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RUDOLF VON JHERING’S INFLUENCE ON KARL LLEWELLYN

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PART I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE LIFE AND WORK OF KARL LLEWELLYN ......................... 96
   A. The Early Years of Karl Llewellyn: Life, Education, and Career ....................... 96
   B. The Later Years of Karl Llewellyn: Scholarship and Philosophy ....................... 98

PART II ................................................................. 104
   A. German Jurisprudence in the 19th Century ..................................................... 104
   B. The Early Years of Rudolf von Jhering: Life and Education ............................. 106
   C. The Later Years of Rudolf von Jhering: Scholarship and Philosophy ............... 107

PART III. THE INFLUENCE OF GERMAN JURISPRUDENCE ON AMERICAN
          JURISPRUDENTIAL THEORY AND THOUGHT ............................................. 109
   A. The Foundations in America for the Reception of German Jurisprudence .......... 109
   B. The German Free Law Movement .................................................................... 110
   C. Reception of the Free Law Movement in the United States ............................ 113

PART IV. RUDOLF VON JHERING’S INFLUENCE OF THE LIFE AND WORK OF KARL
          LLEWELLYN ............................................................................................. 114
   A. Dismissal of German Jurisprudence .................................................................. 114

PART V. CONCLUSION .......................................................................................... 116

Karl Llewellyn1 is today considered one of the most prominent representatives of

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1. The breadth and scope of Karl Llewellyn’s lifetime of experiences and work is remarkable in today’s era of legal concentration and specialization. Llewellyn’s contributions, whether in his academic, professional
the American Legal Realist School. Although American legal realism is no longer the predominant school of jurisprudence in the United States, it still plays an important role in the formation of our legal traditions. Consider President Obama's recent statement concerning the candidate successfully nominated to the United States Supreme Court:

I will seek someone who understands that justice isn't about some abstract legal theory or footnote in a case book, it is also about how our laws affect the daily realities of people's lives, whether they can make a living, and care for their families, whether they feel safe in their homes, and welcome in their own nation.

Several of Llewellyn's contemporaries in the American legal academy, including Arthur Corbin, Jerome Frank and Roscoe Pound have been cited as influences on his
thinking. Given his significant links with the German legal academy, it is not surprising that Llewellyn’s work appears also to have benefited from his acquaintance with the work of German-speaking contemporaries and predecessors. In particular, Llewellyn’s debt to the work of Rudolf von Jhering\(^7\) deserves exploration.

The purpose of this Article is to shed light on the influence of Rudolf von Jhering on Karl Llewellyn. Part I offers a brief overview of Llewellyn’s life, education, major work, and jurisprudential philosophy.\(^8\) Part II offers the same overview for Jhering.\(^9\) Part III gives a general account of the influence of German jurisprudence on American jurisprudential theory and thought.\(^10\) Finally, Part IV surveys the recognized influence from German jurisprudence on Llewellyn’s work and examines Jhering’s influence in particular, with an emphasis on how Jhering may have affected Llewellyn’s work on the Uniform Commercial Code.\(^11\)
PART I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE LIFE AND WORK OF KARL LLEWELLYN

A. The Early Years of Karl Llewellyn: Life, Education, and Career

Karl Llewellyn was born in Seattle, Washington on May 22, 1893, and spent most of his childhood and adolescence in Brooklyn, New York. Showing immense intellectual promise, he graduated from high school at the age of sixteen. Because he was not old enough to enroll as a student at Yale College, his father decided that he would benefit from a period in Germany. Llewellyn happily spent the next three years boarding with relatives of a family friend and attending the Realgymnasium at Schwerin, in Mecklenburg, Germany.

This time spent studying in Germany played an important role in Llewellyn’s life, because at a young age, he was intellectually, culturally, and socially stimulated. The “German experience” enabled him to pursue his studies further with a wider range of awareness, advancing his intellectual inquiry and creativity. This exposure proved particularly useful later in his academic career; Llewellyn was able to use this early experience and knowledge to gain popularity and respect amongst the leading German jurists of the time.

By the time Karl Llewellyn left Mecklenburg, he was completely bilingual and even fluent in the local German dialect. Before returning to the United States and enrolling in Yale College, Llewellyn spent a brief time at the University of Lausanne in Switzerland. Then in 1914, Llewellyn ventured to Paris to study Latin, French, and Greek.

12. TWINING, supra note 11, at 87.
14. TWINING, supra note 11, at 89. Around this time, Mecklenburg had six Realgymnasien and over a thousand students. U.S. BUREAU OF EDUC., REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION 169 (1891) (noting that Mecklenburg had seven gymnasia in 1889). Like other (historical) types of Gymnasium, a Realgymnasium was a nine-year school that combined approximately the periods corresponding to middle school and high school in the United States and allows students to subsequently advance to university education. Id. See also Robert Anderson, The Idea of the Secondary School in Nineteenth-Century Europe, 40 PAEDAGOGICA HISTORICA 93 (2004) (discussing the German Gymnasium and the French lycée as standards of structured, advanced secondary education).
15. TWINING, supra note 11, at 89. Karl Llewellyn also published several law articles and a book in German. Albert Ehrenzweig was one of many distinguished jurists, who was of the opinion that he preferred “Llewellyn’s German to his English prose style.” Id. Ehrenzweig was born in 1906 in Herzogenburg, Lower Austria (a small town about 50 kilometers west of Vienna) into a family that brought forward several distinguished legal scholars. Making himself a name as a judge and scholar in Austria in the 1930s, he had to emigrate due to his Jewish ancestry in 1938. After obtaining U.S. law degrees at Columbia and the University of Chicago, he served as the member of the staff of the Law Revision Commission of New York as well as a practicing attorney at the Cravath law firm in New York. In 1948, he was appointed to the faculty of the University of California at Berkeley, where he became a leading authority on conflict of laws and tort law in the United States. Ehrenzweig died in Berkeley in 1974. See Edward C. Halbach, Foreword, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1419, 1419–20 (1966); John N. Hazard, In Memoriam, 22 AM. J. COMP. L. 603, 603 (1974); Richard W. Jennings et al., In Memoriam Albert A. Ehrenzweig (1906–1974), 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1069 (1974); Walter Perry Johnson, Albert Armin Ehrenzweig, Law: Berkeley 1906-1974 (Univ. of Cal. Academic Senate, Berkeley, Cal.), May 1977. Regarding Llewellyn’s prose, see also Manfred Rehbinder, Einleitung des Herausgebers [Editor’s Preface], Preface to KARL N. LLEWELLYN, RECHT, RECHTSLEBEN UND GESELLSCHAFT 7-8 (1977) (noting that Llewellyn developed the habit of creating new words also in the German language, e.g. “Trecht” as a term for the law (“Recht”) in action).
law, and at the Sorbonne. While there, war broke out and Llewellyn travelled to Germany to attempt to enlist. While accompanying the 78th Prussian Infantry on the western front, he was wounded and spent three months in a military hospital before returning to Yale. For his efforts, he was awarded the Iron Cross Second Class. His military service and subsequent recognition solidified his affinity with the German culture.

Upon graduation from Yale College in 1915, Llewellyn entered Yale Law School. This was an atypical time to be a student at Yale Law due to the transitory war period; the school lost more than half of its students and faculty as a result of America’s entry into the war. As a result, Llewellyn “got little competition or stimulus from his fellows.” On the other hand, Llewellyn was present at a time of much heated philosophical debate and change. He received personalized attention and instruction from the remaining faculty, particularly Arthur Corbin.

Soon, Llewellyn became the Editor-in-Chief of the Yale Law Journal and, reminiscent of the intellectual promise he showed as a high school student, graduated top of his class. Upon graduation in the spring of 1919, Llewellyn taught commercial law at Yale. That subject “remained, with jurisprudence, his great love.”

Beginning in 1920, Llewellyn worked in the legal department of the National City Bank, and then at the law firm of Shearman and Sterling, to which the Bank eventually transferred its legal department. Llewellyn’s transfer to Shearman & Sterling turned out to be a perfect occurrence of events since it gave him the opportunity to work directly under William W. Lancaster, a leading authority on banking law of the time. Armed
with superior practical and theoretical legal experience, Llewellyn now possessed the necessary tools to teach commercial law.

In 1923, Llewellyn became a law professor at Yale Law School. A year later, he moved to Columbia Law School where his wife was a graduate student. This allowed for close intellectual relationships with other Columbia faculty members, particularly with Herman Oliphant. As a specialist in commercial law, Llewellyn was appointed as Commissioner to the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (“NCCUSL”). Among other important roles, he participated in drafting the Uniform Chattel Mortgage Act and the Uniform Trust Receipts Act.

Throughout the 1920s, “formalism” ruled American jurisprudence. Llewellyn began to shift some of his focus toward jurisprudence in an effort to depart “from a tough taught tradition of doctrinal analysis.” One such example of Llewellyn’s break from formalism is his casebook on sales, serving as a classic non-formalist approach toward the regulation of sales.

B. The Later Years of Karl Llewellyn: Scholarship and Philosophy

Karl Llewellyn’s interest in legal jurisprudence further developed upon his return to Germany in the late 1920s. As a visiting professor at Leipzig in the winter term of 1928-29, Llewellyn started a series of lectures which were published five years later under the title 《Präjudizienrecht und Rechtsprechung in Amerika》[The Case Law System in America]. This work was translated into English in 1989. Meant as an introductory

29. HULL, supra note 1, at 138. Llewellyn married Elizabeth Sanford, who was then a graduate student in economics at Columbia when he visited at Columbia Law School in 1924, while maintaining informal teaching positions at Yale Law School. Id.

30. TWINING, supra note 11, at 103. Oliphant was a professor at Columbia who alongside Llewellyn served as members of most important curriculum committees: business relations and methodology. See id. Llewellyn mostly agreed with Oliphant in their approach in organizing courses, particularly in the area of business relations. Id.

31. Id. at 104.

32. Id. In addition to making significant contributions to commercial law, Karl Llewellyn also sought other challenges, and he began involving himself in three main aspects of law: (1) anthropology and sociology (1920s); (2) appellate judicial process and case law (1927); (3) concentration on the curriculum committees at Columbia (late 1920’s). Id. at 105–06. At the outset of his career at Columbia Law in 1925, Llewellyn set out to put his theory into practice. Such examples are giving a series of lectures in Germany in 1928 as well as contributing to the Columbia Law School through his involvement in the Columbia Law Review Symposium and regular curriculum committee meetings.

33. Id. at 104.

34. Id. at 105. During this time, Llewellyn kept in close contact with Judge Cardozo and other judges. For instance, Arthur Corbin’s The Law and the Judges, was influential for Llewellyn. He also attended Judge Cardozo’s “Storrs Lectures on The nature of the Judicial Process.” Id. at 106. Cardozo was a prominent judicial figure who played a major role in Llewellyn’s interest regarding the judicial processes and interpretations. Id. Llewellyn held Cardozo in high regard, even praising Cardozo in his book, The Common Law Tradition, for Cardozo’s ability to interpret documents in their commercial context to make sense of the parties’ dealings. RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 16 (1990).

35. TWINING, supra note 11, at 106.

36. Id.

piece, it “presented an unusually bold and sophisticated account of the practical functioning of American case law” and solidified Llewellyn’s interest in:

[T]he processes and techniques of judicial decisions, as well as in the doctrines that could be extracted from them and he began to realize how much general jurisprudential writing was based on the selective use of examples rather than on the disciplined testing of the hypotheses against the facts of daily practice.

The book is also remarkable because it included a number of opinions by U.S. courts, which he had translated to use them in his course. Llewellyn felt that German jurists had not been given enough source materials to get a clear picture of the American variety of the common law tradition. Unfortunately, the year when it was finally published, 1933, also marked the ascendance of the Nazis to power, which obviously cut off critical debates, thus making it harder for the book to become influential in Germany.

The success of his first stint as visiting professor in Germany suggests that he was well-integrated into German university culture and life. Moreover, in 1931, Llewellyn was again invited to lecture as a visiting professor at Leipzig. One the basis of his introductory lecture to legal sociology he started to work on another book, entitled Recht, Rechtsleben und Gesellschaft [Law, the Life of Law, and Society]. This piece was written in the tradition of Ehrlich, whom he had the opportunity to thoroughly read during his first visit to Germany, and “represents Llewellyn’s first sustained attempt to develop a sociological theory of law.” It was not published until 1977, since the Great Depression put the prospective publisher into dire financial circumstances and the manuscript was only rediscovered and published by the Swiss legal sociologist Manfred Rehbinder decades later.

Llewellyn’s return to Germany to advance his academic career undoubtedly had a profound impact on his scholarship and jurisprudential philosophy. While in Leipzig, “Llewellyn had close contact with a number of distinguished German scholars,” including Hermann Kantorowicz, who had lectured at Columbia in 1927 and most likely

38. Adam, supra note 37, at 690.
39. TWINING, supra note 11, at 106.
40. Id. at 106–07.
41. Ansaldi, supra note 13, at 713. See id. at 720–45, for a detailed summary of the book.
43. TWINING, supra note 11, at 106–07.
44. LLEWELLYN, supra note 15, at 8–9. On the significance of Eugen Ehrlich see infra Part III.B.
45. TWINING, supra note 11, at 107. Unfortunately, this book has not yet been translated into English. Ansaldi, supra note 13, at 720.
46. Rehbinder, supra note 15, at 8–9 (describing the book’s history); See also Ansaldi, supra note 13, at 720. See id. at 745–70, for a summary of the content of the book.
47. TWINING, supra note 11, at 107.
48. Id. Llewellyn described Kantorowicz as follows: And then there was Kantorowicz. As a legal historian, he rates at least with Holmes. As a logistician and technician, he rates only one notch under Jerome Michael [professor at Columbia Law School] himself. As an embodiment of vanity, he rates above any but one I have known. But Kantorowicz said to me with fervor, and at the height of his career: “I would give everything I have done, and more, to have written Gny’s Méthode.” And Kantorowicz was not a Natural Law man.
KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 422 n.46 (1960) (emphasis in the original). Llewellyn especially admired Kantorowicz’s Geny’s Method, written in 1899, because of its emphasis on the importance of common law on French legal tradition. See ROBERTA KEVELSON, CHARLES S.
organized Llewellyn’s visit to Leipzig. He also gave lectures at a number of German universities, all the while developing and maintaining an “excellent reputation among German scholars.”

Upon Llewellyn's return to Columbia, he had all but abandoned the formalist approach to jurisprudence. He and Jerome Frank advocated a sociological approach to jurisprudence. There was a notable effort urging a more sophisticated articulation of the realist philosophy, evidenced in his major works published in 1929: The Bramble Bush, Cases and Materials on the Law of Sales, and several articles on realism. This shift in perspective coupled with the published literature solidified Llewellyn as a co-leader in the American realist movement and as a key protagonist in the realist controversy that broke out in the academic legal world.

Stimulated by this intellectual revolution, Llewellyn published a prodigious...
amount of work in the 1930s. He once again had the opportunity to return to Leipzig in 1931 through 1932 and took this opportunity to extensively travel throughout Germany, no doubt exposing himself to the latest intellectual debate and juristic evolutions of the time.

During the 1930s, the scope of his intellectual capacity truly began to shine. First, Llewellyn reached new audiences when he published a book of poems and a pamphlet of lyrics. Second, in 1933, Llewellyn collaborated with Edward Adamson Hoebel and William T. Ross on a number of studies of American Indian Law. This practical experience eventually led to the publication of The Cheyenne Way, “a major contribution to the anthropological study of primitive law.” Third, his involvement in the Sacco-Vanzetti...
case allowed him to provide great assistance to the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People ("NAACP") as well as the American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU"). This enlivening experience even prompted Llewellyn to run for office. These experiences influenced his efforts toward making legal services more accessible to the poor and to the lower middle class. Lastly, Llewellyn "published a notable series of articles on the law of sales" and lectured on American state appellate courts during the 1930s as well.

the generality of the Cheyennes, not alone the "lawyers" or the "great lawyers" among them, . . . worked out their nice cases with an intuitive juristic precision which among us marks a judge as good; that the generality among them produced indeed a large percentage of work on a level of which our rarer and greater jurists could be proud.

Id. at 312–13.

61. On April 15, 1920, a robbery of a shoe factory in South Braintree, Massachusetts, ended with the shooting of a paymaster and his guard. PAUL AVRICH, SACCO AND VANZETTI: THE ANARCHIST BACKGROUND 3 (1991). Nicola Sacco was a shoe maker and Bartolomeo Vanzetti was a fish peddler. Id. Being Italian immigrants and anarchists, they were both brought to trial during the height of the Red Scare. Id. It was an atmosphere of great hostility and the judge in the case, Webster Thayer, echoed the country’s acrimony toward foreigners: "Outside the courtroom, during the trial and appeals which followed, he made remarks that bristled with animosity towards the defendants (‘Did you see what I did with those anarchistic bastards the other day? I guess that will hold them for a while.’)" Id. at 3–4. The persecution of radicals and immigrants sparked Llewellyn’s interest. Both Llewellyn and future Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter, then a law professor at Harvard, were involved in this case. Llewellyn soon began working on reforms indicated by the case and to establish the innocence of Sacco and Vanzetti while Frankfurter rallied "respectable" opinion behind Sacco and Vanzetti.

Delivered a radio address seeking commutation of sentence on broader grounds: ‘Daily in every city you are permitting lawyers to win—or lose—cases by playing on the passions of the jury—murder cases, accident cases, every jury case . . . You sit and let it happen: the open invitation to an unfair trial . . . we must awake to our responsibilities . . . if a hundred and a thousand of such cases are not to go on occurring without notice.’

LIEBMANN, supra note 16, at 174. After the execution, Llewellyn joined the council of the Sacco-Vanzetti National League and planned to write a book about the case, but the final section was never completed after the league was dissolved. TWNING, supra note 11, at 346. The main argument of the book was:

[That]all the public can do about it is to kick the civil bar; that the problem of improvement is a technical one, and that only technicians are equipped to handle it. And finally, that until the civil bar gets kicked into a sense of its duty as a public watchdog over criminal procedure, we get no reforms on the legal side, as distinguished from the administrative side.

Id. at 347.

62. The writing of The Cheyenne Way motivated Llewellyn to get involved with other "liberal" causes such as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People ("NAACP") and the American Civil Liberties Union, with particular interest in laws to liberalize the sedition acts. TWNING, supra note 11, at 110.

63. In 1934, Llewellyn was a candidate backed by 'the Knickerbocker Democrats' for membership of the Democratic State Committee (11th District). Id. He vowed to "clean up Tammany Hall" and by this time, he was somewhat of a public figure. Id. However, he decided to resign one day before polling day to allow a candidate sharing the same platform to take his place. Id. He was knocked out because of his fighting for the Germans in World War I.

64. Id.

65. Id. at 111.


You cannot listen to the dirge of lawyers about the death of stare decisis (of the nature of which lovely institution the dirge-chanters have little inkling) without realizing that one great group at the bar are close to losing their faith. You cannot listen to the cynicism about the appellate courts that is stock conversation of the semi- or moderately successful lawyer in his middle years without realizing that his success transmutes into gall even as it comes to him.

LLEWELLYN, supra note 48, at 4.
Given his well-rounded experience and the need for written uniformity regarding the law of sales, it is no surprise that by the 1940s Llewellyn’s work primarily revolved around the Uniform Commercial Code. As the chief reporter for the UCC, this enormous undertaking became his monumental task. Still, he also managed to publish “articles on jurisprudence, legal education, the legal profession, and commercial law” during this time. He also continued his study of American Indians.

As a leading member of the American realist movement, it is worth noting that Llewellyn remained a skeptic of the adjudicatory process because he disagreed with the view of law as a system of rules. During his prime years as a realist philosopher, Llewellyn rejected the theory that rules decide cases. However, later in his academic career, Llewellyn became less extreme in his beliefs and put forth that the rule of law plays a significant role in the legal institution.

One can speculate that such academic success placed a tremendous toll on his personal life; in 1946, Llewellyn divorced his second wife, Emma Costvet, in order to marry Soia Mentschikoff. Soon thereafter, he left Columbia Law School for a joint appoint-
ment with Soia at the University of Chicago Law School.\footnote{Whitman, supra note 73, at 1124, 1130.} From 1951 to 1962, he served as a professor at the University of Chicago Law School until his untimely death on February 13, 1962.\footnote{See id. at 1130, n.24.} Dean Levi of the University commented on some of Llewellyn’s academic and personal strengths:

Karl’s many-sidedness was reflected in the radius of his influence at Chicago. . . . His influence was strong for instruction in draftsmanship. His concern for instruction in the skills of the craft produced the course in advocacy, which he taught, and gave impetus to student work in moot court and legal aid. . . . His last year of law teaching was perhaps his best. The barrier between teacher and student was low; the creative power of the teaching was strong. He did not regard his work as finished. He still had before him a work on law in society.\footnote{TWTNING, supra note 11, at 113.}

Before he died,\footnote{Llewellyn is said to have died of a heart attack. Id. at 112. Because he suffered from depression and alcoholism, suicide was also a possible cause of death. Id. at 109.} Llewellyn published his last great work, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals.\footnote{The central theme of The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals is eloquently stated here: “No rational observer of the American legal system suggests that the process of deciding appellate cases is simply a matter of searching out the single right answer. Yet, this very awareness that the judicial process often involves the necessity of choice between two or more possible results occasions further uneasy inquiry. If there is sometimes no single right answer, and if we must therefore accept judicial creativity, what then of the lawyer’s once immutable canon of truth, stare decisis? What then can the lawyer more than any layman offer in the way of predictability?” Robert B. McKay, Review of The Common Law Tradition, 49 CALIF. L. REV. 778, 778 (1961) (book review).} Unfortunately, Llewellyn was unable to make another scheduled trip back to Germany.\footnote{In 1962, Llewellyn was invited to give a lecture in Germany, and this was to be his last statement on his juristic views. TWINING, supra note 11, at 113.}

\section*{PART II.}
\subsection*{German Jurisprudence in the 19\textsuperscript{th} Century}

Rudolf von Jhering is known to have “led the revolt against philosophical abstraction and conceptualism in German jurisprudence and the glorification of logic as a juristic method.”\footnote{Id. at 76.} This established Jhering as the “pioneer of the basic modern trends in jurisprudence.”\footnote{Id. at 86.} During much of the nineteenth century, German legal thought was dominated by the historical school founded by Friedrich Carl von Savigny, who proposed a “science of law” as an independent discipline.\footnote{Friedrich Karl von Savigny was born in 1779 in Frankfurt and died in 1861 in Berlin. For a brief overview of Friedrich Karl von Savigny was born in 1779 in Frankfurt and died in 1861 in Berlin. For a brief overview of
says, Vom Beruf unserer Zeit für Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft of 1814, he argued that the law developed from the Volksgeist [spirit of the people] that could be found in the Roman law and not in codifications, which he famously opposed. In his view, lawyers were in the best position to further its organic development in an evolutionary process. Savigny, the founding father of the German idea of Rechtswissenschaft [legal science] was an influence on opponents of the codification movement in the United States and adherents of American classical legal thought, who considered German scholarship as a model and a reference point. American legal thought in this period is usually seen as representing an understanding of the law as a coherent, logical, and value-neutral system. The legal realists of the 1920s and 1930s later rebelled against these views.

Most famous for his eight-volume System des heutigen römischen Rechts [System of Contemporary Roman Law], Savigny inspired generations of German scholars and founded the “Historical School” of legal science; his students went on to systematically expose the law and to explore its history. Scholars grouped into the “Germanist” and “Romanist” camps, depending on whether they studied the Teutonic and medieval or Roman sources of the legal system. This school of thought, which focused on the logical and systematic basis of the law and dominated throughout much of the Nineteenth Century was later often described as Begriffsjurisprudenz [conceptual jurisprudence], a somewhat derogatory term initially coined by Jhering. The adherents of both of its branches, including Georg Friedrich Puchta, Bernhard Windscheid and Carl Gerber continued to view the law as a coherent and logical system that needed to be viewed as clearly separate from the social circumstances in which it operated.

his work and legacy see Stefan Riesenfeld, The Influence of German Legal Theory on American Law: The Heritage of Savigny and His Disciplines, 37 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (1989).


85. See Reimann, supra note 83, at 110-11 (quoting a passage from Savigny’s Beruf that explains how the spirit of the law is channeled through the jurists).

86. Reimann, supra note 82, at 852.

87. Reimann, supra note 83, at 103-07.

88. Reimann, supra note 82, at 838.

89. Singer, supra note 2, at 499. But note that Holmes was the first to critically engage with Savigny’s theories in the United States. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 207, 211, 218-19 (1881). See POSNER, supra note 84, at 198 (“America’s rejection of Savigny was announced in 1881 by Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.”).

90. 1-8 FRIEDRICH CARL VON SAVIGNY, SYSTEM DES HEUTIGEN RÖMISCHEN RECHTS 1840-1849. This famous work was translated into English in 1880. See Riesenfeld, supra note 82, at 2-3.

91. Reimann, supra note 82, at 858.


93. Grechenig & Gelter, supra note 2, at 345. Bernhard Windscheid was born in 1817 in Düsseldorf and died in 1892. He was famous for influencing the formation of German Civil Code and for his study in Roman law. He also served as a professor at Basel, Greifswald, Heidelberg, and Leipzig. Bernhard Großfeld, Comparatists and Languages in COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES: TRADITIONS AND TRANSITIONS 154, 171 (Pierre Legrand & Roderick Munday ed., 2003).

94. See Vivian Grosswald Curran, Fear of Formalism: Indications of the Fascist Period in France and
Reducing law to a game of induction and deduction. 

While in his early career Rudolf von Jhering was a leading proponent of conceptual jurisprudence, his scholarship underwent a remarkable shift around 1860. By advocating social utilitarianism and focusing on function rather than formal definition, Jhering set himself apart from most other scholars of the time, who were “interested only in legal history or the philosophy of law.” At a time when German jurisprudence was very inward looking, Jhering took a broader view and strove for the high aim of a “general jurisprudence” intended to embrace the legal phenomena of all peoples of all times in one great view, of a “universal legal history” as part of an idealistic history of mankind, imbued with the ideal of progress.

B. The Early Years of Rudolf von Jhering: Life and Education

On August 22 of 1818 in East Frisia, Germany, Rudolf von Jhering was born to a family of jurists and civil servants; among the most notable members was his great-great-grandfather, Hermann Conring, a pioneering German legal historian of the seventeenth century. After leaving the gymnasium at the age of eighteen, Jhering studied law at Heidelberg, Munich, Göttingen, and Berlin, where he became a student of Friedrich Karl von Savigny. At the conclusion of his studies, he began teaching Roman law at Basel, Rostock, and Kiel. In 1852, he went to Giessen to teach and write, gaining substantial recognition with the publishing of Geist des Römischen Rechts auf den verschiedenen Stufen seiner Entwicklung [The Spirit of the Roman Law in the Various Stages of Its Development, published in three volumes from 1852-1865]. He continued onto the University of Vienna in 1867, where he was ennobled by the Emperor, and returned to Göttingen, as a professor, in 1872.

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95. Reimann, supra note 82, at 864.
96. Seagle, supra note 80, at 73. (“[These jurists] paid little or no attention to the needs of practical jurisprudence, which they left entirely in the not too capable hands of the practitioners. Since political unification is the first prerequisite of any effectively functioning legal system, the task of the jurists would perhaps have been hopeless.”).
98. Seagle, supra note 80, at 76. Herman Conring was a German intellectual who focused on economics, politics, and law. Born in 1606, he was no stranger to political controversies as he opposed the Holy Roman Empire. Id.
99. Constantin Fasolt, Hermann Conring and the European History of Law, in Politics and Reformations: Histories and Reformations, Essays in Honor of Thomas A. Brady, Jr. 113, 127 (Christopher Ocker, Michael Princy, Peter Starenko & Peter Wallace eds., 2007) (“[Hermann Conring] has therefore been called ‘the founder of German legal history.’”); Reinhard Zimmermann, Codification: History and Present Significance of an Idea, 3 EUR. Rev. Private L. 95, 99 (1995) (“In the middle of the 17th century, Hermann Conring shattered the Lotharian legend, according to which Roman Law had been introduced in Europe by way of a formal imperial enactment.”).
100. Seagle, supra note 80, at 76.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Hasso Hofmann, From Jhering to Radbruch: On the Logic of Traditional Legal Concepts to the Social Theories of the Law to the Renewal of Legal Idealism, in 9 A TREATISE OF LEGAL PHILOSOPHY AND GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE: A History of the Philosophy of Law in the Civil Law World, 1600-1900 301, 302 (Damiano Canale, Paolo Grossi & Hasso Hofmann eds., 2010); Seagle, supra note 80, at 76.
In his early years as a jurist, Jhering’s jurisprudential philosophy remained a product of his education. As a student of Karl von Savigny, he initially remained a supporter of the historical school, and as a historian of Roman law, “he was really bent on a search for its permanent usable elements.” Nevertheless, while still firmly grounded within conceptual jurisprudence during that period, he went beyond the work of other Romanists by emphasizing that ancient Roman law and the works of the classical jurists could not continue to apply unmodified many centuries later, but that the spirit of Roman law could be preserved to apply under changed circumstances. Even then, he apparently “began to have doubts in mid-career about the accepted view of law as an organic body of rules and concepts.” Given Jhering’s almost Pauline conversion, the Geist des Römischen Rechts remained unfinished, while its earlier volumes continue to be reprinted.

C. The Later Years of Rudolf von Jhering: Scholarship and Philosophy

In 1860, Jhering’s jurisprudential philosophy began to surface. Between 1860 and 1866, he anonymously published a series of six Confidential Letters that questioned the prevailing jurisprudence of the time and criticized the divorce between theory and practice. In 1872, Jhering published Der Kampf ums Recht, based on a series of lectures he had held during his time at the University of Vienna, in which he decidedly distanced himself from his earlier writing. Der Kampf [The Struggle for Law] stirred much discussion because of the controversial content. It was taken as an “attack on the historical school” because Jhering’s theory was premised on the idea that “the law was not a system of abstract rights but a method of reconciling conflicting interests.” In contrast to the prevailing view, Jhering argued that legal cases could not be solved alone on the basis of the body of enacted law, and that judges were not able to simply arrive at their judgment through a process of logical deduction, but that social and situational factors had to be taken into account. Moreover, he emphasized that “the origin of law is
to be found in social struggles” and “urges every individual to the struggle for law” because according to him, “the life of law is a struggle, it can endure only if the individual is ever ready and vigilant to defend his rights.”

Jhering’s final work on the philosophy of law was set forth in Der Zweck im Recht [Law as a Means to an End, two volumes, 1877 and 1883] in which he developed his critique into a fully developed new system that has been described as marking “an epo-ochal turning-point in jurisprudence.” It can best be summarized in the following statement: “Law is not the highest thing in the world, not an end in itself, but it is merely a means to an end, the final end being the existence of society.” Hence, “[c]onstructive jurisprudence was barren and bankrupt, and must be replaced by a system of social mechanics.” Instead, law should be a “system of reconciling conflicting interests” not based on the “analysis and combination of legal principles, which jurisprudence had borrowed from mathematics” because “[l]egal principles cannot be extended merely by a process of analogy; they [do] not contain in themselves the correct solutions for every legal controversy.” Jhering’s view, unorthodox for its time, seems remarkably like the catchword of at least some American Legal Realists — that legal interpretation can legitimately be “purposive.”

Jhering believed that the law should be studied not merely as a theory but in its practical application. Jhering emphasized that “[t]he judge was not an automaton who pronounced his judgments merely on the basis of pre-established legal principles.” Jhering’s main critique of law was that:

Our theory of law, it is only too easy to perceive, is busied much more with the scales than with the sword of Justice. The one-sidedness of the purely scientific standpoint from which it considers the law, looking at it not so much as it really is, as an idea of force, but as it is logically, a system of abstract legal principles, has, in my opinion, impressed on its whole way of viewing the law, a character not in harmony with the bitter reality. This I intend to prove.

Jhering’s perspective of law encourages people to take a more active role in defending their legal rights even if it requires taking an aggressive approach because “the
life of the law is a struggle, — a struggle of nations, of the state power, of classes, of individuals.” 123

PART III. THE INFLUENCE OF GERMAN JURISPRUDENCE ON AMERICAN JURISPRUDENTIAL THEORY AND THOUGHT

A. The Foundations in America for the Reception of German Jurisprudence

German jurists, including Jhering, and the early twentieth century thinkers involved in the free law movement had a significant impact on American jurisprudence and eventually on the realist school. This comes as no surprise, if one accepts that most juristic discoveries of the nineteenth century seem to have been made in Germany and that German jurists enjoyed the highest reputation in Europe. 124

During the time that Jhering was developing his jurisprudential philosophy, the legal conditions in both America and Germany had “strong similarities,” thus making the reception in America of German jurisprudence particularly easy. 125 First, Germany was struggling to adapt Roman law to the newly unified state while the United States was figuring out how to adapt “English common law to the needs of a democratic and increasingly industrialized nation.” 126 Second, German jurisprudence had been dominated by the historical school, whereas American jurisprudence was characterized by the “seventeenth and eighteenth century philosophy of natural rights thinly disguised as constitutionalism.” 127 Finally, America was also struggling with the “tyranny of legal concepts” and focused on solving problems involving vast social, political, and economic interests by ignoring realities and applying “abstract conceptual concepts . . . by a process of pseudological analysis.” 128 This was most evident in treatises and Restatements, which, in functioning much like the BGB, “represented the practical implementation of the positivist legal philosophy in an extreme form.” 129 This period in U.S. jurisprudence later came to be called “classical legal thought,” and is often associated with the name of Christopher Columbus Langdell. 130 Like its German counterpart, Langdellian legal thought adopted an understanding of law as a science, 131 where individual cases could be explained within a coherent system, from which it would also be possible to deduce the outcome of future cases. 132 Classical legal thought in the United States not only par-

123. Id. at 1.
125. Seagle, supra note 80, at 87.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Herget & Wallace, supra note 106, at 430. BGB, the civil code of Germany, became effective on January 1, 1900 and served as a guide for other civil law jurisdictions such as China, Japan, Greece, and Taiwan. See id. at 406–07.
132. E.g., Brian Leiter, Legal Realism, in A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory 262-263 (2d ed., Wiley-Blackwell 2010); Bernard Schwartz, Main Currents in American Legal Thought
alleled developments in Germany, but had apparently also been influenced by the German historical school.\textsuperscript{133}

Such similar legal and juristic conditions made American jurists eager recipients and promoters of the revolutionary concepts articulated by the German jurists. Much of the revolt against the system of jurisprudence in place was influenced by Jhering. The impact spread among many prominent figures such as Justice Holmes,\textsuperscript{134} Roscoe Pound, and their successors during the 1920s and 1930s, who are usually viewed as belonging to the realist school.\textsuperscript{135} Such events suggest that Karl Llewellyn was greatly influenced by Jhering and German jurisprudence.

\textbf{B. The German Free Law Movement}

Jhering died in 1892, but he left a lasting imprint on German legal thought. One current in legal thought that took his views to more radical conclusions was the free law movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, which reached its peak just before World War I. It is crucial to understand the concepts behind the free law movement in order to recognize its influences on the American realist movement. The free law movement developed largely as a response to the inability of the leading jurisprudential schools and the BGB to adequately address the issue of where a judge can go for guidance, especially “when positive law is unclear or does not appear to address a question presented by a case;”\textsuperscript{136} in other words, the objective was to address the case of a lacuna or gap in the legal code. At the time of codification, leading jurists from the prevailing schools were satisfied that “[e]verything a judge needed to know about the civil law was contained in the BGB or could be deduced from it directly or from the concepts that its

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{note346} Singer, \emph{supra} note 2, at 496–97.
\bibitem{note133} Appleman, \emph{supra} note 131, at 274–97; Michael H. Hoeflich, \emph{Savigny and his Anglo-American Disciples}, 37 Am. J. Comp. L. 17 (1989); Duncan Kennedy, \emph{Two Globalizations of Law & Legal Thought: 1850–1968}, 35 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 631, 637–48 (2003) (identifying a globalization of classical legal thought originating in Germany); Reimann, \emph{supra} note 83; Stefan Riesenfeld, \emph{The Influence of German Legal Theory on American Law: The Heritage of Savigny and His Disciples}, 37 Am. J. Comp. L. 1 (1989). See also John Dawson, \emph{The Oracles of the Law} 451 (1968). For a contemporary view, see Joseph H. Beale, \emph{The Development of Jurisprudence During the Past Century}, 18 Harv. L. Rev. 271, 283 (1905) (suggesting that the historical school “obtained a powerful hold” in the United States).
\bibitem{note134} Oliver Wendell Holmes shared common views with Jhering: the two most prominent similarities were: “their views of law as a result of constant struggle in society,” and their sociological observations on legal theories matched one another. Mathias W. Reimann, \emph{Holmes’s Common Law and German Legal Science, in The Legacy of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.} 102 (Robert W. Gordon ed. 1992). See also infra text at n.142. Pound presented the heart of his sociological jurisprudence, a theory of interests, in 1963 in his work titled \emph{The Spirit of the Common Law}, which pays homage to Jhering. \emph{Roscoe Pound, The Spirit of the Common Law} (Marshall Jones Co. ed. 1921).
\bibitem{note135} Karl Llewellyn was instrumental in giving its name to legal realism in exchange with Dean Roscoe Pound, who, in spite of sharing some views with the realists, criticized Llewellyn, and from whom Llewellyn sought to set himself apart. See Karl N. Llewellyn, \emph{A Realistic Jurisprudence – The Next Step}, 30 Colum. L. Rev. 451 (1930); Roscoe Pound, \emph{The Call for a Realistic Jurisprudence}, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 697 (1931). In his response to Pound, Llewellyn compiled his famous list of legal realists that subsequently shaped the perception of the movement. Karl N. Llewellyn, \emph{Some Realism about Realism – Responding to Dean Pound}, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1222, 1226 n.18 (1931) (establishing the criteria of realists). This has sparked some controversy, as it has been argued legal realism should be seen as part of a broader current that includes thinkers such as Holmes and Pound. Robert S. Summers, \emph{Pragmatic Instrumentalism in Twentieth Century American Legal Thought – A Synthesis and Critique of Our Dominant General Theory About Law and its Use}, 66 Cornell L. Rev. 861, 864–65 (1981) (grouping all legal realist thinkers together as “pragmatic instrumentalists”). \emph{Horwitz, supra} note 130, at 171 (suggesting that Llewellyn’s list provides a distorted picture of the realist movement).
\bibitem{note136} Herget & Wallace, \emph{supra} note 106, at 403.
\end{thebibliography}
Rudolf von Jhering’s Influence

terms implied.” Jhering was among the first jurists to voice his skepticism that the law, “through its organic unity, provided the answer to every possible case that could come before a judge.”

Francois Gény, an influential French legal philosopher, expounded upon Jhering’s skepticism and concluded that “it is difficult to assess the practical influence” of German theories in France. Rather, it is drawn from the “objective sociological data-social realities, needs, values, and nature of things.” He also “recognized that this method of decision-making was nothing new; courts had been doing it all along. It was simply time for jurisprudence to recognize the creative aspects of judging.”

The Free Law movement as such is most often associated with the names of Hermann Kantorowicz and Eugen Ehrlich. Going further in their critique than Jhering, they denied the significance of formal legal arguments (such as those based on the accepted methods of interpreting the Civil Code), considering them a linguistic convention behind which judges felt compelled to hide their actual motivations in deciding a specific case. Possibly the most prominent work representing this radical iconoclastic view is Kantorowicz’ Der Kampf um die Rechtswissenschaft [The Struggle for Legal Science], published under the pseudonym Gnaeus Flavius. Kantorowicz “assailed the prevailing notions of proper juristic thinking and called for a new movement to tear down the old scholastic type of analysis and build a new radical science to serve justice.” This work addressed many of the themes of the free law movement and even gave the movement its name. According to Kantorowicz, the main tenets of the free law movement require:

The legal system does not need architects of logical construction but judges who are trained to recognize psychological and sociological factors and who share the legal consciousness of the people. The Administration of the law must be placed in the hands of judges who are willing to invoke free law and whose education fits them for the task. Such education would include the study of political science.
economics, applied psychology, philosophy, and criminology. 145

Thus, Kantorowicz called for judges to use discretion to make greater use of social science, thus considering the consequences of their decisions. However, the Free Law School stopped short of suggesting that judges should not be bound by statutes. 146

Another important example emphasizing social factors in law is *Freie Rechtsfindung und freie Rechtswissenschaft [Free Finding of Law and Free Legal Science]*, 147 by Eugen Ehrlich, 148 which lent its title to the movement. Ehrlich, one of the founding fathers of legal sociology, in his writing “attacked the broad codification that had taken place and assailed lawyers’ technicalism” and “proposed that legal science turn its attention away from conceptual gymnastics and toward the study of the operation of law within its full social setting.” 149 Both Ehrlich and Kantorowicz believed that it was not the enacted law that provided the best guarantee for justice, but, rather, it was the personality and qualification of judges. 150

While the radical free law movement was somewhat influential in early twentieth century Germany, it was virtually over by the time of World War II and failed to exert a transformative influence on German legal thought, unlike its American counterpart, legal realism. Specifically for Kantorowicz, it was difficult to secure a permanent teaching position because of his political leanings, and he was not appointed as a professor in Kiel until 1928 at age fifty-one. 151 Of Jewish ancestry, he was removed from his position by the Nazis in 1933, which led him eventually to take refuge in the United States, 152 where he also took the opportunity to engage with and criticize American legal realism. 153 The fates of other critical scholars were similar. 154 Radbruch, another prominent member of the free law school who remained in Germany during his last years, is often remembered for expounding the view (now often considered a myth) in 1946 that legal positivism

146. Curran, supra note 94, at 162.
148. Eugen Ehrlich was born on September 14, 1862, in Czernowitz, Bukowina, Austrian Empire (now Chernovitsky, Ukraine). Sidney Post Simpson, *Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law*, 51 HARV. L. REV. 190, 190 (1937) (book review). After studying, practicing, and teaching law in Vienna, he became a full-time professor at the Franz-Joseph University of Czernowitz in 1897. *Id.* Observing significant differences between the Austrian law “on the books” and its implementation in practice in his remote and multiethnic region of origin, he became one of the founding fathers of the sociology of law, and he was one of the first proponents of the free law movement. Given that Czernowitz became part of Romania after World War I, Ehrlich would have been required to teach in Romanian. Afflicted by health problems, he retired to Vienna, where he died in 1922. *Id.*
149. Herget & Wallace, supra note 106 at 411–12.
150. Curran, supra note 94, at 158.
152. *Id.*
154. Grechenig & Gelter, supra note 2, at 352–53.
made the law a malleable instrument in the hands of the Nazis, and that judges should refuse to enforce laws that reach an excessive level of injustice.  

Mainstream German private law jurisprudence turned to another legacy of Jhering’s, namely Interessenjurisprudenz [jurisprudence of interests], which was developed by Philipp Heck in the 1920s (building on Jhering’s work), and the younger, similar school of Wertungsjurisprudenz [jurisprudence of value judgments] that dominates today. While these schools recognized the significance of social factors to the juridical process, which was emphasized by Jhering, they are based on a greater confidence in statutory law. Social factors are relevant to the required purposive (or “teleological”) interpretation of the law, namely insofar as they influenced the conflicting interests that led to the enactment of the respective statute (according to Interessenjurisprudenz) or the value judgment embodied in the legislative enactment (according to Wertungsjurisprudenz).

C. Reception of the Free Law Movement in the United States

Turning to the influence on American realism, Roscoe Pound was vital in bringing the free law movement ideas into American jurisprudence. Pound read the free law literature and he expanded on the concept of “living law,” by distinguishing between the “law in the books” and “law in action.” There is some evidence of Jhering’s direct influence on Pound where Pound draws upon Jhering’s notion of law as a means to an end, infusing the debate over whether law is made or found.

There were other American jurists who promoted the free law movement ideas. First, Albert Kocourek drew upon Gény, Ehrlich, and Kantorowicz to summarize the “free law position.” Second, John Chipman Gray cited Jhering and Savigny twen-

The inception of the realist movement in the United States is thought to have started with a “speech given by Professor Herman Oliphant to the annual meeting of the Association of American Law Schools in 1927.”\(^{168}\) This speech was a “call to action by legal academics to storm the barricades of formalism and to breathe new life and realism into their scholarship.”\(^{169}\)

However, Oliphant’s speech only cited a select group of other realists, if at all. The speech barely referenced Pound and it failed to mention German juristic influence. Why was German jurisprudence downplayed? There are several reasons for this. First, German scholarship was unpopular due to the anti-German sentiment surrounding World War I. The social and political atmosphere of the time, namely the growing threat of World War II, made the belief in the legal institution popular. After all, Hitler’s idea of the “State” above all incited fear that legal realism could threaten the legal system in the United States. Second, many legal scholars were not proficient in the German language. Third, citing to German scholarship was avoided because those ideas had already been absorbed into the works of Pound and Llewellyn.\(^{170}\) Furthermore, around this time, Pound was often not cited because of a scholarly debate with Llewellyn that had the immediate effect of casting Pound “in the role of an anti-realist in the eyes of contemporaries,” and “by the time the movement caught on in the United States, Pound’s own thinking had moved beyond realism.”\(^{171}\)

**PART IV. RUDOLF VON JHERING’S INFLUENCE ON THE LIFE AND WORK OF KARL LLEWELLYN**

**A. Dismissal of German Jurisprudence**

Commentary on American realism mainly attributed realist theories to other American realists.\(^{172}\) This could be a reflection of the anti-German sentiment of the time, an

\(^{165}\) See id. Gray’s book dealt with the theory of law, in so far that it defined the “nature of the law in terms of its analytical scope, expanding the number of sources and narrowing the concept of law.” *The Philosophy of Law: An Encyclopedia* 33 (Christopher B. Gray ed., 1999). Gray’s analysis includes Friedrich von Savigny’s version of historical jurisprudence based on judicial discretion. See id.

\(^{166}\) Benjamin Cardozo studied law at Columbia Law School for two years and after a successful career as an attorney, he was elected to a fourteen-year term on the New York Supreme Court in 1913. *Richard Polenberg, The World of Benjamin Cardozo: Personal Values and the Judicial Process* 1 (Harvard Univ. Press ed. 1997). Later, he served on the Supreme Court from 1932 until his death six years later in 1938. Id. at 3.

\(^{167}\) See id. at 2. In his renowned work, Cardozo immediately posed the question: “What is it that I do when I decide a case?” Id. The answer really depends on a multitude of factors: whether precedent is applicable, what sources of information are available, consideration of the social welfare, and opinions of justice and morals to name a few.


\(^{169}\) Id.

\(^{170}\) See generally *Hull, supra* note 1.


\(^{172}\) See, e.g., *Erwin Hexner, Studies in Legal Terminology* (Chapel Hill ed., Univ. of N. C. 1941).
ignorance of German language, or the reception of these ideas into the scholarship of the first American realists.

Llewellyn’s later works express no homage to Jhering, and indeed Llewellyn’s “autobiographical accounts of his intellectual development place relatively little stress on his connections with Germany.” One can argue that Llewellyn’s German acculturation and early interpretations of the works of German jurists make it obvious that Llewellyn was, to some extent, under German influence. Llewellyn’s years in Mecklenburg were full, vibrant and must have helped him to build a basis to expand his thinking about jurisprudence later on, enabling him to make full use of developments in German jurisprudence, which had reached an early peak during that period, for his own work. At the time of Llewellyn’s visits, German private law theory had been profoundly influenced by Jhering’s legacy, and this influence was also apparent in the German scholars with whom Llewellyn interacted. To suggest that Llewellyn’s early years as a jurist were not influenced by von Jhering does not diminish the great contributions made by Karl Llewellyn. Perhaps Llewellyn subconsciously denied his German influences because he was unaware of how much German jurisprudence was integrated into his life. Or, perhaps Karl Llewellyn consciously rejected German influence for fear that this would have a negative effect on his career.

Furthermore, there is little room to argue that Llewellyn was insulated from the major German affairs of the time, particularly involving the legal theory of Jhering. First, Llewellyn was influenced by Jhering’s crusade against conceptual jurisprudence: “Llewellyn’s antipathy to conceptual jurisprudence is legendary,” and “[h]is campaign against the use of ‘heavenly concepts’ to solve real problems is reminiscent of the struggle . . . of Rudolf von Jhering.” Jhering viewed his juristic works as “akin to the work of alchemists . . . driven by purpose, not invisible concepts;” therefore, Jhering pointed out that “the life of the law was experience, not logic,” and “maintained that ‘law had to be functional.’”

Second, Llewellyn expanded on ideas similar to those of Jhering, one being the promotion of purposive interpretation. Llewellyn learned of purposive interpretation through his study of Jhering, who was one of its greatest exponents. As a result, Llewellyn believed that “[t]he language of a statute was relative, not absolute” and that it “had to be understood in terms of its context.” Both jurists espoused that “law was a means to preselected social ends, and that statutes could not be adequately understood by references only to plain meaning and usage.”

Third, Llewellyn’s views on the judicial function echoed Jhering’s philosophy. Llewellyn’s work emphasized that law is merely a prediction of what the courts will ac-

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Before 1933, Professor Hexner referenced works to German sources, and during 1933 to 1935, his main sources were English publications. Many see this shift as Hexner’s allegiance to American public opinion and the political turmoil in Nazi Germany.

173. TWINE, supra note 11, at 108.
175. Id. at 1135–36.
176. Id. at 1135–36.
177. Id. at 1136.
178. Id. at 1135–36.
ually do. Instead, the legal actors should apply rules more scientifically and the judicial law-creating process should be investigated by jurists. In order to derive these conclusions, Llewellyn drew from “Jhering’s discoveries in the area of latent legal rules and legal fictions.”

Finally, Jhering’s inspiration is most recognizable in the Uniform Commercial Code, though the features may only be cognizable to lawyers trained in the civil law. Additionally, “[t]he whole modern American growth of administrative agencies, such as boards and commissions, from the Interstate Commerce Commission to the National Labor Relations Board, owes much to Jhering’s gospel of purpose and interest.” These agencies used the UCC to “accomplish some particular social purpose or correct some particular social abuse, but they [were] designed to fulfill their tasks without observing all the techniques and procedures of the conventional legal system.”

For instance, Section 2-615 of the UCC, “The Doctrine of the Failure of Presupposed Conditions” is based on a situation posed by Jhering that was later resurrected by Bernhard Windscheid, and later by Paul Oertmann, as Geschäftsggrundlage [basic assumption of the parties]. While drafting the UCC, it is fair to conclude that Llewellyn knew of Geschäftsggrundlage because he was a visiting professor in Germany at the time when the doctrine was still much discussed.

**PART V. CONCLUSION**

Rudolf von Jhering’s influence on Karl Llewellyn and the American realist movement was substantial and meaningful. Jhering was the first jurist in Germany to set the free law movement in motion, which largely and directly influenced the American realist movement. As a leader of this realist movement, Llewellyn played a major role in redefining how there is room to interpret the law. The German jurists, and particularly Jhering, strongly influenced Llewellyn because Llewellyn held close, personal ties to Germany and its culture. His legal works and constant interactions encouraged his acceptance into the German legal community. The American and German Realism movement shared similarities despite the development of American anti-German sentiment upon the rise of Adolf Hitler, and Nazism. While this development caused the link between German jurisprudence and realism in America to be purposely broken, Rudolf Von Jhering, and other German jurists, undoubtedly helped to shape and motivate what is known today as American Legal Realism.

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180. See Seagle, *supra* note 80, at 88 (discussing Jhering’s influence on American realists); *see also* Whitman, *supra* note 11.
182. *Id.*
183. Riesenfeld, *supra* note 82, at 5.
184. *Id.* at 6.