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RESURRECTION FROM BABEL: THE CULTURAL, POLITICAL, AND LEGAL STATUS OF CHRISTIAN COMMUNITIES IN LEBANON AND SYRIA AND THEIR PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

Alexandra R. Harrington

I. INTRODUCTION

In a well-known Biblical story, the faithful attempted to create a place of unity for themselves and set about building the Tower of Babel, only to see the Tower implode due to linguistic differences and power assertions. The end result of efforts based in faith and mutual belief was utter destruction of the shared dream and goal, and all of those involved in the attempt to build the Tower were relegated to the same failure despite their best intentions and communal support.

Thousands of years later, the world is still plagued by sectarian strife and warfare. Indeed, the situation has only become more involved since Babel, as there are now inter-communal and intra-communal conflicts for supremacy and superiority. A notable difference in these conflicts is that

† J.D. 2005, Albany Law School of Union University; B.A. Politics, B.A. History 2002, New York University. The author wishes to thank her parents for their advice and encouragement, and particularly her mother for handing down a love of her heritage and her willingness to read about it. She also wishes to thank John Harrington, long-suffering and perpetual reader, Onchan, Professor Sandra Stevenson, Professor Connie Mayer, and her family and friends for their support. This article is dedicated to the memory of the author's grandparents, Norman Mokhiber and Marion Devlin Mokhiber, and aunt, Kathy Mokhiber. The author welcomes comments regarding this article via e-mail to arharrington@gmail.com.

1. Genesis 11.
2. Id.
the ultimate tool of getting to Heaven is no longer a tower, it is now a state. Within the framework of the much-vaunted and highly-contested state structure, which sits at the heart of inter-communal and intra-communal conflicts, lays a duality of politics and law. A state cannot exist without political actors, whatever their motivations may be, and political actors of all belief systems have embraced the need for laws as a method of control— if not equality and a means of assuring an open society.

For Christian communities in the Middle East there is perhaps no greater a living symbol of the effects of Babel-esque intra-communal fighting than Lebanon. The fighting between Christian communities in Lebanon, and the alliances of these communities with various Muslim communities and other nations trying to crush rival Christian opposition, is more than just a memory of decades past; it continues today, albeit in slightly less violent forms than during the civil war which ravaged the country for over a decade. By contrast, the political and legal standing of Christian communities across the border in Syria is nowhere near as visible, or publicized as their Lebanese co-religionists. However, lack of visibility does not correlate to lack of existence, and indeed there are many historical Christian communities within Syria. Disturbingly, at a time when many see the Middle East as an area that is unquestionably Muslim in character, and when Arab scholars themselves write on the topic of creating a symbiosis between democracy and Islam while ignoring the existence of other salient groups in the democratic debate, Christian communities in Lebanon and Syria appear to be phased out of public discourse. There is perhaps no more vital a time for these communities to come to the forefront of the political and legal lives of their nations than at

3. See discussion infra Parts II.A., II.B.
4. See discussion infra Parts II.A., II.B.
5. See discussion infra Parts II.D., III.D.
6. See discussion infra Part III.A.
7. See discussion infra Part III.A.
9. See generally SADIKI, supra note 8 (emphasizing that Islamic governments will be the continued trend in the Middle East and failing to address the impact of non-Muslims on the advent of democratic regimes in the Middle East).
the present, as the future composition of the Middle East lies in the balance, and with it the future rights of these communities.

Part II of this article will discuss the Lebanese situation. This part starts with a description of the Christian communities in Lebanon, including their relationships with larger churches throughout the world. Discussion then turns to the political history of Lebanon since the nation's founding, with the promulgation of its constitution in 1926, which necessarily includes the Christian communities. Emphasis will be placed on the intra-communal relationships during the last civil war (1975-1991) and its aftermath, as well as the growth of Islamist groups in Lebanon and their effect on the global perception of Lebanon as a political actor. After this historical discussion, the article will present the Lebanese constitutional law, as well as statutory law in the form of electoral law, personal status law, property law, and criminal law. These laws will be analyzed in terms of their plain language meanings and practical implications in a country that has varied widely from the tenets of the rule

10. See discussion infra Part II.
11. See discussion infra Part II.A.
12. See discussion infra Part II.B.
13. See discussion infra Part II.B.
14. There are some conflicting opinions as to the precise dates of the Lebanese civil war. For simplicity, and because it represents an outside opinion and is less open to charges of domestic Lebanese political influence, the author uses the dates provided by the C.I.A. and U.S. Department of State for the civil war. See LEBANON FACTBOOK, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/le.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2005) [hereinafter LEBANON FACTBOOK]; Background Note: Lebanon, U.S. Department of State http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35833.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2006) [hereinafter Background Note: Lebanon].
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See discussion infra Part II.C. The author has selected these areas of law for analysis because it is her belief that constitutional law tenets such as equality of all persons before the law and the ability of people to own property without interference from the government (in the absence of a legitimate exercise of eminent domain) are hollow if they are only codified in a constitutional document and are not made a valid and enforceable part of the laws which enshrine the daily rights and practices of a nation's population. Not only does the author believe that equality in areas of personal status and property ownership are necessary to legitimate a constitution, she believes and will argue in Parts II, III, and IV that the ownership right in one's status and one's property is an essential way to link any person/population to the nation in which he resides and create ownership of that nation's laws and future. As will be seen throughout this article, the author advocates for legal changes and protections primarily in the form of statutory laws to accompany already existing constitutional law provisions in Lebanon and Syria based on her belief in the need for constitutional and statutory law to mirror each other rather than excuse each other.
of law and the guarantees enshrined in its constitution, despite having had
a continual constitutional apparatus since 1926.\textsuperscript{18} Part II will close with
the author's call for unity among Lebanese Christian communities as a way to
ensure political stability,\textsuperscript{19} enshrine legal rights for Christians in Lebanon,
which do not mirror those applied to Christians in other Muslim
communities (or the \textit{dhimmi} patterns used in the Ottoman Empire),\textsuperscript{20} and
give Lebanese Christians a greater role in the control of their country.\textsuperscript{21} It
will be argued that these suggestions will not only strengthen the Christian
communities, and Lebanon itself, but will also strengthen Lebanese
Muslim communities that are currently facing an uneasy choice between
terrorist group affiliation and a peaceful civil society.\textsuperscript{22} Unity among
Lebanon's Christian communities will also invite confidence from the
United States and its allies in the global war on terror, which would serve
to bolster the ability of the Lebanese state to be a reliable and functional
ally, rather than a Syrian pawn.\textsuperscript{23}

Part III of this article will discuss the Syrian situation.\textsuperscript{24} The
available information on Christian communities in Syria is not on par with
the information available about the Lebanese Christian communities,
hence the initial background discussion of the Syrian Christian
communities will be brief.\textsuperscript{25} Part III will turn from the Syrian Christian
communities themselves to the history of Syria since its independence in
1926, with an emphasis on its cross-border role in Lebanon.\textsuperscript{26} A discussion
of Syrian constitutional law, as well as statutory law in the form of election
law, personal status law, and the effect of decades old emergency law will
then ensue.\textsuperscript{27} As in Part II, the legal analysis will emphasize the real,
pragmatic state of Syrian law rather than the esoteric or plain meaning of

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{18} See discussion \textit{infra} Part II.C.
  \item \textsuperscript{19} See discussion \textit{infra} Part II.D.
  \item \textsuperscript{20} See Fuad I. Khuri, \textit{The Alawis of Syria: Religious Ideology and Organization in
SYRIA: SOCIETY, CULTURE, AND POLITY} 49 (Richard T. Antoun and Donald Quataert eds.,
1991); see generally \textit{ALBERT HOURANI, A HISTORY OF THE ARAB PEOPLES} 220, 242 (1991);
Sergei Hackel, \textit{The Orthodox Churches of Eastern Europe}, in \textit{THE OXFORD HISTORY OF
CHRISTIANITY} 564 (John McManners ed., 2002).
  \item \textsuperscript{21} See discussion \textit{infra} Part II.D.
  \item \textsuperscript{22} See discussion \textit{infra} Part II.D.
  \item \textsuperscript{23} See discussion \textit{infra} Part II.D.
  \item \textsuperscript{24} See discussion \textit{infra} Part III.
  \item \textsuperscript{25} See discussion \textit{infra} Part III.A.
  \item \textsuperscript{26} See discussion \textit{infra} Part III.B.
  \item \textsuperscript{27} See discussion \textit{infra} Part III.C. See also supra note 17 and accompanying text
(stating the author's reasoning in selecting these areas of law for discussion and analysis).
\end{itemize}
the Syrian Constitution. The conclusion of Part III will be the author’s call for Syrian Christians – those in Syria and those who have emigrated – along with Lebanese Christians to use the increasingly dire situation of the Assad regime in Syria to push for legal reform for Syrian Christians and Syrians as a whole. This call comes with the caveat that domestic agitation might be too risky to attempt at present, but will highlight that if Lebanese Christian communities were to follow the author’s recommendations in Part II, the situation and bargaining power of Syrian Christians would likely increase as a result.

Finally, Part IV will summarize the conclusions and recommendations in Parts II and III for Lebanon and Syria. Part IV will emphasize that from the pieces of Christian communities in Lebanon and Syria which have been ravaged by both internal and external forces, it is possible to resurrect the modern Babel and fashion, if not a tower to Heaven, at the very least two states which celebrate their shared faiths rather than their devastating divisions.

II. LEBANON

A. Christian Communities in Lebanon

The officially recognized Christian communities in Lebanon include the Maronites, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholics, Armenian Catholics, Roman Catholics, Syrian Catholics, Armenian Orthodox, Syrian Orthodox, Orthodox Melkites, and forms of Protestantism. These communities have a long history with Lebanon, and were part of the Ottoman governing system of allowing millets – groups of non-Islamic, or non-Arabic as the case might be, peoples – to live within the confines of

28. See discussion infra Part III.C.
29. See discussion infra Part III.D.
30. See discussion infra Part III.D.
31. See discussion infra Part III.D.
32. See discussion infra Part IV.
33. See discussion infra Part IV.
the Ottoman Empire in exchange for a lower social status and payments from the millet leaders to the Ottoman regime. As fellow believers in God and “the book,” Christian communities were also protected by the Ottomans because of their status as dhimmi – believers who did not convert to Islam but nevertheless worshiped God and a holy book.

Throughout the growth and development of Mount Lebanon, Beirut, and the areas which comprise modern-day Lebanon, the Maronites and the Greek Orthodox became the paramount groups in the Christian power structure; the Maronites came to control the Mountain, and the Greek Orthodox extended more control over Beirut. Politically, these groups have stood the test of time and continue to be the most influential Christian communities in Lebanon, although in the author’s opinion, all of the Christian communities have gained in status – extant or potential – in the wake of the civil war and the current war on terrorism taking place in the Middle East. This is because many of the traditional leaders in the Maronite community in particular were killed or forced into exile by the civil war, and recent polling data indicates that many of the remaining Christian political leaders in general are tainted in the eyes of Lebanese Christians, because of their dependence upon and affiliation with Syria.

36. See Johns, supra note 35.
37. Id.
39. See id.; Samir Khalaf, Civil and Uncivil Violence in Lebanon: A History of the Internationalization of Human Contact 281 (2002). “In a sense, the Maronites never ceased to recognize Mount Lebanon as their national home.” Id.
40. See Chamie, supra note 34, at 180 (describing the results of a 1970 Lebanese study finding that “the percentage of all Catholics (mainly Maronites) who are located in Mount Lebanon and Beirut is 38 and 37 percent, respectively.”); see generally Khalaf, supra note 39, at 281 (setting out the dichotomy between the worldview of the Maronites in the mountain and the Greek Orthodox and other communities which had established themselves in various Lebanese cities).
41. See generally Chamie, supra note 34; Johnson, supra note 38, at 2.
42. See Khalaf, supra note 39, at 54 (2002) (“While all other communities appear to enjoy uncontested leaders or spokesmen, the Maronites seem leaderless, splintered and bereft of compelling voices apart perhaps from the Patriarch.”); Simon Haddad, The Christians of Lebanon in the Context of a Syrian-Israeli Political Relations, 26(3) J. of Soc. Pol. & Econ. Stud. 589 (2001) (recounting polling results in which many Lebanese Christians reported that they were not pleased with the political leaders who had survived the civil war and remain active in Lebanese politics).
43. Haddad, supra note 42, at 601 (explaining that most powerful Christian politicians are tainted by their affiliations with Syria and stating that “[n]early 84% of the respondents [who were all Lebanese Christians] do not feel that their ruling elites work in the best interest of the people.”); see also id. at 602-03 (stating that, although disenchantment with
In this situation, it is politically feasible that a member of any Christian community, with the right grass-roots support and personality, could emerge as a future leader of a block of united Lebanese Christian communities, provided that the political and legal reality of the need for unity is understood and achieved. After all, the presence of Maronites and other Christian groups in Lebanon has historically been such that, at its founding, many Lebanese considered the nation to be rightfully Christian.

To understand how this unity is possible in terms of beliefs as well as pragmatic politics, it is important to examine briefly the doctrinal beliefs of several Christian groups and their historical places in Lebanon.

1. The Maronites

Founded as a separate religious group, the Maronites are currently one of the many Uniate Churches affiliated with Roman Catholicism through a sworn allegiance to the Pope. Maronites have claimed shelter in Mount Lebanon for well over a thousand years, were involved in the Crusades at various points in time, and were rewarded with the 1584 founding of the Maronite College in Rome. The Maronite College still

and distrust of the Lebanese government and the individuals who comprise it is prevalent among all religious communities, it is most prevalent among Lebanese Christians per se).

44. See KHALAF, supra note 39, at 27 (discussing the increasing trend of confessional identification among Lebanese today).

[M]ore and more Lebanese are today brandishing their confessionalism, if we may invoke a dual metaphor, as both emblem and armor: Emblem, because confessional identity has become the most viable medium for asserting presence and securing vital needs and benefits . . . Armor, because it has become a shield against real or imagined threats. The more vulnerable the emblem, the thicker the armor.

Id.; see also Ahmad Beydoun, Confessionalism: Outline of an Announced Reform in OPTIONS FOR LEBANON 75, 85-87 (Nawaf Salam ed., 2004) (describing the effect of the civil war on self-identification with a confessional community in Lebanon). It is the author’s opinion that this trend will only continue in the face of increased instability in the Middle East generally, and particularly in light of the Hariri investigation and the steadily more public debate over the appropriate role of Syria in Lebanese political life.

45. See Rania Maktabi, The Lebanese Census of 1932 Revisited. Who Are the Lebanese?, 26(2) BRIT. J. OF MIDDLE EASTERN STUD. 219, 224 n.9 (1999); WINSLOW, supra note 35, at 64-70 (describing the motivations of early Lebanese Republic founders videlicet religion and the state).

46. Gemayel, supra note 34.

47. Id. Interestingly, some of the Muslim civil war opponents of the Maronites in particular referred to them as “crusaders.” See generally Johns, supra note 35.

48. Gemayel, supra note 34; HOURANI, supra note 20, at 242.
exists today, as does the role of the Maronite clergy as religious and political leaders within Lebanon.

With historical longevity on its side, the Maronite Church in Lebanon has continued to be a political force. Maronites were vehement that Lebanon be founded on the principle of having a Christian majority after independence was achieved in 1943. However, at the time of the creation of the Lebanese Constitution, which was in essence the founding of the modern Lebanese Republic, and in the years afterward when citizenship and voting rights became paramount issues in the political and legal power structure of Lebanon, the Maronites and other Christian communities took a pragmatic view of the need to buffer the Christian communities as a whole, consenting to the extension of citizenship rights to members of other Christian communities who had emigrated.

Due to the potential contentiousness that a religion-based census could bring to Lebanon, an official census has not been released since the 1932 census which was used to create the legislative apportionment scheme of seats as 6 Christian seats for every 5 Muslim seats in the Lebanese Parliament. However, the total estimated Christian population in Lebanon is approximately 1.48 million, representing the estimate that Christians comprise approximately 39% of the Lebanese population as of mid-2005. In this context, it is important to note the toll that the 1975-1991 civil war took on the Christian communities in Lebanon as a whole. It has been estimated that roughly 950,000 people fled Lebanon during the decades of the war, approximately two-thirds of whom were Christians.

49. Gemayel, supra note 34.
51. See Maktabi, supra note 45, at 227; Winslow, supra note 35, at 67; Background Note: Lebanon, supra note 14.
52. See Maktabi, supra note 45.
53. Id.
54. See Background Note: Lebanon, supra note 14. This apportionment system, as well as the confessional apportionment system used for the top governmental positions in Lebanon, was part of the National Fact, an unwritten agreement which was in effect until the end of the civil war. Id.
55. See Maktabi, supra note 45; LEBANON FACTBOOK, supra note 14; Background Note: Lebanon, supra note 14. It is important to remember that the population percentages do not necessarily correspond to citizenship status and voting rights figures, as Palestinian refugees who can be counted as Lebanese inhabitants are not granted citizenship rights and cannot vote in Lebanon. See id.; see also Haddad, supra note 42 (describing the position of Palestinians in Lebanese society and their relationship with Lebanese Christians).
56. M. Joseph Khoreich, Results of the Lebanese War 1975-1997, Centre Catholique d’Information (Dr. Georges Kallas trans.), at
It is also estimated that roughly two-thirds of the Lebanese who fled during the civil war and have chosen not to return to Lebanon to date are Christians of some denomination.\textsuperscript{57} All Christian denominations in Lebanon are, or have been active in the propagation of religious orders in Lebanon, and/or the maintenance of hospitals, schools, and charitable institutions.\textsuperscript{58} Many of these institutions, especially schools, were damaged or destroyed in the war.\textsuperscript{59} Yet, they still carry on today as integral parts of the community. Indeed, with the exception of the American University of Beirut,\textsuperscript{60} the best known universities in Lebanon are at least affiliated with Christianity.\textsuperscript{61}

Due to their preeminent status among the Lebanese Christian communities, the Maronites have enjoyed the guarantee that the President of Lebanon will always be a Maronite.\textsuperscript{62} The only other groups so privileged are the Sunnis, who are guaranteed the Prime Minister’s spot in any Lebanese government, and the Shi’is, who are guaranteed the slot of the President of the Lebanese Parliament.\textsuperscript{63}

During the civil war, by far the greatest number of Christian combatant groups were Maronites;\textsuperscript{64} indeed, although the Lebanese national Kata’ib party was founded on the idea of a Christian state in Lebanon,\textsuperscript{65} it ultimately eschewed a Maronite identity and became associated with the Maronite-dominated Phalanges party and its militant

\textsuperscript{57} Khoreich, supra note 56.

\textsuperscript{58} KHALAF, supra note 39, at 281 (providing a brief account of the role of Christian religious orders in the early founding of Lebanese educational institutions).

\textsuperscript{59} See Khoreich, supra note 56.

\textsuperscript{60} The American University of Beirut is administered under the auspices of the State University of New York. See About the University, American University of Beirut, http://www.aub.edu.lb/about/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2006).

\textsuperscript{61} See GASPARD, supra note 56, at 46 (describing the founding of several influential religious-based universities in Lebanon, especially at the behest of the Jesuits and Lazarists).

\textsuperscript{62} This is one of the provisions of the National Pact which remains in effect today. See Background Note: Lebanon, supra note 14.

\textsuperscript{63} Id.

\textsuperscript{64} WINSLOW, supra note 35, at 192-93; JOHNSES, supra note 38, at 36-37.

\textsuperscript{65} WINSLOW, supra note 35, at 193-94; JOHNSES, supra note 38, at 36-37, 150-51.
groups. While the civil war raged, so too did the internal divisions within
the Maronite community, particularly within the groups established by
former notable Maronite families. Ultimately, these divisions would
provide an opening for both Syria and Israel to enter the conflict and add
their own agendas to the war and the peace which followed.

Despite the ravages of war, the Maronites have managed to
maintain their permanent hold on the Presidency, and have also
maintained the majority apportionment of Christian seats in the Lebanese
Parliament, even after the Ta'if Agreement (officially known as the
Charter of Lebanese National Reconciliation) altered the apportionment
of seats in the Parliament so that there would be absolute parity between
Christians and Muslims. However, neither the Ta'if provisions nor the
constitutional enshrinement of religion-based awarding of key
governmental posts has been enough to stop violence carried out against
Christian targets and in Christian neighborhoods, most recently in the
form of bombings.

2. The Greek Orthodox

The Greek Orthodox Church in Lebanon traces its origins to the
early years of Christianity. As a separate entity from Roman
Catholicism, and not part of the Uniate Churches, the Greek Orthodox


66. Winslow, supra note 35, at 193-94; Khalaf, supra note 39, at 230 (describing the
escalation of Maronite, and particularly Kata'ib, militarization and mobilization in the face
of the initial events which ultimately lead to the civil war); Id. at 241 (describing the various
combination of sectarian allies and enemies during the course of the civil war).

67. Winslow, supra note 35, at 193-94; Id. at 221-30; Khalidi, supra note 50, at 68-72
[hereinafter Zisser Lebanon].

68. See Winslow, supra note 35, at 199-200, 218-24; Khalidi, supra note 50, at 139-43
(describing the process in which escalating hostilities between Syria and Israel were played
out through the actions of these countries, and their designated agents, in Lebanon).

69. Lebanon Factbook, supra note 14.

70. Khalaf, supra note 39, at 54 (describing the impact of this parity on the psyche of
the Christian and Muslim communities). Currently, Maronites hold 34 of the 128 seats in
Parliament. See Loi Electoral Parlementaire, Tableau 1 – Les Sieges Parlementaire Dans
Les Circonscriptions Electorale (Electoral law, Table 1 – parliamentary seats in the
electoral districts), Republique Libanaise Assemblee Nationale, available at
[hereinafter Loi ELECTORAL PARLEMENTAIRE].

71. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 38, at 246-49 (describing Syrian attempts to intimidate
non-cooperative groups in Lebanon in the aftermath of Syrian attempts to increase local
and national control from 2000 onward).

72. It should be remembered that the Orthodox Church per se did not exist until
Christianity was well established in the Middle East.
population is not affiliated with the Vatican, although recent popes and patriarchs have made overtures that indicate all sides are willing to attempt to breach the schism, which divided the churches initially.\(^\text{73}\) While the Maronites primarily gathered on Mount Lebanon, the Greek Orthodox became increasingly urban, especially during the nineteenth-century, when many Greek Orthodox became traders, merchants and bankers.\(^\text{74}\)

As mentioned above, the Greek Orthodox represent the second largest Christian community in Lebanon, and have historically held this position.\(^\text{75}\) There are no governmental positions guaranteed to the Greek Orthodox community under the National Pact,\(^\text{76}\) although the community has been apportioned fourteen seats in the Lebanese Parliament since the Ta'if Agreement.\(^\text{77}\) Despite the lack of a guarantee to hold certain positions, the Greek Orthodox clergy and leadership still wield tremendous influence within the community.\(^\text{78}\)

In the civil war years, the Christian communities in Lebanon fought not only within their own sects, but also with their co-religionists. Maronites and Greek Orthodox fought each other,\(^\text{79}\) as well as other Christians and Muslims,\(^\text{80}\) in a war which, although began as a religious war in name, ultimately blurred confessionalism with pragmatic alliances, and in the process undermined the cohesion of the Lebanese Christian communities. This was dangerous enough for Lebanese Christians; however, media coverage of the war, which tended to portray the conflict

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74. ZISSER LEBANON, supra note 67, at 61.

75. Id. at 8-9.

76. See id. at 60-61; see Background Note: Lebanon, supra note 14.

77. Loi Electoral Parlementaire, supra note 70; see also Background Note: Lebanon, supra note 14.

78. See Haddad, supra note 42 (describing the anti-Syrian actions of the Greek Orthodox Archbishop Elias Audi during a period of anti-Syrian agitation in 2000; Archbishop Audi went so far as to use a Palm Sunday homily to deliver a message of support for anti-Syrian activists).

79. See KHALIDI, supra note 50, at 75-78 (describing the range of political groupings adopted by the Greek Orthodox and other Christian communities during the civil war, including those which openly opposed Maronite and Muslim hegemony in Lebanon); JOHNSON, supra note 38, at 150-51, 160-61; ZISSER LEBANON, supra note 67, at 177-86 (providing background on the tensions between factions of the Maronite and Greek Orthodox communities as they emerged in the founding of the Syrian Nationalist Party (or PPS) in Lebanon by, among others, a Lebanese Greek Orthodox).

80. KHALIDI, supra note 50, at 75.
as between Muslims and Christians, or Israelis and Arabs, created and perpetuated an understanding of the politics of the region which is oversimplified, easily manipulated, and continues with the present-day media and international societal understandings.

3. Other Christian Communities

With the exception of the Protestant groups represented in Lebanon, the remaining Christian communities are either part of the Uniate church umbrella, linking them to Roman Catholicism, Roman Catholic themselves, or various forms of Orthodox churches. Although these communities do not have the numerical strength of the Maronites or Greek Orthodox, they nevertheless have long standing historical ties to Lebanon, and are an integral part of Lebanese society.

These communities were involved in, and damaged by the civil war; indeed it can be argued that the damage sustained by these communities was perhaps more severe than the majority communities. However, the plight of the majority communities was misidentified as the plight of "Christians" or "Arabs" in general, and was more visible to the world. In an electoral sense, these communities have regained at least some measure of status under the current Christian Parliamentary apportionment system.

B. Lebanese Creation and Strife

Lebanon's status changed dramatically in the early twentieth century, starting out as part of the rapidly declining Ottoman Empire, then becoming a French mandate after the cessation of World War I, promulgating a constitution in 1926, and eventually achieving its own independence in 1943. When Lebanon was created, it was an enigma, the first Christian-associated nation in the Middle East at the time. Although known for its confessional status, the original Lebanese Constitution

81. LEBANON FACTBOOK, supra note 14.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Although there are no official census figures available, a rough estimate of the populations of these groups can be inferred from the number of Parliamentary seats apportioned to each group. See Loi Electoral Parlementaire, supra note 70. At present, excluding Maronite and Greek Orthodox seats, there are 15 "other" Christian seats in the Lebanese Parliament. See id.
85. See id.
86. See Background Note: Lebanon, supra note 14.
eschewed confessionalism, declaring that there would be religious freedom and tolerance for all.\textsuperscript{87}

Like most enigmas, particularly those dependent on politics and law to perpetuate their status, Lebanon’s myth was soon subsumed by the reality of inter-confessional divisions which threatened the future of the young nation. In 1943, these divisions resulted in the National Pact - an unwritten agreement between various powerful political leaders of religious communities - that created the 6 Christian and 5 Muslim Parliamentary seat apportionment system, which would remain in effect until the Ta’if Agreement.\textsuperscript{88} The National Pact also enshrined the permanent assignment of the Presidency of the Lebanese Republic to a Maronite, the position of Prime Minister to a Sunni, and the President of the Lebanese Parliament to a Shi’ia.\textsuperscript{89}

The reasons asserted for the increasing tensions in Lebanon in the years from the creation of the National Pact through the next incidence of civil strife in 1958,\textsuperscript{90} and culminating in the civil war are numerous: the increasing influence of Israel and Palestinian refugees who relocated to Lebanon;\textsuperscript{91} the rising influence of Syria in Lebanon’s domestic politics and in the international world;\textsuperscript{92} the increasing number of Muslims in the country, coupled with Lebanon’s status as the only Christian country in the otherwise Muslim Middle East;\textsuperscript{93} the changing social and economic milieu of the country;\textsuperscript{94} the difficulties in trying to establish a pan-Arab culture with sectarian differences;\textsuperscript{95} the list goes on. Although these explanations may seemingly confuse the understanding of the situation, the disconnect between the laws and principles enshrined in legal documents and

\begin{footnotes}
\item[87] The current Lebanese constitution still retains these protections. See discussion infra Part II.C (discussing Lebanese constitutional and statutory law, with emphasis on personal status law).
\item[88] See Background Note: Lebanon, supra note 14; see generally ZISSER LEBANON, supra note 67, at 60-67.
\item[89] ZISSER LEBANON, supra note 67, at 58.
\item[90] See Background Note: Lebanon, supra note 14.
\item[91] See, e.g., Haddad, supra note 42.
\item[92] See Background Note: Lebanon, supra note 14.
\item[93] See, e.g., id.
\item[94] See generally GASPARD, supra note 56 (discussing the changing economic situation in Lebanon from independence onwards, and the impact of this change on the social makeup of the Lebanese).
\item[95] See generally ZISSER LEBANON, supra note 67, at 164-89 (discussing the PPS); see discussion infra Part III (discussing the rise of the Ba’athist movement in Syria and its goals).
\end{footnotes}
discourse and the meaning of these laws and principles in reality becomes vividly real.

This disconnect reached new heights during the civil war,96 when law as such was ineffective, and even customary communal laws – such as respect for notable families,97 respect for elders and women,98 and the observance of standard social tenets grounded in religious teachings, i.e. that killing is illegal and against God’s commandments99 – were cast aside in an escalating cycle of violence and hatred.100 The disconnect was thus nearly complete.

Once peace arrived through the Ta’if Agreement,101 which is widely held to be a compromise document created at the behest of foreign governments, particularly Syria,102 the words of law were again meant to solidify the Lebanese state, though this time at the cost of significant legislative powers for the Christian communities as a whole.

C. Lebanese Constitutional and Statutory Law

1. Lebanese Constitutional Law

The original Lebanese Constitution was promulgated in 1926,103 and has been amended on multiple occasions.104 In the aftermath of the civil

96. A discussion of the causes of the Lebanese civil war is outside the scope of this article, and indeed this has been the subject of many books and articles. See generally JOHNSON, supra note 38; KHALAF, supra note 39; Background Note: Lebanon, supra note 14, LEBANON FACTBOOK, supra note 14.

97. For a discussion of the splits between Christian groups, which evinced a disregard for the established leadership and primacy of notables, see supra discussion Part II.A.

98. For an account of the horrific and ritualistic violence carried out against women, children, and the elderly by all sides during the war, see generally JOHNSON, supra note 38 (positing that these crimes were perpetrated because of the role that women in particular served in all religious groups within Lebanese society, namely that of the repository of the male community’s honor).

99. This is perhaps the most elemental of the Ten Commandments and also carries over into Islam, regardless of the legal penalties placed on killing by a statutory law-based society.

100. See generally JOHNSON, supra note 38 (accounting the escalating brutalities committed during the war); see also Background Note: Lebanon, supra note 14.

101. See Background Note: Lebanon, supra note 14; see also KHALAF, supra note 39, at 54.

102. See KHALAF, supra note 39, at 54 (detailing the Ta’if Agreement’s requirement that Syrian troops be stationed in Lebanon in the aftermath of the Agreement’s implementation and a later interpretation of the Agreement to allow for the presence of Syrian troops in Lebanon until certain milestones in Syrian/Lebanese/Israeli relations are met).

103. LEBANON FACTBOOK, supra note 14.
war, a new constitutional preamble was inserted, providing in relevant part that: Lebanon is “sovereign, free, and independent,” for the benefit of all of its “children,” inside the borders recognized by the international community; Lebanon is Arab in its identity; the Lebanese economic system is open and guarantees individual rights and private property; and that “[t]he suppression of confessionalism [in politics] constitutes a national goal essential practice for the nation.” Title one, chapter two of the constitution provides that all Lebanese are to be considered for public employment without regard to factors other than their individual merit and qualifications, as well as other factors dictated by law. Chapter two also protects private property from a governmental taking without reason and compensation.

Contrary to the goals of the preamble, title two, chapter two provides that apportionment for parliamentary seats is to be made initially on an equal division between Christians and Muslims, with these seats subdivided by region and by sect within each religion and region. Currently, the Lebanese Parliament is comprised of 128 seats, of which 64 are designated as Christian seats and 64 as Muslim seats. Interestingly, despite the apportionment system used, the constitution goes on to state that each Member of Parliament (“MP”) is a member for the nation rather than his own constituency, and must act accordingly in performing the duties of his office.

The President of Lebanon is largely a figurehead under constitutional law, albeit it a confessionally selected figurehead. His powers as commander-in-chief are subsumed by the powers of the Council of Ministers, and technically his term is limited to one consecutive


106. Id. at tit.1, ch. 2, art. 12.

107. Id. at art. 15.

108. LEBANON [Constitution], supra note 105, at tit. 2, ch. 2, art. 24 (a).

109. Id. at art. 24(c).

110. Id. at art. 24(b).

111. LEBANON FACTBOOK, supra note 14.

112. LEBANON [Constitution], supra note 105, at tit. 2, ch. 3, art. 27.

113. Id.
term, although past and present attempts to thwart this provision have been made. The President signs laws into effect, although he does not possess the ability to change laws promulgated by Parliament; in terms of foreign policy, both the President and the Prime Minister must sign treaties into law for them to be legally binding. The Prime Minister is named by the President with the consent of Parliament. The primary executive function of the Lebanese government is carried out by the Council of Ministers, which is comprised of MPs elevated to ministerial status.

2. Statutory Law

a. Electoral Laws

Electoral laws are the backbone to free participation in government and an open society. In Lebanon, all Lebanese who are age 21 or over are given the right to vote, as long as they are not subject to a legal penalty (i.e. deprivation of rights as punishment or an established state of mental insanity) and are not part of the military or any other national policing body. Eligible voters are registered to vote in their assigned geographical electoral districts by religious sect, and must identify themselves by name, address, and religion when going to the polls to vote.

114. Id.; see also Jean Naffah, Administrative Law in THE LEBANESE LEGAL SYSTEM vol. I 60 (Antoine El-Gemayel ed., 1985).

115. Most recently, controversy over extending the presidency of Emile LaHoud for a second term caused a rift between the Syrian regime and Lebanese leaders, key among them former Prime Minister Rafiki Hariri. According to press accounts at the time, and the preliminary findings of the U.N. committee charged with investigating Mr. Hariri’s murder on February 14, 2005, this rift with Syria resulted in hostile confrontations between Syria and several Lebanese regime members, as well as Mr. Hariri’s assassination by car bomb in the streets of Beirut. At present, as the result of the 2004 decision by the Lebanese Parliament, Mr. LaHoud still retains the office of President of the Republic of Lebanon. LEBANON FACTBOOK, supra note 14.

116. LEBANON [Constitution], supra note 105, at tit. 2, ch. 4, art 51.

117. Id. at art. 51.

118. Id. at art. 53.

119. Id. at art. 65.


121. Id. at arts. 9, 10 (the most common cause of legal deprivation of the franchise is the violation of the Lebanese Criminal Code provisions).

122. Id. at art. 9.

123. Id. at ch. 4, art. 28.

124. Id. at ch. 1, art. 4.
vote. There are established mechanisms of governmental oversight of persons who are on voting lists and their status as eligible voters, and these lists must be compared prior to any election.

b. Personal Status Laws

Under the terms of the Lebanese Constitution, all Lebanese are “children” of the nation and enjoy the same rights, regardless of confession. However, the Lebanese personal status laws illustrate a disconnect between constitutional imperatives and the reality of law and society in Lebanon. Secular courts in Lebanon, which are tasked with certain limited functions, many of these having to do with governmental and constitutional oversight, figure heavily in Lebanese jurisprudence. It is important to note that religious communities form their own councils and governmental bodies for their communities in addition to administering religious courts.

Religious courts in Lebanon are barred from trying cases brought pursuant to Lebanese penal laws, as well as certain civil cases. While it is possible for a person to change his religious sect, religious courts assume they have jurisdiction over a person if they have jurisdiction over the person’s father by virtue of his religious affiliation. If the father changes his religious affiliation and his child has yet to reach the legal age of majority, the father’s new religion has jurisdiction over both the father and his children. In cases where the litigants belong to different religions, jurisdiction shifts to secular courts.

125. Id. at ch. 3, art. 13.
127. LEBANON [Constitution], supra note 105, at pmbl.
131. Id. at 268.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
One of the primary areas of jurisprudence for religious courts is marriage, and subsidiary questions arising from marriage-related issues. It is in these areas that there is a disparity between the laws and requirements for Christians of various sects, not to mention Jews and Muslims. For example, Catholic and Orthodox communities have slightly different requirements for marital capacity, and their interpretation of what voids a marriage and the effects of a void marriage on any children of that marriage differ vastly. Christian communities also differ in their requirements for establishing valid parentage, recognition of children, and adoption of children. Religious status also impacts the inheritance and gift-giving rights of Lebanese in both life and death.


c. Property Law

Regardless of their religion, land-owning Lebanese are required to register their land with their local government, subject to an official assessment of the land by a surveyor. All landowners receive the same rights in and to their property, subject to the general interests of society in the use of the property and the ability of the government to take the property for cause and with compensation to the property owner. Secular Lebanese courts govern disputes regarding land-ownership, and the ability to use the right of usufruct, except to the extent that inheritance laws are involved.

135. Id.
136. Personal Status, supra note 130, at 276 (explaining that Catholic courts will find a lack of capacity when there is some element of "feigning" involved in consent to marry such as a lack of intent to remain faithful to one's spouse during the marriage or to procreate during the marriage while "[a]ccording to the Christian Orthodox and Evangelical sects, coercion or seduction only will nullify consent.").
137. Id. at 276-77, 296-300, 306-12.
138. See id. 321-34.
139. See id. 349-51, 363-77.
141. Id. at 208.
142. Id. at 221-27.
143. Id. at 233-34.
144. Id. at 238-43. This right under Lebanese law is analogous to usufruct in American law, which is defined as: "[a] right to use another's property for a time without damaging or diminishing it, although the property might naturally deteriorate over time." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1542 (7th ed. 1999).
145. See discussion supra Part II.C.2.b.
d. Criminal Law

All Lebanese are subject to the criminal code regardless of their religious affiliation or status.146 The criminal code makes distinctions between crimes that qualify as “major offenses” and those which are essentially misdemeanor offenses.147 Crimes that are classified as political are subject to a different set of mens rea requirements and punishment standards, than those imposed for major offenses and misdemeanors.148 Criminal trials start at the lower court level.149 Their adjudicative results, but not sentencing, can be appealed up a chain of appellate courts as applicable,150 except in the case of military court decisions, which have a separate appellate procedure.151 There is a limited right to counsel at certain points in the adjudicative and questioning process, subject to the rights of the examining magistrate during the initial investigative proceeding.152

D. Possibilities for the future

As the previous sections have illustrated, there is a clear disconnect between constitutional provisions, laws, and societal practices in Lebanon. The constitution itself decries confessionalism in politics, yet at the same time enshrines voting procedures that institutionalize religious voting segregation.153 Electoral laws provide the franchise based solely on citizenship status and capacity. However, voters are registered by religion and must identify themselves by such when they vote.154 Criminal and civil laws of the Lebanese nation are applied to all Lebanese alike. Yet, intimate personal legal issues are subject to the requirements of religious courts and bodies except in rare circumstances which cross the communal divide.155 Lebanese property law provides for equal protections of landowners regardless of religion, unless it intersects with questions of inheritance, which are the province of religious courts.156 These differences

147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 400-01.
150. Id. at 406.
151. Alyeh, supra note 146, at 401.
152. Id. at 404.
153. See discussion supra Part II.C.1, 2.a.
154. See discussion supra Part II.C.2.a.
155. See discussion supra Part II.C.2.d.
156. See discussion supra Part II.C.2.b.
and contradictions only further serve to divide Lebanese Christian communities themselves, not to mention Lebanese society as a whole.

There are many historical reasons for the legal divide between Christian and Muslim communities in Lebanon. A call to radically change this practice is not only unrealistic, but also potentially dangerous given the presence of Hizbollah\textsuperscript{157} and other terrorist groups which have used Lebanese internal weaknesses to create instability in the region in the past and continue their attempts to do so.\textsuperscript{158} However, this is not necessarily detrimental to the current and future state of Lebanon, and its Christian and Muslim populations.

At present, there is a divide between nations fighting the war on terror and Middle Eastern countries, whose response to the war varies from the more aggressive pursuit of terrorists,\textsuperscript{159} to countries which are much more likely to pay lip service to the idea of stopping terrorists than to take concrete action to stop them.\textsuperscript{160} The divide is both political and cultural, and in many cases is mirrored in the structure of legal, or at least tacit, legitimization of terror groups in the electoral process.\textsuperscript{161} In the morass of intra-national and inter-Arab debate over terrorism and Islamist concepts, there are very few state-based ways to offer interested Muslims a way out of conflict without engendering suspicion from outside forces and their co-religionists. However, the situation of the Lebanese Christian communities presents such an opportunity for Muslims, as well as for the Christian communities themselves.

The legal framework for religious tolerance in Lebanon already exists. At the same time, there exists a legislative power structure in which

\textsuperscript{157} See generally Background Note: Lebanon, \textit{supra} note 14 (offering a brief explanation of the origins of Hizbollah).

\textsuperscript{158} See \textit{LEBANON FACTBOOK}, \textit{supra} note 14. Hizbollah has become such an entrenched presence in the Lebanese political sphere that, for the first time, an open member of Hizbollah was elected to the Parliament and is serving as a minister. \textit{See Lebanon Reborn? Defining National Priorities and Prospects for Democratic Renewal in the Wake of March 14, 2005: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on International Relations, 109th Cong. 3-5 (2005) (statement of Rep. Tom Lantos) [hereinafter \textit{Lebanon Reborn?}]. This ministerial appointment has drawn sharp criticism, especially from the United States, which is unable to meet with any members of Hizbollah, in accordance with its policies regarding giving even tacit recognition to terrorist groups. \textit{See id.} at 8-12 (statement of C. David Welch, Assistant Sec., Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dept. of State).

\textsuperscript{159} Egypt, for example, has been fighting the Muslim Brotherhood for years. \textit{See generally Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism, and Political Change in Egypt} (2002).

\textsuperscript{160} See discussion \textit{infra} Part III (discussing Syria).

\textsuperscript{161} Egypt is a primary example of this despite its long-time ban on political participation by the Muslim Brotherhood. \textit{See generally Wickham, supra} note 159.
Christians could take centralized control of their assigned governmental segments, as well as the appointment powers given to the President (provided that the president himself was not a Syrian pawn). Using these constitutional powers, a united Christian block could start taking corrective measures to rid Lebanon of Syrian presence, and the presence of Hizbollah and other such terror groups operating in Lebanon. With the attention garnered by the assassination of Rafik Hariri, and the subsequent attempts on the lives of other anti-Syrian voices, Lebanese Christians and Muslims began vocal protests which resulted in at least the superficial withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon. The withdrawal, however, did not remove Syrian influence from Lebanon and did not stop terrorist groups from using Lebanon as a training ground and bank through which to launder illicit funds. Currently, intelligence, military, and security analysts attest to Lebanon's role in terrorism, and members of

162. See Background Note: Lebanon, supra note 14.

163. See id.

164. JOHNSON, supra note 38, at 243-49 (detailing recent Syrian actions to manipulate domestic Lebanese politics from the local level upwards, as well as Lebanese foreign policy in regards to its relationship with Israel).


166. See, e.g., WMD Terrorism and Proliferant States: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Prevention of Nuclear and Biological Attack of the H. Comm. on Homeland Security, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Dr. Daniel Byman, Director, Center for Peace and Security Studies, Georgetown University Senior Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution); Lebanon Reborn?, supra note 158, at 8-12 (statement of C. David Welch, Assistant Sec., Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dept. of State); id. at 14-16 (statement of The Honorable James Kunder, Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Asia and the Near East, U.S. Agency for International Development); id. at 37-41 (statement of Paul Salem, Ph.D., Writer and Analyst, Beirut, Lebanon); Foreign Assistance Oversight: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 109th Cong. 33-42 (2005) (statement of
both parties on Capitol Hill are adopting these views as fact. At the same time, a study of legislative proposals and enactments since September 11, 2001 indicates that the United States government is increasingly willing to provide Lebanon with resources to build peaceful institutions. In the days after Hariri’s assassination, a bi-partisan chorus was heard essentially acknowledging that Lebanon is not a willing participant in Syria’s policies and calling for a stronger and independent Lebanon.

If the Lebanese Christian communities decided to act as a block, rather than breaking down along confessional lines, they could elect MPs who would act in concert. It is the belief of the author that at least some Sunni members would go along with this to avenge Hariri. Legal protection of religious beliefs already exists in Lebanese statutory law, and the Christian communities would still be able to maintain their own personal status-based courts and councils under such an alliance. The major change would be a change in mindset from thinking of oneself as a part of a separate legal enclave within Lebanon to thinking of oneself as a

Honorable David M. Satterfield, Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State, Washington, D.C.).


168. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 35 (2005) (advocating, in a report from the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, extending U.S. aid money to southern Lebanon for the purpose of assisting in water infrastructural development); H. REP. No. 663 (2002) (advocating, in a report from the House Committee on appropriations, continued funding of religious and other international organizations working in Lebanon at or above the $35,000,000 level, which had been previously appropriated). Cf. H. REP. No. 345 (2001) (advocating extending the bar on sending U.S. funds of any sort to Syria).

169. For an example of pre-Hariri assassination legislation, see Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-175 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2151 (2004). For some examples of Hariri assassination-based statements, see S. Res. 77, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. Res. 91, 109th Cong. (2005); Exec. Order No. 13,338, 69 Fed. Reg. 26,751 (May 11, 2004) (extended by H.R. Doc. 109-21 (2005)). In this context, it is important to note that, in addition to Syrian removal from Lebanon, Lebanese Christians have voiced an overwhelming interest in settling the Lebanese-Israeli dispute and bringing peace on that front. See Haddad, supra note 42, at 613 (“Lebanese Christian respondents reveal more than 90% in favor of peace with Israel.”). The stated reasons for this desire for peace are both aspirational and pragmatic, with many Lebanese seeing peace with Israel as part of the path towards a more stable and prosperous Lebanese economy. See id. at 613-22 (describing empirical findings regarding Lebanese Christian support for Lebanese-Israeli peace).

170. See discussion supra Part II.C.

171. See discussion supra Part II.C.2.b.
Lebanese Christian. The disconnect between constitutional, statutory law and tradition could, in this instance, be used to give the Christian communities the strength and reassurance needed to create a power block. In turn, the author believes that this block would be formidable enough to encourage further support from the international community, particularly the United States, and provided that the constitutional and statutory provisions allowing freedom of religion were not abridged, would pave the way for a stable and less sectarian Lebanon in the future.

Admittedly, there is a risk that the Christian communities could attempt to overstep legal boundaries. However, considering the negative view taken by the international community to more strife in the Middle East, and the existence of Muslim terrorism groups in Lebanon, to say nothing of recent memories of wartime atrocities, it is unlikely that such an usurpation would happen. Assuming that such an usurpation did not happen, a Christian block would function to offer Lebanese Muslims the benefit of having an ideology to adhere to, while not having to splinter their own communities as much to get to the ideology.

III. SYRIA

A. Christian Communities in Syria

Although they do not share the notoriety of their Lebanese neighbors, Christian communities in Syria are just as historically based. There are several Christian groups in Syria, although most literature lumps them together as “Christians.” It is estimated that 10% of Syrians are Christians of some variety. The Greek Orthodox Patriarch for Antioch and All The East sits in Syria, and many religious and charitable works are carried out through the auspices of the Patriarchate. There are several


174. See Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Antioch and All the East, Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, available at http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9037927 (last visited Feb. 22, 2006); Historical Overview, Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Antioch and All The East, available at http://antiochpat.org/english/sitefiles/viewcontent.php?content=%241%24Fqww80sV%24LJl/mlsne5lz0mZ5kCy0_%241%24Y2fEC.3%242X4rjsf3DqljEbC53bz6R/_%241%24Fqww80sV%24LJl/mlsne5lz0mZ5kCy0b56a92baa0ee987eb7f7e4a179b60efb&i=1&cat=%241%24DdKoSQCb%24FO96gT8jCFwnHPxW4LNZj1%241%24pCxQHS8F%24GHaB W0fpsqpxYoSn4BEOM/_%241%24DdKoSQCb%24FO96gT8jCFwnHPxW4LNZj150102e
Uniate churches in Syria, principally Syriac Catholicism, the Melkite Church, the Assyrian Church of the East, the Copts, the Maronites, as well as Roman Catholicism itself. One of the often unheard of side effects of the current Iraqi political situation is that the Christian Assyrians (or Chaldo-Assyrians), a group which has in recent years come to rely on the Kurds for support and protection, are now being removed from their traditional areas by the Kurds and are fleeing to neighboring countries, including Syria.

B. Syrian Independence and History

The Syrian Arab Republic was established as an independent entity in 1946, and has remained such until the present day, with a slight interruption in independence occurring during the ill-fated attempt at Egyptian and Syrian unity, the United Arab Republic. Its constitution was not promulgated until 1973. The religious composition of Syria at its founding did not mirror the levels of equality experienced in Lebanon; the majority of the population was Muslim, with Sunnis being the dominant sect.

During the early part of Syria’s existence, there was political instability and infighting among groups vying for governmental primacy; however, political dominance started to coalesce in the 1960s and 1970s with the creation and rise to prominence of the Ba’ath party. Though widely viewed today through the lens of Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist state

124822220aaa78a8e3b2cca34&catid=3&contentname=Historical%20Overview&catname=Other%20Contents (last visited Feb. 22, 2006).

175. See Gemayel, supra note 34 (detailing the many Christian communities which exist in both Syria and Lebanon).

176. See House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, FOREIGN POLICY ASPECTS OF THE WAR AGAINST TERRORISM ev118-ev119 (2004), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200405/cmselect/cmfaff/109/109.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2006) (“There are currently only about 800,000 to one million Chaldo-Assyrians left in Iraq. Tens of thousands of them fled to neighbouring countries such as Jordan and Syria after lethal and co-ordinated church bombings by Islamic extremists killed at least 12 people and injured many more in August 2004.”) Id. at ev118;

177. Background Note: Syria, supra note 172.

178. Id.

179. Id.

180. EYAL ZISSER, ASAD’S LEGACY: SYRIA IN TRANSITION 5 (2001) [hereinafter ZISSER SYRIA].

181. Id. at 6-8; Khuri, supra note 20, at 49.
in Iraq, and the Assad state in Syria, it is interesting to note that one of the fathers of Ba'athism was himself a Greek Orthodox, who established the party as a way to promote pan-Arab unity.\textsuperscript{182} The intent of the Ba'ath party was initially secular, with the unifying element being a shared Arab ethnicity rather than religion.\textsuperscript{183}

At the same time that Ba'athism was coming to prominence in Syria, so too were the Muslim minority Alawis, who were easily outnumbered by Sunnis.\textsuperscript{184} Alawi leaders began infuse themselves in the Ba'ath party, as well as governmental and military apparatuses, and ultimately were able consolidate power and take control of Syria under Hafiz al-Assad.\textsuperscript{185} From 1970 until his death in 2000, Hafiz al-Assad ruled Syria under the guise of being the elected President and Ba'ath party leader.\textsuperscript{186} In the wake of Hafiz al-Assad's death, his second son, Bashar al-Assad, was elected President of Syria in a move which required a constitutional amendment lowering the age of eligibility for the office of President.\textsuperscript{187} Despite his stated desire to bring Syria into the modern world, \textsuperscript{188} Bashar al-Assad's presidency has thus far been known for its ties to many terrorist groups,\textsuperscript{189} political repression following a brief period of opening,\textsuperscript{190} and most recently, its role in the assassination of former

\textsuperscript{182} See Zisser Syria, supra note 180, at 5.

\textsuperscript{183} See Raymond Hinnebusch, Syria: Revolution from Above 20 (2001) (describing the early involvement of Christians – particularly Greek Orthodox, in the Ba'athist movement); Zisser Syria, supra note 180, at 26-27.

\textsuperscript{184} Id. at 48-49, 69-72.

\textsuperscript{185} Id. at 67-69.

\textsuperscript{186} See Background Note: Syria, supra note 172.

\textsuperscript{187} Id.

\textsuperscript{188} See Flynt Lawrence Leverett, Inheriting Syria: Bashar's Trial by Fire 100 (2005).


\textsuperscript{190} See Background Note: Syria, supra note 172; State-Civil Society Relations: Syria, United Nations Development Programme, Programme on Governance in the Arab Region, available at http://www.pogar.org/countries/civil.asp?cid=19 (last visited Mar. 6, 2006); Leverett, supra note 188, at 88-95.
Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri – the increasingly anti-Syrian figure discussed in Part II of this article.\(^1\)

In terms of Lebanese relations, Syria has considered Lebanon to be a rightful part of its territory since its founding,\(^2\) and has not shied away from saying that its separation from Lebanon is essentially illegal.\(^3\) Indeed, the language of the Syrian Constitution preamble clearly reflects both this belief and the Ba’athist belief that the partition of the Middle East was illegal.\(^4\) Syrian claims to rights over the domestic situation in Lebanon only increased with the power of Israel, and often Syria and Israel have used Lebanon as a battleground in their own disputes.\(^5\) The Lebanese civil war provided a ripe situation for Syrian intervention, and throughout the decades of war the Syrian regime did just that, although it intervened for different sides at different times, and was no more averse to providing support to Christian fighters than to Hizbollah during the course of the conflict.\(^6\)

The years of ceasefire in Lebanon have not seen a relaxing of Syrian control.\(^7\) There is perhaps no better evidence of this than the Hariri incident, which has raised the specter of Syrian secret police control over Lebanon and its political actors to an international frenzy.\(^8\) No longer the elephant in the room of Middle Eastern diplomacy, the Hariri assassination, and the public outcry and investigation which followed, has brought Syrian tactics to the forefront of world politics. In a global atmosphere which widely regards Syria as implicated in nefarious forms of

\(^{191.}\) See discussion supra Part II. It is perhaps not surprising that Bashar al-Assad has been at least inadvertently linked to Syrian operations in Lebanon, as before ascending to the presidency he was given control of the “Lebanon file,” Syria’s terminology for the oversight of Syrian operations in Lebanon. See LEVERETT, supra note 188, at 100.

\(^{192.}\) See ZISSER SYRIA, supra note 180, at 129-32; LEVERETT, supra note 188, at 3-4.

\(^{193.}\) See LEVERETT, supra note 188, at 3-4 (describing the Syrian view that Lebanon, as well as Jordan, was artificially created by the West and should be territorially part of Syria).


\(^{195.}\) See discussion supra Part II; HINNEBUSCH, supra note 183, at 155-56.

\(^{196.}\) See HINNEBUSCH, supra note 183, at 155-56 (describing the Syrian aims in switching alliances during the civil war as framed against the Israeli/Syrian situation); ZISSER SYRIA, supra note 180, at 133-36.

\(^{197.}\) A year after the Ta’if Agreement was formalized, Syria and a war-weakened Lebanon entered into the Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination, which sought to tacitly legitimize the presence of Syria in Lebanon after the conclusion of the war. See ZISSER SYRIA, supra note 180, at 129-30.

\(^{198.}\) See discussion supra Part II; see also Background Note: Lebanon, supra note 14; see also Tim Lister, Syrian Lawmakers Lambaste Ex-VP, Dec. 31, 2005, available at http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/12/31/syria.reax.
financing and terrorism, this controversy has created a weakened position for the current Syrian regime.

C. Syrian Constitutional and Statutory Law

1. Constitutional Law

The current provisions of the Syrian Constitution were enacted in 1973.\textsuperscript{199} Much of the constitutional preamble deals with Ba’athist goals and beliefs, enshrining pan-Arabism as the preeminent constitutional and political principle in Syria.\textsuperscript{200} Theoretically, Syria "is a democratic, popular, socialist, and sovereign state,"\textsuperscript{201} to be run as a republic. Further, Islam is declared the primary provider of Syrian legislation,\textsuperscript{202} and although a state religion is not provided for in the constitution, "[t]he religion of the President of the Republic has to be Islam."\textsuperscript{204} At the same time, the constitution also provides that "[t]he freedom of faith is guaranteed. The state respects all religions"\textsuperscript{205} and "[t]he state guarantees the freedom to hold any religious rites, provided they do not disturb the public order."\textsuperscript{206} Thus, religious rights are both protected and circumscribed by a subjective constitutional standard.

Much of the Syrian Constitution reflects the strong affiliation which existed between Syria and communist countries prior to the collapse of the U.S.S.R.\textsuperscript{207} The role of socialism in framing the Syrian legal system is particularly evident in the constitutional provisions regarding categories of allowed ownership,\textsuperscript{208} and the rights of owners of real and personal property in their belongings;\textsuperscript{209} the right of the state to appropriate personal funds and belongings is also set out in the constitution.\textsuperscript{210}

Interestingly, the Syrian Constitution’s plain meaning expresses a respect for the individual in criminal matters\textsuperscript{211} and specifically states that "[n]o one may be tortured physically or mentally or be treated in a

\begin{footnotes}
\item[199] See Background Note: Syria, supra note 172.
\item[200] See Syria [Constitution], supra note 194, at pmbl.
\item[201] Id. at ch. 1, pt. 1, art. 1.
\item[202] Id. at art. 2.
\item[203] Id. at art. 3.
\item[204] Id.
\item[205] Id. at art. 35.
\item[206] See Syria [Constitution], supra note 194, at ch. 1, pt. 1, art. 35.
\item[207] See generally Leverett, supra note 188, at 54-55.
\item[208] See Syria [Constitution], supra note 194, at ch. 1, pt. 2, arts. 14, 16.
\item[209] Id. at art. 15.
\item[210] Id.
\item[211] Id. at pt. 4, arts. 28, 29.
\end{footnotes}
These tenets are applied more stringently in word than in practice under the Syrian regime according to official reports. Again highlighting the disconnect between constitutional jurisprudence and practices of the Syrian regime, the constitution guarantees "[e]very citizen has the right to freely and openly express his views in words, in writing, and through all other means of expression.... The state guarantees the freedom of the press, of printing, and publication in accordance with the law." The right to publicly gather and protest is also guaranteed in the Syrian Constitution, tempered by the express proviso that "[t]he law regulates the exercise of this right."

Electoral districts are defined under Syrian constitutional law as being formed by a set number of peasants and workers per area, and are not drawn according to sectarian affiliations. Nominally, the People's Assembly - the Syrian legislative branch - has wide-ranging constitutional powers; however, in reality the associates of the Assad regimes have wielded these powers from within legislative and ministerial circles. The constitution sets out many powers for the President as well, including a place on the Syrian Supreme Court and the High Council of the Judiciary.

2. Syrian Statutory Law

Constitutional protections aside, all Syrians are entitled to suffrage from age 18 onwards, as long as they are not members of the military or police forces, or immigrants to Syria. Despite these protections, Syrians lack the ability to directly change their government at the federal

212. *Id.* at art. 28.
213. See generally Background Note: Syria, *supra* note 172.
214. SYRIA [Constitution], *supra* note 194, at ch. 1, pt. 4, art. 38.
215. *Id.* at art. 39.
216. *Id.* at ch. 2, pt. 1, art. 53.
218. See Background Note: Syria, *supra* note 172.
219. See SYRIA [Constitution], *supra* note 194, at ch. 2, pt. 2.
220. *Id.* at ch. 3, pt. 2, art. 139.
221. *Id.* at pt. 1, art. 132.
223. *Id.*
224. *Id.*
level under the electoral law, and have open electoral options at the most basic levels of political elections.\textsuperscript{225}

In terms of personal status, Syrian law recognizes the same set of religious courts for determining status-based questions as does Lebanese law.\textsuperscript{226} These courts fit into a judicial structure in Syria which is heavily linked to the regime at the helm.\textsuperscript{227}

The constitution is essentially ineffective in the face of emergency laws which have been in effect for decades in Syria;\textsuperscript{228} these rules include the applicability of marital law to the general population, especially political protesters and dissidents.\textsuperscript{229} Additionally, the emergency laws are routinely used in Syria to control the media and its messages.\textsuperscript{230} During an attempted reformation of Syria's laws in 2005, the Assad government promulgated rules purporting to require that the prosecutorial body holding prisoners state a reason for the detention within five days of the onset of the detention.\textsuperscript{231} Importantly, however, security and terrorism related crimes do not fall under the terms of these legal changes.\textsuperscript{232}

None of these laws are directed at religious groups in particular, as the focus of the state is the control of the population as a whole, especially given the status of the ruling Alawi elite as a minority religion within the Syrian Muslim population. The state apparatus has made itself into an all-encompassing bureaucracy in order to subjugate the religious and class differences that existed from the time of Syrian independence onwards, and has at least facially completed part of its task.\textsuperscript{233}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Id. The election laws for local elections were drastically amended in April, 2005 to allow for greater electoral freedom for positions lesser than those of the governor.
\item Id.
\item Id.
\item Id.
\item Id.
\item Id.
\item See HINNEBUSCH, \textit{supra} note 183, at 84-85 (describing the role of the state bureaucracy in Syrian society); Raymond A. Hinnebusch, \textit{Class and State in Ba'athist Syria} in \textit{SYRIA: SOCIETY, CULTURE, AND POLICY} (Richard T. Antoun and Donald Quataert eds., 1991) (describing the educational apparatus established under the Assad regime); LEVERETT, \textit{supra} note 188, at 24-25.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
D. Possibilities for the future

The strength of the Christian communities in Syria is difficult to assess because of the lack of information available, however it is clear that there are such communities involved in active worship and religious works.234 It is also clear that the forced migration of Assyrians from Iraq to Syria is an evolving situation235 which, over time, could result in a political issue for the Syrian regime, as well as Syrian Christian leaders.

While tensions might not be overtly brewing within Syrian Christian communities, the increasing international scrutiny on the Assad government could lead to greater disturbances in the social and political order in Syria. This in turn could cause sectarianism to come to the forefront of Syrian politics, causing problems in Muslim and Christian communities. Given these considerations, it is important to note that analysts and United States lawmakers have steadily increased their stated beliefs that Syria has been and continues to be a source of support for terrorist groups,236 their financiers and arms providers,237 as well as a place of severe political repression,238 and a state involved in repeated incursions into the sovereignty of Lebanon.239 The Hariri controversy may be the

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234. In addition to the existence of churches and Christian religious organizations in Syria, perhaps the best measure of the presence and vivacity of Christian communities in Syria is that 10% of the population does identify itself as Christian.

235. See supra note 176 at ev 118.

236. See LEVERETT, supra note 188, at 10 (stating that Syria was first placed on the United States’ state-sponsored terrorism watch list in 1979; it has not been removed since); Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-175 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2151 (2004)).


239. See Background Note: Lebanon, supra note 14; H. Con. Res. 32, 109th Cong. (2005) ("Expressing the grave concern of Congress regarding the occupation of the Republic of
most visible chapter in this escalation of international hostilities with the Syrian regime. However, the Syrian Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003, enacted by Congress and signed into law by the President, is an indication that skepticism about the propriety of the Syrian position in Lebanon existed before the death of Hariri and will continue even after the conclusion of the investigation into his assassination.

In this context, Syrian Christian communities stand in a position to influence their status and the future of Syria by taking action to undermine the Assad regime, at the most extreme, or at least to enforce their constitutional rights and force the abrogation of emergency and statutory laws that serve only to abridge the rights guaranteed to all Syrians under the constitution. Certainly, there is risk involved in this course of action, and perhaps the best way to encourage this type of agitation is through members of the Syrian diaspora living abroad, as well as funding and legislative actions by the United States and its allies to assist these communities. By creating a shared identity outside of the state apparatus, Syrian Christians would create a way to circumvent repressive politics while acting confidently in their constitutional rights and privileges. With adequate support, this could prompt regime changes which would open society for all Syrians and stop Syrian incursions into Lebanon, thus further raising the international prestige of Syria as a whole and promoting greater regional stability.

In this context, Lebanese and Syrian Christian communities would do best to work in tandem to promote their agendas within the legal frameworks which protect them in their respective countries. The current disconnect between the provisions of the Lebanese and Syrian constitutions and their respective statutory laws is not insurmountable, especially as constitutions tend to engender a more exalted status in society than do legislatively promulgated laws, which can be more easily done away with.

Lebanon by the Syrian Arab Republic”; this bill was introduced nearly a month before the Hariri assassination); H.R. 1141, 109th Cong. (2005) (introducing the “Lebanon and Syria Liberation Act”).

This article has discussed the Christian communities in Lebanon and Syria, as well as the legal protections guaranteed for citizens of Lebanon and Syria under their respective constitutional and statutory laws. Emphasis has been placed on certain aspects of legal life in both countries, as the author believes that these areas are key testing grounds for the connection between constitutional protections and everyday life – and in this test both countries fail. Brief historical sketches have been offered in order to provide a background for the religious and legal discussions of the article, and also to illustrate why Christian communities in these countries would function best when they function as a co-religionist block rather than within the framework of their own sects.

Admittedly, the courses of action advocated in this article would require all communities to put away sectarian interests, which is much more easily advocated than achieved in reality. However, the reality of the current political situation in the Middle East, and international relations as a whole is changing to the point where alliances with groups which share at least some communal interests are becoming more necessary than in the post-World War II era of self-determination and group segregation for statehood purposes. Both legally and politically, now is the time for Christian communities in Lebanon and Syria to come together to help reshape their states in ways which previous conflicts have not allowed. The story of Babel, reflected in modern Christian community conflicts such as that experienced in Lebanon, is a constant reminder of what happens when societies divide over a common aim; it is hoped that a bringing together of Christian communities may take them from the ruin of collapse and failure to a path towards a state which embraces its enunciated respect for religious freedom.