaard), 18 Bankr. 990 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 1982).

In re Conn, decided in 1982, rejected the Simpson rationale and prior purchase money transformation theories. In Conn, the vendor executed a purchase money security interest to secure the purchase price of the collateral. When the purchase money obligation was refinanced, the lender issued new debt and took new collateral. Upon the debtor's bankruptcy, the court followed a two tier analysis to hold that purchase money character was not changed by refinancing.

The first level of analysis focused on a fundamental error in the reasoning of In re Simpson. The court pointed to the fact that Simpson did not recognize the explicit statutory language of the purchase money requirement, "to the extent that." Relying on the interpretation given to this language by the court in In re Coomer, the Conn court held that security interests may consist of two parts, purchase money and nonpurchase money. It also held that the U.C.C. does not require purchase money status to be lost in its entirety if the collateral secures both its price and an antecedent debt or future advance. Comment two to section 9-107 merely prohibits purchase money status to be found "to the extent that" an item secures antecedent debt. The court reasoned the substance of the transaction, not the form, should be the basis of the decision.

Though in form the original note is cancelled, its balance is absorbed into the refinancing loan. To the extent of that balance, the purchase money security interest taken under the original note likewise survives, because what is owed on the original note is not eliminated, it is merely transferred to, and increased in amount by, another obligation. The refinancing changes the character of neither the balance due under the first loan nor the security interest taken under it.

The second level of analysis focused on the method of apportion-
ment used to separate the purchase money and nonpurchase money parts of the debt.\textsuperscript{138} The court rejected prior holdings, stating that purchase money status should not hinge on the presence of a statutory or contractual method of apportionment; rather the court should give effect to the rule that a security interest is purchase money to the extent that property secures its price, and apportion the debt by the first-in-first-out method.\textsuperscript{139} The court reasoned that even with legislative or contractual guidelines to assist in apportioning the debt, the determination of the extent of purchase money security interest would be complex. The difficulty of dividing a security interest into purchase money and nonpurchase money parts does not prohibit a court from allowing both parts to exist.

V. DISCUSSION

Although the controversy over the character of purchase money security interests following refinancing began before the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code, the effect of such characterization under section 522(f)(2)(A) magnifies its importance.\textsuperscript{140} The transformation of a purchase money security interest into a nonpurchase money security interest upon refinancing can have three

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{138} \textit{Id.} at 458-59.
  \item \textsuperscript{139} \textit{Id.} For an example of a statutory method of apportionment, see \textsc{Oklahoma Stat.} tit. 14A, \textsection 2-409 (1981) (Consumer Credit Code provides \textit{for} first-in-first-out method of allocation of consumer related debts). Section 2-409 provides,
    \begin{enumerate}
      \item If debts arising from two or more consumer credit sales, other than sales primarily for an agricultural purpose or pursuant to a revolving charge account, are secured by cross-collateral (Section 2-408) or consolidated into one debt payable on a single schedule of payments, and the debt is secured by security interests taken with respect to one or more of the sales, payments received by the seller after the taking of the cross-collateral or the consolidation are deemed, for the purpose of determining the amount of the debt secured by the various security interests, to have been first applied to the payment of the debts arising from the sales first made. To the extent debts are paid according to this section, security interests in items of property terminate as the debts originally incurred with respect to each item is [sic] paid.
      \item Payments received by the seller upon a revolving charge account are deemed, for the purpose of determining the amount of the debt secured by the various security interests, to have been applied first to the payment of credit service charges in the order of their entry to the account and then to the payment of debts in the order in which the entries to the account showing the debts were made.
      \item If the debts consolidated arose from two or more sales made on the same day, payments received by the seller are deemed, for the purpose of determining the amount of the debt secured by the various security interests, to have been applied first to the payment of the smallest debt.
    \end{enumerate}
  \item \textit{Id.}; see also \textit{In re Staley}, 426 F. Supp. 437 (M.D. Ga. 1977) (contractual apportionment of debt by first-in-first-out method).
  \item \textsuperscript{140} \textit{See supra} notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
\end{itemize}
consequences. First, the creditor loses purchase money status; second, the creditor loses in a priority dispute with other perfected creditors; and third, the creditor loses to the trustee in bankruptcy.

Prior to the Bankruptcy Code, the transformation of a purchase money security interest resulted in the creditor losing the right to automatic perfection. Thus the creditor’s stake in the debtor’s estate became subject to the priority rules of the U.C.C. The transformation of a purchase money security interest may now result in the creditor’s purchase money security interest being totally voided, divorcing the creditor from the general priority rules of U.C.C.

The cumulative effect of loss of purchase money status following refinancing is to jumble the priorities among creditors and to defeat the following reasons for a priority system:

1. [to assure] [c]ommercial certainty...
2. [to assure that] [c]reditors ... know with precision what their rights are relative to the collateral...
3. [to protect] the reliance interest ... [of creditors]
4. [to] encourage the flow of commerce...
5. [to protect] [the purchase money lenders] whose credit enables the debtor to acquire ... assets...
6. [to promote] a policy of fairness ...

The courts have not articulated whether they will recognize the “to the extent that” language in section 9-107, and the interpretation given this section has produced conflicting results. Some courts have ignored the express “to the extent that” language. Other courts have given effect to the express language and have acknowledged that a purchase money security interest may have two parts, which may be apportioned into purchase money and nonpurchase money by either contractual, statutory, or judicial methods.

Before the enactment of the U.C.C., collateral from a conditional sale could not secure a debt owed to a vendor that was unrelated to the

142. Id. § 9-312(5).
145. A creditor's nonpurchase money security interest in household goods can be avoided by a debtor pursuant to § 522(f)(2)(A) (Supp. IV 1980) of the Bankruptcy Code.
146. See supra note 144.
147. B. CLARK, supra note 1, ¶ 3.1[2](a), (c), (d), (e), (f), at 3-4 to -6 (1980).
149. See In re Conn, 16 Bankr. 454 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982).
purchase price of the collateral.\textsuperscript{150} In contrast, collateral from a chattel mortgage could secure debt that was owed to the lender even though it was unrelated to the mortgaged sale.\textsuperscript{151} Section 9-107 of the U.C.C. combined these two concepts in subsections (a) and (b), creating a new concept for securing the debt.\textsuperscript{152} It can be argued that by combining these two concepts and their historical allowances and prohibitions into one conceptual mechanism, the drafters wanted to strictly define the circumstances in which a vendor or a lender could use collateral acquired through borrowed money to secure a debt that was unrelated to the purchase price. It can be further argued that the “to the extent that” language of section 9-107 was inserted not to void purchase money status when collateral secures a debt that is unrelated to and greater than the collateral’s purchase price, but merely to limit availability of purchase money status.

Courts have not viewed the history of purchase money security interests as decisive in the determination of whether purchase money status should survive refinancing. Since both the arguments for and against transformation of a purchase money security interest following refinancing have merit, the purposes of the U.C.C. and the Bankruptcy Code must be reviewed to see which characterization is most desirable.

The congressional intent in enacting section 522(f)(2)(A) was to give the debtor a fresh start by permitting avoidance of nonpurchase money obligations which held used household goods as their collateral.\textsuperscript{153} Therefore, section 522(f)(2)(A) is improperly used when purchase money security interests on newly acquired household goods are transformed into nonpurchase money security interests and avoided under the section.

Section 1-102(1) of the U.C.C. states that the provisions of the Code should be liberally construed. The underlying purposes include, “(a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial transactions; (b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage and agreement of parties; (c) to make uniform the law among various jurisdictions.”\textsuperscript{154} \textit{In re Simpson}\textsuperscript{155} argued that a purchase money security interest should be transformed

\textsuperscript{150} See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{151} See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{152} See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{153} See supra notes 40-45 & 60 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{154} U.C.C. § 1-102(2) (1978).
into a nonpurchase money security interest following refinancing to promote the simplicity required in commercial transactions under U.C.C. section 1-102(2)(a). The court reasoned that transformation freed the security agreement from "complicated and ambiguous impediments." However, section 102(2)(b) of the U.C.C. offers a competing policy favoring retention of purchase money status following refinancing, "to permit the continued expansion of commerce." Commerce is benefited in two ways. First, from the borrower's point of view, purchase money status makes expansion easier, because the creditor will be more likely to advance funds to help purchase an asset if the creditor can have the debt secured by the acquired property. If purchase money status is lost upon refinancing, creditors will have to make each purchase money security interest a separate transaction which results in additional costs for both debtor and lender. From the creditor's point of view, purchase money survival encourages sales by giving the creditor purchase money priority over other pre-existing creditors. If the creditor's purchase money status is transformed, the sale "will be discouraged rather than encouraged, and the Code policy of purchase money priority will be undermined." The transformation of purchase money security interests discourages loans and the use of those loans to acquire new assets.

Second, section 1-102(2)(a) and (c) of the U.C.C. offers the following policies that support retention of purchase money status following refinancing: "[T]o simplify [and] clarify . . . the law governing commercial transactions . . . [and] to make uniform the law among various jurisdictions." If purchase money status is permitted to survive refinancing, the courts will acknowledge the "to the extent that" language of section 9-107. This will achieve the above mentioned goals to simplify, clarify, and unify the law. If court decisions follow one interpretation of the language, creditors and debtors will have the ability in advance to better determine their respective rights under the refinanc-

156. Id.
157. Id. at 248.
159. McLaughlin, supra note 1, at 670. Perfection by filing for purchase money security interests in consumer goods has three adverse effects: (1) clutters filing system; (2) inconveniences those involved in filing system; (3) results in expenses disproportionate to the amount of credit given. See generally J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 74, § 23-7, at 920 (automatic perfection of consumer goods spares the filing system considerable burden).
160. McLaughlin, supra note 1, at 671.
162. U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(a), (c) (1978).
PURCHASE MONEY SECURITY INTERESTS

ing agreement. This should lead to more settlements by negotiation. Another advantage of a clear and uniform law is the prevention of forum shopping by a party in an effort to find a court which will support its position. In addition, this solution comports with general business practice and understanding.163

Addressing the problems created by conflicting decisions, one court stated, "[A]bsent specific congressional legislation to the contrary, the rules applicable to priorities in commercial law must be consistent whether in the context of bankruptcy or everyday commercial transactions . . . . [T]he Bankruptcy Code is designed to interact with the Uniform Commercial Code . . . ."164 Allowing purchase money status to be transformed following refinancing potentially allows two different systems of priorities, one in bankruptcy proceedings and the other in nonbankruptcy proceedings. Although it can be argued that a legislativé remedy is needed,165 until the differences in basic assumptions of the Bankruptcy Code and U.C.C. are legislatively resolved,166 a uniform rule is needed to decide this issue to produce the desired outcomes and support the underlying policies. Presently, various courts adopt the divergent views of either In re Simpson, which precludes any purchase money security interest when refinancing occurs, or the view advanced by In re Conn. By holding that a security interest can be divided into two parts and that purchase money status following refinancing is not dependent on the presence of some method of allocation,

163. See McLaughlin, supra note 1, at 669.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 111-13.
166. Some argue that the interaction between the Bankruptcy Code and the U.C.C. creates an inherent conflict due to the difference in basic assumptions on which each is grounded.

It can be argued that the Bankruptcy Code is grounded in pre-twentieth century economic conditions. Credit used to be based principally on assets. To obtain credit a debtor had to pledge assets; if the debtor didn't pay, he lost his assets. Traditional consumer bankruptcy relief is predicated on that experience. Today, however, all consumer credit is extended upon a consumer's ability to repay out of future income, not through liquidation of assets. Yet, while the creditor looks to income, the Bankruptcy Code looks only to assets. Not surprisingly, virtually no assets are available for distribution to creditors in consumer cases; property exemptions and security interests in the consumer's most valuable assets . . . . come first.

In short, it is possible to conclude that the code approach contradicts the basic assumption on which credit was extended—the consumer's future income . . . .

Conn allows the creditor to retain purchase money status on newly acquired household goods used as collateral for the indebtedness. This analysis confirms that Conn is the better view because it allows a purchase money security interest to survive refinancing to the extent of the actual value of the collateral, which promotes the policies of both the U.C.C. and Bankruptcy Code.

VI. CONCLUSION

This Comment has traced the history of purchase money transformation following refinancing from In re Simpson to In re Conn. It has argued that the more recent decision, Conn, is based upon a more reasonable interpretation of the statutory rules. Transformation of non-purchase money security interests upon refinancing, which is inherent in the Simpson rationale, does not fairly balance the interests of the parties involved in bankruptcy proceedings. Good faith creditors lend purchase money in reliance that their security interests will have purchase money priority; this should not be avoided by refinancing. If courts continue to follow the Simpson rationale and deny creditors purchase money status, debtors will find refinancing difficult to obtain. The interests of both creditors and debtors will be advanced if the lead taken by Conn is followed and Simpson is ultimately rejected.

J. Devereaux Jones