Technology and Teen Sex: The Need for Legislative Action in Response to Sexting

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TECHNOLOGY AND TEEN SEX: THE NEED FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION IN RESPONSE TO ‘SEXTING’

I. INTRODUCTION

MaryJo Miller, mother of fourteen-year-old Marissa, was shocked to find her daughter faced possible felony child pornography charges, stemming from a photograph taken two years previously at a friend’s slumber party. The picture displayed Marissa from the waist up in an opaque bra. A lunchroom incident involving a teen boy displaying nude pictures of female classmates stored on his cell phone sparked the investigation leading to the scrutiny of Marissa’s image. The investigation led to the discovery of similar images, such as one of a seventeen-year-old girl in a towel wrapped just below her breasts, resulting in numerous teens facing possible felony charges and sex offender registration.

In 2009, numerous parents, school officials, and law enforcement officers discovered the meaning of “sexting,” the conduct of sending sexually explicit photos via cell phone. The concept has become a cultural phenomenon, evidenced by the plots of the teen drama 90210 and Law & Order: Special Victims Unit. As entertaining as these story lines may seem, it is imperative not to lose sight of the real-life effects of felony sex convictions for teens. Some debate the frequency and pervasiveness of sexting among teens. However, there is no debating that the current state of child pornography laws provides law enforcement officers the discretion to charge America’s youth with felony charges for sexting. Rampant teen cell phone usage, coupled with...
the broad terms of child pornography statutes, unintentionally regulates teen sexual behavior. In light of the expansive state of sex offender registry laws, sexting charges can irreparably harm the lives of teens for decades, if not permanently.

The recent trend to charge, or threaten to charge, teens for sexting under a state’s child pornography laws is contrary to the legislative intent of the statutes, thus demonstrating the state’s motivation is paternalistic; accordingly, child pornography laws require amendment to reflect the “Romeo and Juliet” exceptions to statutory rape and the intent of the teen producer. This comment first discusses the intent of child pornography laws and the recent rise of sexting. Application of this intent to sexting charges demonstrates the need for amendment of child pornography laws, based on the current state of statutory rape laws and the intent of the teen producer, due to the state’s impermissible motives for charging teens with sexting.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Overview of Federal Legislation Defining Child Pornography

Congress’ purpose in enacting laws criminalizing pornography was the prevention of exploitation and abuse of minors. Before 1988, Congress attempted to confront these concerns in two main ways: by banning all obscene pornography, regardless of the age of the subject, and by banning all pornography depicting minors.

Congress first enacted the Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act (“Act”) of 1977. The Act was meant as a check on the rapidly growing child pornography industry, which Congress felt was harmful to children’s “physiological, emotional, and mental health, as well as to the good of society as a whole.” In enacting this legislation, which prohibited numerous aspects of child pornography, including production, possession, and transmission, Congress noted this was the first time in its history to directly criminalize the exploitation of minors. Congress stressed its purpose was not to reach the “private relations of individuals, or those of consenting minors or consenting adults,” but to counteract the rapidly increasing commercial exploitation of minors.

In response to the Supreme Court’s 1982 decision New York v. Ferber, Congress noted the “national tragedy” that was the “tens of thousands of children under the age of 18 . . . believed to be filmed or photographed while engaging in sexually explicit acts for

15. See infra notes 60-83 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 165-190 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 303-315 and accompanying text.
23. Id.
25. Id.
the producer's own pleasure or profit."27 Consequently, Congress determined the 1977 Act needed amendment.28 In Ferber, the Court examined, for the first time, the constitutionality of a statute criminalizing images of children engaged in sexually explicit conduct.29

The Court determined the states' compelling interest30 in protecting minors from commercial exploitation and abuse outweighed the need to protect child pornography under the First Amendment.31 Thus, the Court upheld a New York statute categorizing child pornography under a broader test than the general test for obscenity under Miller v. California.32 Although the Court afforded states more leeway in defining child pornography than obscenity in order to protect "the physiological, emotional, and mental health"33 of children, it stressed the need that conduct prohibited by the statute be clearly and adequately defined.34

The Child Protection Act of 1984 ("CPA") cited Ferber,35 and the low number of prosecutions under the Act,36 as a call to extend its coverage.37 The amendments deleted the term "commercial purpose" from the legislation, attempting to reach those who coerced children to engage in sexually explicit conduct, but not necessarily for profit.38

Under the existing Act, the prosecutor had to prove the subject's age was sixteen.39 The difficulty was compounded given the subjects of the images were generally unable to be located.40 Therefore, the CPA raised the age of protection from sixteen to eighteen
to facilitate prosecution.\textsuperscript{41} Congress acknowledged its intention was to facilitate more effective prosecution of images of sixteen-year-olds and younger, not expansion of the images criminalized by the CPA.\textsuperscript{42}

Beginning in 1988, in light of technological developments, Congress amended the Act multiple times in response to the difficulties faced in policing the world of child pornography.\textsuperscript{43} In order to keep up with technology, regulation of child pornography expanded based on the means of production, in addition to the content.\textsuperscript{44} Congress expanded the means of production encompassed by the Act through the Child Protection and Obscenity Enforcement Act of 1988 ("CPOEA").\textsuperscript{45} CPOEA expanded the Act including the movement of child pornography "by any means including the computer."\textsuperscript{46} Subsequently, prosecution of child pornographers rose over 600 percent.\textsuperscript{47}

In 1996, the Child Pornography Prevention Act ("CPPA") attempted to broaden the definition of child pornography to encompass virtual images of children.\textsuperscript{48} The Supreme Court held two provisions of CPPA as unconstitutional infringements on the First Amendment in \textit{Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition}.\textsuperscript{49} The Court found that defining child pornography to include virtual images merely resembling minors encompassed additional images that were by no means harmful or abusive to children.\textsuperscript{50} The interests involved in protecting First Amendment rights outweighed the benefits of endorsing the tenuous connection between the production of virtual pornography and child abuse.\textsuperscript{51} The fact that the virtual images "[did] not involve, \textit{let alone harm}, any children in the production process" weighed heavily on the Court’s decision in finding the provisions overinclusive.\textsuperscript{52}

The Court discussed the realm of images covered that did not merit prosecution at length.\textsuperscript{53} In citing the artistic value of many works banned under the CPPA, the Supreme Court noted, "[t]he statute proscribes the visual depiction of an idea—\textit{that} of teenagers engaging in sexual activity—\textit{that} is a fact of modern society and has been a theme in art..."\textsuperscript{54}

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{1} H.R. REP. NO. 98-536 at 495.
\bibitem{2} \textit{id.} (stating, this expansion "facilitate[d] the prosecution of child pornography cases and raise[d] the effective age of protection of children from these practices, probably not to eighteen years of age, but perhaps to sixteen").
\bibitem{3} Buckman, \textit{supra} note 18, at 544.
\bibitem{4} \textit{id.}
\bibitem{6} Buckman, \textit{supra} note 18, at 544 (citing Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7511(b), 102 Stat. 4485, 4485).
\bibitem{8} Victoria Broussard, Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition: \textit{Legislators Push for Policy Direction to Protect the Age of Innocence While the Court Turns a Deaf Ear}, 29 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 419, 419-420 (2004) (citing 18 U.S.C.A. § 2256(8)(B) (West 2001) (defining pornography as "any visual depiction, including any photograph, film, video, picture, or computer or computer generated image," that “is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct") (emphasis added)) (held unconstitutional by Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 258 (2002)).
\bibitem{9} \textit{Free Speech Coal.}, 535 U.S. at 258 (holding §§ 2256(8)(B) and 2256(8)(D) substantially overbroad and in violation of the First Amendment).
\bibitem{10} \textit{id.} at 241 (explaining that by implication one could be prosecuted for owning a Renaissance painting).
\bibitem{11} \textit{id.} at 258.
\bibitem{12} \textit{id.} at 241 (emphasis added).
\bibitem{13} \textit{id.} at 247.
\end{thebibliography}
and literature throughout the ages."\(^5\) Under the statute’s broad sweep, films or books depicting stories such as Romeo and Juliet were obscene.\(^5\) By designating the age of eighteen, the statute prohibited images of subjects who in many states were older than the legal age to marry and engage in consensual sexual relations.\(^5\)

In finding two provisions of CPPA overinclusive, the Court distinguished “teenage sexual activity” from “sexual abuse.”\(^5\) The Court struck the statute down under \textit{Ferber}, because as opposed to the speech in \textit{Ferber}, “speech that in itself [was] the record of child abuse, the CPPA prohibit[ed] speech that record[ed] no crime and create[d] no victim by its production. Virtual child pornography [was] not ‘intrinsically related’ to the sexual abuse of children.”\(^5\) In \textit{Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition}, the Supreme Court clarified and reaffirmed \textit{Ferber}’s main holding that although the government could define child pornography more broadly than obscenity in its attempted protection of child victims, speech that was neither obscene nor the product of child abuse still warranted considerable protection under the First Amendment.\(^5\)

\textbf{B. State Laws Pertaining to Child Pornography}

Although the definitions and elements concerning child pornography differ across jurisdictions,\(^5\) every state currently has legislation aimed at criminalizing the production and dissemination of child pornography.\(^5\) The broad terms within these statutes enable

\begin{itemize}
\item 54. \textit{Free Speech Coal.}, 535 U.S. at 246.
\item 55. Id. at 247.
\item 56. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C.A. § 2243(a) (West 2001)) (stating the age of consent in federal maritime and territorial jurisdiction as 16); \textit{NATIONAL SURVEY OF STATE LAWS} 384-388 (Richard A. Leiter ed., 3d ed. 1999) (forty-eight states permit sixteen-year-olds to marry with parental consent).
\item 57. \textit{Free Speech Coal.}, at 247-48.
\item 58. Id. at 250 (emphasis added) (citing \textit{Ferber}, 458 U.S. at 759).
\item 59. Id. at 251 (citing \textit{Ferber}, 458 U.S. at 764-65).
\item 61. \textit{Commonwealth v. Davidson}, 938 A.2d 198, 210 (Pa. 2007) (stating that as of 1990, only nineteen states had promulgated statutes criminalizing possession of child pornography, but as of 2007 all fifty states had statutes criminalizing child pornography); see \textit{ALA. CODE} § 13A-12-192 (2009); \textit{ALASKA STAT.} § 11.61.127 (West 2009); \textit{ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.} § 13-3553 (2009); \textit{ARK. CODE ANN.} § 5-27-304 (West 2009); \textit{CAL. PENAL CODE} § 311.11 (West 2009); \textit{COLO. REV. STAT.} § 18-6-403 (West 2009); \textit{CONN. GEN. STAT.} § 53a-196d (West 2009); \textit{DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1111} (West 2009); \textit{FLA. STAT. ANN.} § 827.071 (West 2009); \textit{GA. CODE ANN.} § 16-12-100 (West 2009); \textit{HAW. REV. STAT.} § 707-752 (West 2009); \textit{IDAHO CODE ANN.} § 18-507(A) (West 2009); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-20.1 (West 2009); \textit{IND. CODE ANN.} § 35-42-44 (West 2009); \textit{IOWA CODE ANN.} § 728.12 (West 2009); \textit{KAN. STAT. ANN.} § 21-3516 (West 2008); \textit{KY. REV. STAT. ANN.} § 531.335 (West 2009); \textit{LA. REV. STAT. ANN.} § 14:81.1 (2008) (amended by 2009 La. Sess. Law Serv. 382 (2009)); 17 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29 § 2911 (2009); \textit{MD. CODE ANN. CRIM. LAW} § 11-208 (West 2009); \textit{MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 29C} (West 2009); \textit{MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.154c} (West 2009); \textit{MINN. STAT. ANN.} § 617.247 (West 2009) (subd. 8 held unconstitutional in \textit{State v. Cannady}, 727 N.W.2d 403 (Minn. 2007); \textit{MISS. CODE ANN.} § 97-5-33 (West 2009); \textit{MO. REV. STAT.} § 568.060 (West 2009); \textit{MONT. CODE ANN.} § 45-5-625 (2008) (amended by 2009 Mont. Laws 198); \textit{NEB. REV. STAT.} § 28-1463.05 (2009) (amended by 2009 Neb. Laws 197); \textit{NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.} § 200.730 (West 2009); \textit{N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.} § 649-A:3 (2009); \textit{N.J. STAT. ANN.} § 2C:24-4 (West 2009); \textit{N.M. STAT. ANN.} § 30-6A-3 (West 2009); \textit{N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 263.11, 263.16} (McKinney 2009); \textit{N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN.} § 14-190.17A (West 2009); \textit{N.D. CENT. CODE ANN.} § 12.1-27.2-04.1 (West 2009); \textit{OHIO REV. CODE ANN.} § 2907.321 (West 2009); \textit{OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1024.2} (West 2009); \textit{OKLA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 163.686-163.689} (West 2009); 18 Pa. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6312 (West 2009); \textit{RI. GEN. LAWS ANN.} § 11-9-1.3 (West 2009); \textit{S.C. CODE ANN.} § 16-15-410 (2008); \textit{S.D. CIVIL CODES ANN.} § 22-24A-3 (2009); \textit{TENN. CODE ANN.} § 39-17-1003 (West 2009); \textit{TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.} § 43.26 (West 2009); \textit{UTAH CODE ANN.} § 76-5a-3 (West 2009); \textit{VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2827} (West 2009); \textit{VA. CODE ANN.} § 18.2-374.1:1 (West 2009); \textit{WASH. REV. CODE ANN.} § 9.68A.070 (West 2009).
juvenile prosecution for self-produced child pornography. For example, an Oklahoma child pornography law states,

Every person who willfully and knowingly ... writes, composes, stereotypes, prints, photographs, designs, copies, draws, engraves, paints, molds, cuts, or otherwise prepares, publishes, sells, distributes, keeps for sale, knowingly downloads on a computer, or exhibits any obscene material or child pornography ... shall be guilty, upon conviction, of a felony.

Juvenile prosecution for self-produced child pornography has only recently garnered significant attention. However, there is appellate authority upholding a state’s power to punish minors under child pornography laws for producing images of themselves. In A.H. v. State, a Florida appellate court determined A.H.’s privacy rights were not violated when prosecuted for self-produced child pornography. She faced prosecution for sending naked pictures over the internet to her boyfriend depicting sexual acts between them; she was sixteen, he was seventeen. The defendant, A.H., argued that because the Florida Supreme Court had ruled sexual conduct between minors evoked constitutionally protected privacy rights under the Florida Constitution, pictures of teenagers engaging in the same conduct sent over the internet warranted similar protection.

The court distinguished dissemination of sexually explicit pictures from sexual conduct, stating the pictures were prone to dissemination among many people and could lead to the minors’ commercial exploitation. The court noted constitutionally protected privacy rights depended on a reasonable privacy expectation. Minors engaging in documented immature sexually active relationships had no reasonable expectation that the sexually explicit photographs would remain discreet. For this reason, the court concluded the state’s compelling interest in preventing sexually explicit transmissions warranted the minor’s prosecution.

The dissent of A.H. discussed potential flaws in the court’s reasoning. The court’s premise rested on the belief that the minor’s prosecution under the Florida child
pornography statute ultimately protected her from abuse. However, the dissent noted the purported purpose of the statute was protection for minors, in this case, the statute's effect was the protected class' punishment. The dissenting opinion did not distinguish between minors engaging in sexual conduct and minors engaging in documented sexual conduct. The court's decision to distinguish these two actions rested on multiple unsubstantiated conclusions, such as speculations concerning the ultimate demise of the romantic relationship and the inevitable dissemination of the photographs to third parties. The dissent emphasized the minor's intent as the controlling factor in prosecution. Because an intention to disseminate the photographs to third parties did not exist, her right to privacy was reasonable, and thus should have been constitutionally protected.

C. The Rise of "Sexting"

Currently, four out of five teens possess a wireless device, which is a forty-percent increase since 2004. Nearly half of teens believe their social lives would vanish without their cell phones, and nearly sixty percent state their cell phones improve their quality of life. Thirty-nine percent of teens send or receive text messages, and admit to taking and sending pictures via text. Sexting, a side effect of the sudden explosion in cell phone usage, leaves parents, teachers, and lawmakers in an unprecedented position. Confronted with this new technological phenomenon, law enforcement officers filed criminal charges against teens for sexting in Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, Alabama, Wisconsin, Florida, New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, Texas, Utah, and other states. In Oklahoma, prosecutors have referred at least ten cases of self-produced child pornography to juvenile courts but have not yet filed charges in adult courts.

A recent survey by The National Campaign to Prevent Teen and Unplanned Pregnancy detailing sexting's pervasiveness received much attention in light of

76. A.H., 949 So. 2d at 239 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 827.071(3) (West 2007)).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 240.
80. Id.
81. A.H., 949 So. 2d at 240.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 241.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
90. Id. (stating that parents' and lawmakers' fears surrounding "sexting" lead to "crackdown" on prosecution).
93. See generally Sex and Tech: Results From a Survey of Teens and Young Adults, THE NAT'L. CAMPAIGN
sexting's newfound prevalence.94 Thirty-nine percent of the teen respondents admitted sending or posting "sexually suggestive" images via text, email, or instant message.95 Of the teens that sent sexually explicit messages, seventy-one percent of females and sixty-seven percent of males sent them to their boyfriend or girlfriend.96 Seventy-five percent of the teens believed that sending "sexually suggestive content [could] have serious negative consequences."97

Pennsylvania teens Marissa Miller and Grace Kelly know the truth of this statement all too well.98 In October 2008, Tunkhannock School District officials confiscated several student cell phones and discovered they contained pictures of female teenage students "scantily clad, semi-nude, and nude."99 The School District gave the phones to George Skumanick, the District Attorney of Wyoming County, Pennsylvania.100 Skumanick stated publically to local newspapers and parents at a school assembly that he could prosecute the teens under Pennsylvania's anti-child pornography statute,101 resulting in felony convictions for the teens.102 He also warned of probable sex offender registration for a period of at least ten years.103

Skumanick sent letters to approximately twenty parents informing them their child was "identified in a police investigation involving the possession . . . of child pornography."104 This letter promised the termination of charges if the teens entered a six to nine month "education and counseling" program.105 Skumanick held a meeting with the parents at the county courthouse in February 2009, addressing the teens' options.106 At the meeting, Skumanick discussed the inevitability of prosecution unless the "children submitted to probation, paid a $100 program fee and completed the program successfully."107

Parents at the meeting inquired into the nature of the photographs that warranted prosecution.108 One parent asked directly why a picture of his daughter in a swimsuit

95. Id. at 2.
96. Id. at 3.
98. Id. at 637.
99. Id. (citing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6312 (West 2009)) (defining "prohibited sexual act" as depicting "sexual intercourse . . . masturbation, sadism, masochism, bestiality, fellatio, cunnilingus, lewd exhibition of genitals or nudity if such nudity is depicted for the purpose of sexual stimulation or gratification of any person who might view such depiction").
100. Id. at 638.
101. Miller, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 638 (citing "Meghan's Law," 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9791 (West 2009)).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Miller, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 638.
justified her prosecution for possession of child pornography. Skumanick replied the girl’s “provocativ[e]” pose warranted her prosecution. When the father pressed Skumanick to define “provocative” more precisely, he refused to discuss the matter and reminded the crowd he could charge all the minors that night. Skumanick added, “[T]hese are the rules. If you don’t like them, too bad.”

Skumanick’s proposed “re-education program” was divided into separate boys’ and girls’ programs. The program’s purported purpose was to teach young girls “how their actions were wrong” and to “gain an understanding of what it mean[t] to be a girl in today’s society, both advantages and disadvantages.” A mandatory homework assignment included in the program’s syllabus required the children to write “‘[w]hat [they] did’ and ‘[w]hy it was wrong.’” Without showing the parents the allegedly “provocative” photos, Skumanick asked every parent at the meeting to sign a form submitting their children to probation and participation in the program. Only one parent signed the form. Skumanick gave the parents one week to comply with his request before pressing charges.

When Marissa’s and Grace’s parents finally saw the picture of their daughters, they saw an image of two thirteen year old girls “from the waist up, each wearing a white, opaque bra.” Grace was playfully making a peace sign, and Marissa was talking on the phone. The other photo in question depicted a young girl (“Jane Doe”) with a white, opaque towel wrapped around her body “just below her breasts.” Despite the parents’ repeated contention the photos did not depict sexual activity, Skumanick reiterated his threat to press felony child pornography charges based on the photos’ “provocative” nature.

His belief the girls “allowed themselves to be photographed” was the sole basis for prosecution, dismissing the girls’ contention they had no part in the dissemination of the photographs. Eventually, all the parents succumbed to Skumanick’s threats and entered their children into the program except Marissa’s, Grace’s, and Jane Doe’s parents. These parents filed a petition for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) in federal court to enjoin Skumanick from filing charges against their daughters, alleging that the threatened prosecution was retaliation for exercising their First and Fourteenth

109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Miller, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 638.
114. Id.
115. Id. (citing the course syllabus attached as an exhibit to the complaint).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Miller, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 639.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. The girl depicted was granted leave of court to remain anonymous. Id.
122. Miller, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 639.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 640.
Amendment rights in refusing to enter the “re-education” program.\(^{125}\)

First, the parents contended the non-obscene nature of the photographs afforded them protection under the First Amendment.\(^{126}\) Second, the program’s forced admission of guilt, despite the fact the children did not violate a law, was impermissible compelled speech.\(^{127}\) Lastly, the parents asserted Skumanick’s program violated their parental right to “control the upbringing of their children.”\(^{128}\) Since the petition was for a TRO, the court considered whether the parents had a reasonable probability of success at trial, if the children would suffer irreparable injury if relief was denied, the nonmoving party’s possible stake in the outcome, and the public interest in granting the relief.\(^{129}\)

The court determined the parents and children had a reasonable chance of success on the merits because they sufficiently asserted constitutionally protected activities.\(^{130}\) The program potentially infringed on the parents’ right to control the upbringing and education of their children,\(^{131}\) and the program’s requirement that the children write an essay concerning how their actions “affected the victim in the case” magnified the parental right infringement.\(^{132}\) In the parents’ eyes, their daughters were the “victims” as they did not disseminate the photos and accordingly did not deserve this lesson.\(^{133}\)

The children demonstrated a right to be free from government-compelled speech.\(^{134}\) The program would force the children to explain the impermissible nature of their actions.\(^{135}\) Because the photographs did not depict a “prohibited sexual act”\(^{136}\) and because the children were arguably the victims of the offense, as they did not disseminate the pictures,\(^{137}\) it was reasonably likely they would not face conviction for the child pornography offense.\(^{138}\) The court determined the children would suffer irreparable harm in the event the TRO was not granted.\(^{139}\) The irreparable harm was the “chilling effect” the “threat of prosecution” had on “plaintiffs expressing themselves by appearing in photographs, even such innocent photographs as those in bathing suits.”\(^{140}\) The court found the plaintiffs met their burden and granted the TRO.\(^{141}\)

While Marissa’s and Grace’s ordeal was not trivial by any measure,\(^{142}\) Ohio teen Jesse Logan felt sexting’s repercussions much more acutely.\(^{143}\) Jesse sent nude pictures

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125. \textit{Id.}
126. \textit{Id.}
128. \textit{Id.}
130. \textit{Id.} at 644.
131. \textit{Id.} (citing Troxel \textit{v.} Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); Meyer \textit{v.} Neb., 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).
133. \textit{Id.}
134. \textit{Id.} (citing Turner Broad Sys., Inc. \textit{v.} FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994)).
135. \textit{Id.}
136. \textit{Id.} at 645 (citing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6312 (West 2009)).
138. \textit{Id.} at 646.
139. \textit{Id.}
140. \textit{Id.}
141. \textit{Id.}
142. \textit{Miller}, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 646 (citing the irreparable harm the threat of prosecution caused the teens).
of herself to her boyfriend. When they broke up, he sent them to their female classmates. The ridicule that followed turned the vivacious young girl into a depressed and desperate teen. She feared the daily name-calling of “slut” and “whore” so intensely that she became afraid to go to school and began skipping classes to avoid the inevitable fear and embarrassment. In May 2008, Jesse went on a local television program to warn other teens about the consequences of sending nude photos to peers. She wanted something positive to come out of her ordeal and “to make sure no one else [would] have to go through [her experience] again.” Two months after Jesse’s television appearance, Jesse’s mother felt she was slowly returning to her old self. Tragically, this was not to be. Jesse’s mother found her daughter’s body hanged in her closet after attending the funeral of a fellow classmate who also committed suicide.

As these cases demonstrate, there is research suggesting the production of sexting photos is more prominent among teenage girls, while the dissemination of the photos is more prominent among teenage boys. One social psychologist, Dr. Arthur Cassidy, suggests the desire of young girls to mirror the images they see in fashion magazines coupled with the explosion of internet networking sites creates unprecedented pressure on young girls to present themselves as sexual objects. The prevalence of teen access to camera phones creates a natural outlet for this sexual pressure.

D. Recent Legislative Actions in Response to Sexting

In 2009, many states took legislative steps to amend child pornography laws in response to sexting. Lawmakers in Utah enacted legislation downgrading punishment for sexting from a third degree felony to a misdemeanor if the person disseminating the pornographic photographs is seventeen or younger. Nebraska now affords an affirmative defense to minors in possession of sexually explicit images of children fifteen and older provided the images depict only one child, coercion did not produce the pictures, and dissemination of the photographs did not occur.

Specifically citing the recent Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”), requiring substantial implementation by every state at the risk of losing

144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Celizic, supra note 143.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
154. Id.
158. Internet and Information Technology: States Act to Address ‘Sexting’, supra note 156 (citing Leg. 97, 101st Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Neb. 2009)).
funding. Vermont moved minor adjudication for sexting to juvenile court to avoid sex offender registration. The Vermont legislation also decriminalized minor possession of images of other minors, as long as the possessor attempted to destroy the image and did not send it to others. Ohio introduced similar legislation, creating a misdemeanor offense for minors convicted of sexting. The law states, "[n]o minor, by use of a telecommunications device, shall recklessly create, receive, exchange, send, or possess a photograph, video, or other material that shows a minor in a state of nudity." While Oklahoma has not yet enacted legislation addressing sexting, a hearing held in October of 2009 discussed the possible ramifications of sexting and the need for parental awareness and possible legislative change.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Sexting Offenses Violate Statutory Intent of Child Pornography Statutes

The recent rise of sexting among teenagers is a serious issue underscoring disturbing developments in the lives of teenagers. The relevant question is whether the severe punishment under current child pornography laws, enacted in response to specific egregious acts of child abuse, is an appropriate response to teen-produced sexual images sent to a significant other of similar age and maturity. When first confronted with the rapidly growing child pornography industry, Congress noted its intent in enacting legislation confronting this disturbing phenomenon was counteraction of the "commercial exploitation" of minors, not the private conduct of "consenting minors or consenting adults."

After the Supreme Court in Ferber approved a more expansive definition of child pornography than obscenity, Congress greatly expanded its child pornography legislation. The deletion of the term "commercial purpose" allowed for prosecution of producers who did not have commercial intentions. Congress expanded the amount of teen sexting images that warrant prosecution by raising the age of the protection under the Act from sixteen to eighteen.

159. 42 U.S.C.A §§ 16901-16917 (West 2006).
161. Id. at 6.
163. Id.
164. Hoberock, supra note 92, at A11
165. Smith, supra note 60., at 515.
166. Id.
168. Smith, supra note 60., at 515-16.
169. Buckman, supra note 18, at 543.
170. 95 CONG. REC. H139 (emphasis added).
173. Id. at 493-94.
174. Id. at 496.
protection to older teens, but merely facilitation of adult prosecutions, made difficult under the previous Act by the requirement of proving the age of an often-absent subject as sixteen or under.

While Congress accomplished its goal of raising child pornography prosecutions it could not have intended the Act, and state laws modeled after it, to facilitate the prosecution of self-produced teen sexting images. However, because the Act raised the age of protection to encompass images of older teens as well as younger teens, the overall pool of teens vulnerable to prosecution for voluntary, self-produced images expanded as well. Furthermore, in sexting cases the minor charged with production of the image is also the subject of the image, and therefore is obviously present throughout the proceedings. Thus, Congress’ reasons for raising the age of protection do not translate to sexting prosecutions of minors.

After given the authority to expand the definition of child pornography, Congress specifically cited situations where the subject of the images and the producer of the images were separate individuals, as the impetus for increasing protection under the Act. The Court also referenced the harmful effects of the production of child pornography at the hands of an adult in striking down the Act’s inclusion of virtual images. Because the process of producing virtual child pornography did not harm any children, the First Amendment shielded the virtual images from prosecution. Therefore, unless coerced into producing a sexting image, teen prosecution for production of the image is unwarranted. The Court in Free Speech Coalition further distinguished the production of harmful images from the production of images depicting an idea embodying a “fact of modern society and ... a theme in art and literature

175. Id. at 505 (explaining the Act would most likely not reach images of eighteen year olds due to the difficulty in proving the age of the subjects, but would merely facilitate prosecution of images of children sixteen and younger).
176. Id.
177. 134 CONG. REC. E3750 (stating prosecution of child pornography rose 600 percent in response to the expansion of the Act).
178. See supra note 61 (citing all fifty states’ child pornography laws, most of which passed after the federal laws criminalizing child pornography, and nearly all listing eighteen as the age of protection).
179. See 134 CONG. REC. E3750. By raising the age of protection to eighteen, the amount of teens covered by the Act expanded to enable prosecution for older teens as well as younger teens. See id.
180. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-536. By raising the age of protection to eighteen, the amount of teens covered by the Act expanded to enable prosecution for older teens as well as younger teens.
181. See id. at 494 (stating under the pre-amendment Act prosecutors had to prove to the jury the age of the subject was sixteen or less because the subject was generally not known or locatable due to the images’ commercial nature).
184. H.R. REP. NO. 98-536, at 492 (stating children filmed engaging in sexual acts “for the producer’s own pleasure or profit” was a “national tragedy”).
186. Id.
187. Id. at 258.
188. See Miller v. Skumanic, 605 F. Supp. 2d 634 (M.D. Pa. 2009). None of the teen images found on the teenagers’ phones were described as “coerced.” Id.; See Celizic, supra note 143. Jesse voluntarily produced the images she sent to her boyfriend. Id.
throughout the ages,” the idea of “teenagers engaging in sexual activity.”\(^{189}\)

The Court emphasized most states allow marriage below the age of eighteen, thus the Act criminalized the depiction of an act which, when consensual, was legal in most states.\(^{190}\) Because the virtual images “creat[ed] no victim by [their] production,” they were not intertwined with the “sexual abuse of children,” and thus constitutionally protected.\(^{191}\) Similarly, the dissemination of sexting images, not their voluntary production, is what victimizes the teen subjects,\(^{192}\) therefore, the First Amendment shields teens from criminal prosecution for merely producing the images.\(^{193}\) When sexting images are not obscene, as the images in \textit{Miller}, the First Amendment indisputably provides protection as their production is legal.\(^{194}\)

**B. The State’s Purpose in Charging Teens for Producing Sexting Images**

Exploring the state’s reasoning behind teen prosecution for child pornography offenses is imperative, as the purpose is not mitigating harm caused to children through the production of child pornography by adult coercion.\(^{195}\) In recent years, extensive “advocacy, funding, and programmatic effort have focused on encouraging Americans to abstain from sexual intercourse until they marry.”\(^{196}\) The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (“Welfare Reform Act”), enacted in 1996, authorized fifty million dollars a year for abstinence- until-marriage education.\(^{197}\) The education programs endorsed by the Welfare Reform Act had to promote sexual abstinence outside of marriage as their sole purpose.\(^{198}\) Congress required programs funded by the Welfare Reform Act teach that pre-marital sex created detrimental physical and psychological effects in its participants.\(^{199}\)

These programs sought to reduce teen sexual activity in response to the reported seventy percent of females, and sixty-five percent of males, engaging in sexual activity by age nineteen.\(^{200}\) Despite opinion polls that registered only thirty-five percent of adults

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190. *Id.* at 247.
191. *Id.* at 250 (emphasis added).
192. Sed Celizic, supra note 143 (Jesse did not suffer embarrassment and the resulting depression from the production of the images, but the dissemination of the images to her classmates); see *Miller*, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 644. The court granted the TRO in part due to parents’ belief their daughters were made “victims” by the dissemination of the photographs, not the production; especially in light of the non-obscene nature of the photographs. *Id.*
193. See *Free Speech Coal.*, 535 U.S. at 250-1. The abusive production of the images was emphasized by the Court. *Id.*
194. See *Miller*, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 645 (citing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6312) (defining “prohibited sexual act” as depicting “sexual intercourse . . . masturbation, sadism, masochism, bestiality, fellatio, cunnilingus, lewd exhibition of genitals or nudity if such nudity is depicted for the purpose of sexual stimulation or gratification of any person who might view such depiction”).
195. See supra notes 165-194 and accompanying text (demonstrating prosecution of teens for producing sexting images violates the statutes’ intent, as the intent is to mitigate the child abuse that results from child pornography produced by adults).
197. *Id.* at 74 (citing Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 912, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996)).
198. *Id.*
199. *Id.*
200. *Id.*
felt premarital sex was always or almost always wrong, Congress continued to promote its single-minded intent to abolish all pre-marital sex as immoral and wrong.\textsuperscript{201}

The internet and technology explosion of the late nineties made policing teen interactions increasingly difficult.\textsuperscript{202} Approximately eighty-seven percent of teens use the internet and sixty-four percent of those teens belong to social networking sites or blogs on which they post pictures of themselves.\textsuperscript{203} Teens tend to use the invisible wall created by technology between the sender and recipient as a means to experiment with their sexuality.\textsuperscript{204} Sexting embodies this desire to experiment sexually,\textsuperscript{205} and accordingly frustrates Congress’ desire to condemn all sexual activities outside of marriage as morally unacceptable.\textsuperscript{206} By prosecuting teens for sexting, states are furthering the belief that sexual interaction among teens is wrong.\textsuperscript{207} This takes advantage of a veritable “loop hole” in child pornography laws enabling regulation of the increasingly private technological interactions among teens.\textsuperscript{208}

C. Alternatives to Criminal Charges

Charging teens with child pornography offenses for the production of sexting images serves to victimize them, not protect them.\textsuperscript{209} Because the intent of child pornography laws is protection of inexperienced and vulnerable minors from sexual exploitation,\textsuperscript{210} it is important to teach children the dangers of sexual exploitation, rather than punish them for sexual experimentation.\textsuperscript{211} The topic of sex education invites political discourse surrounding the proper role of the government versus the family in educating teens about sexual issues.\textsuperscript{212} However, as sexting demonstrates, it is indisputable that teens are involved in sexual interactions.\textsuperscript{213} Therefore, sex education regarding both moral implications and health concerns is required.\textsuperscript{214}

As Miller suggests, parents, not the state, are the preferred instructors for education.\textsuperscript{215}

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\textsuperscript{201} Finer, supra note 196, at 74.
\textsuperscript{202} See Caitlin May, Comment, “Internet-Savvy Students” and Bewildered Educators: Student Internet Speech Is Creating Legal Issues for the Educational Community, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 1105, 1106 (explaining the surge in legal issues concerning “student internet speech”).
\textsuperscript{203} Id. at 1105.
\textsuperscript{204} See Bruce Bower, Growing Up Online: Young People Jump Headfirst into the Internet’s World, 179 SCI. NEWS, June 17, 2006, at 376, 377 (June 17, 2006) (discussing teen inclination to talk about sexual issues in chat rooms).
\textsuperscript{205} See id. (explaining technology’s role in promoting sexual expression among teens). “Sexting” is an extension of the feeling of anonymity and excitement teens feel when discussing sex in chat rooms. See id.
\textsuperscript{206} Finer, supra note 196, at 74.
\textsuperscript{207} See id.
\textsuperscript{208} See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1021. This statute is typical of the vast majority of child pornography statutes in stating every person in possession of child pornography is guilty of a felony. Id. (emphasis added).
\textsuperscript{210} See S. REP. NO. 95-438, at 5.
\textsuperscript{211} See Rommy A. Shtarkshall, John S. Santelli & Jennifer S. Hirsch, Sex Education and Sexual Socialization: Roles for Educators and Parents, 39 PERSP. ON SEXUAL AND REPROD. HEALTH, June 2007, at 116, 116 (explaining the important role sexual education and socialization plays in a child’s upbringing).
\textsuperscript{212} Id.
\textsuperscript{213} See Smith, supra note 60, at 508-9 (discussing the issues surrounding teen-produced child pornography and the prevalence of teens sexual interactions).
\textsuperscript{214} See Shtarkshall et al., supra note 211, at 116.
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concerning the moral implications surrounding sexual interactions.215 “Sexual socialization,” in contrast to sexual education, concerns the learning of beliefs, norms, values, and proper codes of conduct surrounding sexual interactions.216 Children model their sexual behavior after the sexual ideals and beliefs taught to them informally in their home environment.217 Teens who describe their relationships with their parents as “warm and supportive” tend to postpone sexual interactions.218 Further, teens whose parents disapprove of teen sexual behavior are less likely to be sexually active.219

Ideally, the home should be the primary source of education concerning sexual mores and conduct.220 However, as technology and mass media continue to rise in popularity, teens are looking to other outlets for models of appropriate sexual behavior.221 Sexting is a glaring example of this.222 As Dr. Cassidy suggests, teen girls especially look to the sexual images portrayed by the media as models for their sexual behavior.223 Sexting is a wake-up call to parents to resume their rightful place as the appropriate models of sexual conduct and to become more active in their teens’ lives.224

The most obvious outlet through which parents can deter the rise of sexting is to limit the usage of their teens’ cell phones.225 Most major cell phone providers offer tools that allow parents to either limit the amount of texts teens are able to send, or to monitor the content of such communication at a minimal cost.226 While these tools can deter the conduct by instilling fear of parental punishment,227 open communication and positive familial models concerning appropriate sexual behavior is preferable.228

Besides the prevalence of the media,229 another impediment to teen education within the home environment concerning sexual behavior is the discomfort felt by teens at the thought of discussing sex with their parents.230 Parents, especially fathers, share this sentiment.231 This mutual feeling of unease bolsters the need for sex education in schools.232 A school’s prominent role in regulating sexting offenses also magnifies the need for continued diligence by school administrators concerning sex education.233

216. Shtarkshall et al., supra note 211, at 116.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 117.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 116.
221. Shtarkshall et al., supra note 211, at 116.
222. See supra notes 202-8 and accompanying text (describing the impact the technological explosion has had on regulating teen interactions).
223. See Barbieri, supra note 153.
224. See Shtarkshall et al., supra note 211, at 117 (explaining that teens who have close relationships with their parents are less likely to be sexually active).
226. Id. (citing sexting as an impetus behind these tools).
227. Id. (stating the purpose of these tools is to monitor teen behavior). Presumably, the purpose of the monitoring is to be able to punish the teens in the event sexual images are found. Id.
228. See Shtarkshall et al., supra note 211, at 116.
229. See Barbieri, supra note 153.
230. See Shtarkshall et al., supra note 211, at 117.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. See Miller v. Skumanic, 605 F. Supp. 2d 634, 637 (M.D. Pa. 2009) (stating the pictures at issue were all
need for familial education concerning the subjective moral implications of sexual interactions, and the need for school education of the objective health risks, demonstrates a shared obligation between parents and schools. Criminal punishment of teens for sexting is an ineffective and inappropriate method to teach socially acceptable sexual behavior compared to education by parents and teachers. Therefore, the state should concede sex education to parents and schools and focus on punishing adults who exploit minors, the intended perpetrators of child pornography laws.

This is not to say law enforcement should play no role in mitigating sexting. The need for parental and school involvement as opposed to criminal charges pertains solely to teens that voluntarily produce images of themselves and disseminate them to a single person. Threatening criminal charges is completely appropriate to convince teens to desist from sending the sexually explicit images to multiple individuals. For example, teens such as Jesse Logan’s boyfriend are entirely worthy of criminal punishment, but Jesse herself most certainly was not.

Law enforcement can deter sexting by educating teens about the possible criminal sanctions involved in sexting. As Ohio prosecutor Mathias Heck explains, most teens that produce and send sexting messages simply are unaware of the criminal repercussions surrounding their decisions. In March of 2009, Heck’s county introduced a program specifically aimed at juvenile sexting offenders. The six-month “diversion program” requires teen participants of sexting to relinquish their cell phones, participate in community service, and take four hours of educational courses concerning the appropriate and legal use of the internet and related topics. While programs such as these are a welcome alternative to criminal charges, prosecutors must take into account the lessons learned from Miller. These programs must focus on the legal ramifications of sexting and not the state’s beliefs concerning the appropriateness of gender roles and teen sex. Due to the paternalistic motives behind teen sexting charges and the need for parental and educational responsibility in response to the

confiscated from cell phones at school); see May, supra note 202, at 1106-7 (describing the implications of the increased presence of internet communications on school campuses).

234. Shtarkshall et al., supra note 211, at 117.
236. See supra notes 165-194 and accompanying text (describing child pornography laws’ intended purpose was punishment of adults who exploit minors).
237. Smith, supra note 60, at 541.
238. See id. at 541-542 (discussing the need for criminal punishment only those teens that refuse to cooperate with law enforcement in destroying the images).
239. Id.
240. See Celizic, supra note 143.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
246. See id.
247. See supra notes 195-208 and accompanying text (explaining the government’s intentions in charging teens for sexting is mitigation of pre-marital sex, not child abuse).
sexting phenomenon, state child pornography laws require amendment.

D. SORNA's Effect on Convictions of Minors

1. SORNA's Expansive Reach

The recent enactment of SORNA, the national sex offender registry, bolsters the need for legislative change to state child pornography laws. John Walsh, an invaluable advocate for missing children and unsolved crime, has orchestrated the enactment of numerous laws aimed at child protection and sex offender registry. One example of this activism, The Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, became federal law on July 27, 2006. Additionally, this came with its most controversial and significant provisions, SORNA.

Initially, all fifty states were individually required under SORNA to implement procedures creating a national sex offender registry by July 27, 2009, or lose ten percent of its allocated Byrne Justice Assistance Grant funds for each year it did not comply. On May 26, 2009, the Attorney General granted a blanket extension to all jurisdictions for substantial implementation of the terms of SORNA until July 27, 2010. As of October 2009, Ohio and the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation (located in Oregon) were the only two jurisdictions in substantial compliance with SORNA. Upon this bill's signature in 2006, President Bush explained the necessity for compiling a public national database of sex offenders. Such a database enabled "parents to protect their children from sex offenders that might be in their neighborhoods" when these offenders moved across state lines.

Despite the implementation costs for states, and the already existing sex offender registry statutes, states are required to impose these restrictions at the risk of losing necessary funding. SORNA creates a national sex offender registry by implementing a three-tiered system of classification for offenders who are required to register.

248. See supra notes 210-34 and accompanying text (describing the parental and educational alternatives that could mitigate sexting).
249. See supra notes 60-5 and accompanying text (stating the vast majority of child pornography laws contain language broad enough to encompass sexting offenses, therefore amendment is necessary).
251. See Smith, supra note 60, at 536.
253. 42 U.S.C.A § 16901.
254. Salerno & Goldstein, supra note 252, at 32 (citing 42 U.S.C.A §§ 16901-16917).
255. Id. (explaining these grants generally apply to law enforcement and drug laws).
256. Id.
258. Id.
260. Id.
261. Salerno & Goldstein, supra note 252, at 32.
offenders are the least offensive sex offenders. The term Tier I offenders are merely defined as those offenders that are neither Tier II nor Tier III, and are required to register for fifteen years, with renewal once per year. Tier II offenders are generally felons convicted of numerous sexual offenses, including production and distribution of child pornography. These offenders must register for twenty-five years, with renewal every six months. Tier III offenders are the most serious of the sexual offenders convicted of the most egregious sexual offenses. Also included in this category are repeat Tier II offenders. Tier III offenders are required to register for life at a renewal rate of every three months.

Section 111 of AWA details the applicability of SORNA’s sex offender registration to juvenile offenders adjudicated delinquent of a sex offense. This section mandates that juvenile offenders, who are fourteen years or older at the time of conviction of an offense “comparable to or more severe than aggravated sexual abuse, . . . or [who have] [attempted] or [conspired] to commit such an offense,” are required to register as sex offenders.

Although at first glance it does not appear AWA includes juveniles found delinquent for possession or dissemination of child pornography, AWA allows states considerable leeway in determining who will be required to register. Additionally, this discretion can affect minors charged with sex offenses by altering state laws pertaining to juvenile documents. These guidelines set the minimum requirements a state must follow, meaning states can use this federal law to expand registry laws they already have in place. Furthermore, the pressure placed on states to adopt these guidelines at the risk of losing funding compromises the privacy of juvenile records.

Additionally, there is no assurance to minors that juvenile court is the proper venue for charges brought against them. Furthermore, even if charges are initially filed in juvenile court, minors can find themselves transferred to criminal court during the
duration of their proceedings.\textsuperscript{278} In both state and federal courts, prosecutors have the option to request a removal from juvenile court to criminal court, and some states can avoid juvenile court entirely by initially filing charges against minors in criminal court.\textsuperscript{279} If criminal court is the chosen venue for minors charged with sexting offenses, SORNA’s provisions will make sex offender registration mandatory for such teens.\textsuperscript{280} As discussed previously, the overwhelming majority of state child pornography laws proscribe felony charges to \textit{any} person in possession of child pornography;\textsuperscript{281} thus under SORNA, minors convicted in criminal court for sexting offenses would be required to register for a minimum of twenty-five years as sex offenders.\textsuperscript{282}

Many circuit court opinions have addressed the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. §2250(a), which makes it a felony to fail to register as a sex offender as defined by SORNA.\textsuperscript{283} The Attorney General was delegated the task of determining SORNA’s retroactive application to offenders convicted before the statute’s effective date.\textsuperscript{284} However, no guidelines accompanied the implementation of this decision.\textsuperscript{285} The Attorney General determined the requirements of SORNA applied to “all sex offenders, including sex offenders convicted of the offense for which registration is required prior to the enactment of [the] Act.”\textsuperscript{286}

Prior to September 2009, all circuit courts had rejected claims that the provision

\textsuperscript{278} Id.
\textsuperscript{279} Id. at 534 (citing 18 U.S.C.A. §5032 (West 1996) (“granting federal district court judges broad discretion, in the interests of justice, to allow juveniles to be prosecuted as adults in federal court”); see \textit{National Overviews: Which States Try Juveniles as Adults and Use Blended Sentencing?}, NAT’L CTR. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, http://www.ncjj.org/stateprofiles (select “Trying and Sentencing Juveniles as Adults” in the “National Overviews” drop down box; then select the hyperlink for the article) (last accessed Nov. 20, 2009) (stating, “Thirty-eight states allow for the possibility that minors will be prosecuted as adults on any felony charge; twenty of those go even farther, permitting minors to be prosecuted in criminal court for misdemeanors as well).\textsuperscript{280}
\textsuperscript{280} Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 111 (persons convicted of felony child pornography convictions are Tier II offenders).
\textsuperscript{281} See \textit{supra} note 61 (listing state child pornography laws which proscribe felony charges to any person convicted of possession of child pornography).
\textsuperscript{282} Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 111.
\textsuperscript{283} Corey Rayburn Yung, \textit{One of These Laws is Not Like the Others: Why the Federal Sex Offender Registry and Notification Act Raises New Constitutional Questions}, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 369, 384-5 (2009) (citing 18 U.S.C.A. § 2250 (West 2006); U. S. v. Dixon, 551 F.3d 578, 586-587 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding defendant was required to register in Indiana even though Indiana had not established the SORNA procedures, Congress did not violate separation of powers when it delegated to the Attorney General authority to specify SORNA’s applicability, defendant’s conviction did not violate due process, and defendant’s second conviction did not violate Ex Post Facto Clause); U.S. v. May, 535 F.3d 912, 920 (8th Cir. 2008) (holding registration requirements applied to defendant and this did not violate Ex Post Facto Clause, defendant lacked standing to challenge SORNA provision giving authority to the Attorney General to promulgate rules regarding SORNA, his conviction did not violate due process, and SORNA did not violate the Commerce Clause) (8th Circuit subsequently affirmed its judgment in May and found § 16913 constitutional under the Commerce Clause in U. S. v. Howell, 552 F.3d 1329 (8th Cir. 2009)); U.S. v. Hinkley, 550 F.3d 926, 940 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding SORNA did apply to defendant, SORNA did not violate Ex Post Facto Clause or the Commerce Clause); U.S. v. Amber, 561 F.3d 1202, 1215 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding the application of the provisions making it a crime not to register under SORNA did not violate the Ex Post Facto provision of the Constitution, did not violate defendant’s substantive or procedural due process rights, SORNA did not exceed Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause, and the provision giving the Attorney General the authority to determine the retroactive application of the Act was not an improper delegation of legislative authority)).
\textsuperscript{284} 42 U.S.C.A. § 16913(d).
\textsuperscript{285} Yung, \textit{supra} note 283, at 382.
\textsuperscript{286} U.S. v. Juvenile Male, 581 F.3d 977, 982 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing 28 C.F.R. § 72.3 (2007)).
violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution. But on September 10, 2009, deciding an issue of first impression, the Ninth Circuit determined the retroactive application of SORNA’s provision concerning juvenile registration of convictions prior to SORNA’s passage was an impermissible violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. The opinion highlighted the reasoning behind the juvenile justice system, and the far-reaching implications sex offender registry imposed on juveniles for the entirety of their adult lives. SORNA’s recent addition intensified these far-reaching implications by broadening previously discreet state and federal juvenile proceedings.

The court stated, “[a]s a society, we generally refuse to punish our nation’s youth as harshly as we do our fellow adults, or to hold them to the same level of culpability as people who are older, wiser, and more mature.” It determined the statute’s effect was punitive when applied retroactively to juveniles. The practice of near absolute confidentiality that historically attached to juvenile proceedings, in which the proceedings were generally closed and records sealed, weighed heavily on the court’s determination that SORNA’s effects were punitive. This was because the hallmark of juvenile proceedings was rehabilitation, as opposed to the punitive nature of adult criminal proceedings.

Before SORNA’s passage, open juvenile proceedings or released documents, which were sparse, could not publicly disclose the juvenile’s “identity” or “image.” SORNA did not merely make previously public information more accessible

287. See Yung, supra note 283. In reaching this conclusion, the circuit courts relied on Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2004) where the Supreme Court found the Alaska sex offender registration and notification law did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Id. at 105-6. The statute in question was indisputably retroactive, as it applied to sex offenders convicted before the statute’s enactment. Id. at 91. However, a statute of this kind only violated the Ex Post Facto Clause if the legislature intended to punish, and not merely to establish “civil proceedings.” Id. at 92 (quoting Ks. v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997)). If the legislature’s intent was found to impose a civil regulatory system, the statute required further examination to determine whether the scheme was “so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the state’s] intention to deem it ‘civil.’” Id. at 92 (quoting U.S. v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-249 (1980)). The Court noted “only the clearest proof” would counteract legislative intent and deem a statute’s intended purpose morphed from a “civil remedy into a criminal penalty.” Id. at 92 (citing Hudson v. U.S., 522 U.S. 93, 100 (1997)); see also Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361; U.S. v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 290 (1996); U.S. v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 365 (1984). In finding the statute was not punitive in effect, the Court relied upon the statute’s “rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose.” Smith, 538 U.S. at 102 (citing Ursery, 518 U.S. at 290). In this case, the purpose was to further public safety through alerting the public of sex offenders in their neighborhoods, especially in light of the reportedly high rate of recidivism among sex offenders and their overall “dangerousness as a class.” Id. at 103.

288. Juvenile Male, 581 F.3d at 979.

289. Id.

290. Id. at 978.

291. Id. at 979.

292. Id.

293. Juvenile Male, 581 F.3d at 978.

294. Id. at 979.

295. Id. at 983-4.

296. Id. at 986 (citing district judge at juvenile’s revocation hearing stating, “[T]his is a juvenile proceeding. Consequently, it is closed to the public.”).

297. Id. at 988.

298. Juvenile Male, 581 F.3d at 989.

299. Id. at 986.

300. Id. (emphasis omitted) (citing 18 U.S.C.A. § 5038(a) (West 2009)) (stating, “Throughout and upon the completion of the juvenile delinquency proceeding, the records shall be safeguarded from disclosure to
to the public.\textsuperscript{301} Rather, it made previously confidential information public, subjecting juveniles to sex offender registry's irreparable repercussions, an injury previously withheld from them.\textsuperscript{302}

2. SORNA's Impact on Sexting Offenses

SORNA is another example of expansive moral legislation with unforeseen consequences for minors convicted of sexting offenses.\textsuperscript{303} While the goal of creating a national sex offender registry is necessary to allow, "parents to protect their children from sex offenders that might be in their neighborhoods,"\textsuperscript{304} narrow tailoring is required to ensure it does not victimize its intended protected class.\textsuperscript{305} As \textit{Juvenile Male} explains, the intent of criminal proceedings involving minors is rehabilitation, not disproportional punishment.\textsuperscript{306} Requiring teens to register as sex offenders for a large portion of their adult lives for teen sexting offenses clearly punishes them for immature, sometimes harmless, decisions made during their formative years.\textsuperscript{307} Furthermore, even if teens are adjudicated in juvenile court and therefore most likely exempt from registration,\textsuperscript{308} their juvenile records may become public, thus stigmatizing them long after they have reached the age of majority and served their punishment.\textsuperscript{309}

While SORNA's intentions are worthy, its incidental consequences have proved far-reaching.\textsuperscript{310} As Vermont has foreseen, legislative amendment at the state level is necessary to ensure teens charged with sexting offenses are not required to register as sex offenders.\textsuperscript{311} A federal blanket provision,\textsuperscript{312} which allows one person the ability to decide such imperative decisions as retroactive application without so much as guidelines,\textsuperscript{313} is not capable of accounting for the individualized effects of sex offender registry.\textsuperscript{314} Therefore, states must amend their child pornography laws to shield minors charged with sexting offenses from the irreversible effects of expansive sex offender
registry laws. 315

D. The Form Amendments Should Take

1. “Romeo and Juliet” Exceptions to Statutory Rape

Charging teens with statutory rape for consensual teen sex draws numerous similarities to teen sexting offenses. 316 Just as every state regulates child pornography, 317 every state regulates sexual intercourse between unmarried people below a certain age, commonly referred to as statutory rape. 319 Lawmakers generally deem these individuals legally incapable of consent. 320

Initially, statutory rape laws reflected the premise that a woman’s premarital chastity was a valuable commodity worthy of legal protection. 321 Accordingly, these laws were gender specific; they only targeted male activity as criminal. 322 Modern laws regulating consensual teen sex evolved from a desire to protect a property interest into the belief that statutory rape laws necessarily regulated teen sexual behavior. 324 Lawmakers cited the many risks accompanying adolescent sexual behavior as bolstering the necessity of these laws. 325 These risks ranged from the intangible harms surrounding inexperienced sexual interactions, such as coercion or abuse, to tangible effects, such as the proliferation of teen pregnancy. 326

A study published in 1992 by Professor Michael Males indicated that an alarmingly high number of teen mothers gave birth to babies fathered by adult men. 327 The Alan Guttmacher Institute replicated this study on a larger scale, finding sixty-five percent of teen mothers bore babies to fathers at least twenty years old. 328 This study

315. See Juvenile Male, 581 F.3d at 981-982 (detailing the expansive provisions and their lasting and punitive effects on juveniles).
316. See generally Siji A. Moore, Comment, Out of the Fire and Into the Frying Pan: Georgia Legislature’s Attempt to Regulate Teen Sex Through the Criminal Justice System, 52 HOW. L.J. 197 (2008) (discussing Georgia’s attempt to regulate consensual teen sexual interactions through criminal sanctions). States are similarly using sexting offenses to regulate teen sexual interactions. See notes 195-208 and accompanying text.
317. Smith, supra note 60, at 513.
320. COCCA, supra note 318, at 1.
321. Id. at 11.
322. Id. at 9, 18-9.
323. Id. at 11.
326. Id. at 705.
327. Id. (citing Mike Males, Adult Liaison in the “Epidemic” of “Teenage” Birth, Pregnancy and Venereal Disease, 29 J. SEX RESEARCH 525, 527-44 (1992)).
328. COCCA, supra note 318, at 25; see also Oberman, supra note 325, at 705 (citing Jacqueline E. Darroch et. al., Age Differences Between Sexual Partners in the United States, 31 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 160, 163 (1999); Rigel Oliveri, Statutory Rape Law and Enforcement in the Wake of Welfare Reform, 52 STAN. L. REV. 463, 504-5 (2000) (stating the term “teen” is vague, and recent studies have shown nearly two-thirds of teen mothers are eighteen or nineteen years old, and thus do not qualify as “victims” under statutory rape laws)).
also demonstrated that often the younger the mother, the older the father.329 Despite subsequent studies showing nearly sixty percent of these teen mothers as eighteen or nineteen years old with partners aged twenty-one or twenty-two,330 the Alan Guttmacher Institute findings fueled the fire for the strict enforcement of statutory rape laws.331 Lawmakers and individuals believed a tougher stance on statutory rape prosecution, such as heightened penalties for consensual teen sex, would lower teen pregnancy rates.332

The concerns surrounding the moral and financial implications attributed to rampant teen pregnancy led to legislation aimed at promoting statutory rape convictions in the mid-nineties.333 One year after the Alan Guttmacher findings, Congress looked to welfare reform as a means of enticing states into enforcing statutory rape laws.334 As previously mentioned,335 Congress enacted the Welfare Reform Act in 1996,336 simultaneously establishing Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), a block grant to the states.337

In addition to providing funding for educational programs positing the immoral and unacceptable nature of premarital sex,338 the Welfare Reform Act also targeted the financial burdens and moral implications accompanying out of wedlock teen births.339 Every state was required to submit its individual plan reducing illegitimate teen pregnancy and specifically required to provide “education and training on the problem of statutory rape.”340 States could potentially receive bonuses of up to twenty-five million dollars in TANF funding each year if teen pregnancy decreased.341 Shortly after the Welfare Reform Act’s passage, ten states poured millions of dollars into targeting teen sex through increased statutory rape prosecutions, “explicitly intertwining the moral and economic bases of statutory rape laws.”342 This increased interest in statutory rape prosecution garnered mixed reviews,343 but it was not until a 2006 Georgia case, Wilson v. State,344 that teen sex prosecution’s far-reaching implications were brought into focus.345

On December 31, 2003, seventeen-year-old homecoming king Genarlow Wilson

329. COCCA, supra note 318, at 25.
330. Id.
331. Oberman, supra, note 325, at 706.
332. COCCA, supra note 318, at 25.
333. Id. at 26.
334. Id.
335. See supra notes 196-201 and accompanying text (explaining the Welfare Reform Act’s connection to the purpose of “sexting” charges).
337. Id. (citing §§ 101-116).
338. Finer, supra note 196, at 74.
339. COCCA, supra note 318, at 26.
341. Id. (citing §§ 403(2)(A), 403(2)(B)) (stating “[e]ach state shall be entitled to receive from the Secretary a bonus each year for which the state demonstrates a net decrease in out-of-wedlock births,” totaling up to $25,000,000).
342. Id.
343. Id. at 26-7.
345. Koch, supra note 324 (discussing debate sparked by Wilson opinion among state legislatures).
Wilson, along with several of his male classmates, received oral sex from a fifteen-year-old classmate, Tracy. After investigating the incident and recovering a videotape of various sexual encounters that took place at the party, police officers arrested Wilson and five other seventeen-year-old males for a variety of sexual offenses. Wilson's charge was aggravated child molestation resulting from oral sex he engaged in with Tracy. At the time of Wilson's arrest, Georgia law classified sex, including oral sex, with any person under the age of sixteen as aggravated child molestation, regardless of the age difference between the two individuals. This charge carried a statutory minimum of ten years imprisonment, and required defendants to register as sex offenders.

Wilson decided to risk trial rather than submit to registration, while the other young men accepted plea bargains. The jury found that the voluntary act of oral sex by a person over the age of sixteen with someone under the age of sixteen, regardless of consent, satisfied the elements of aggravated sexual assault. The jury sentenced Wilson to ten years in prison and required his registration as a sex offender. Wilson's case, along with the sentencing of his classmate Marcus Dixon, brought national attention to Georgia's teen sex laws and placed pressure on its legislature to amend its aggravated child molestation law. Accordingly, Georgia amended its law reducing Wilson's crime to a misdemeanor, but failed to make the amendment retroactive. Wilson spent two years in jail before the Georgia Supreme Court finally authorized his release in 2007, based on the premise that his punishment was cruel and unusual.

In response to Wilson's punishment and the national crackdown on statutory rape, several states enacted legislation eliminating the prosecution of consensual teen

347. Id. at 198.
348. Id. at 198-9.
349. Id. at 199.
350. Id. (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-4(c) (West 2009)).
351. Moore, supra note 316, at 199 (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-4(c)).
352. Id. at 200 (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15 (West 2006) (stating this law would have prevented Wilson from living with his little sister as sex offenders were prohibited from living within “1,000 ft. of any child care facility, church, or area where minors congregate”).
353. Id. at 201. Moore explains consent was an issue at trial, but there was considerable evidence Michelle consented to the sexual acts she committed. Id.
354. Id.
356. Moore, supra note 316, at 201; see Dixon v. State, 596 S.E.2d 147 (Ga. 2004) (sentencing Dixon to ten years imprisonment for having sex with a girl two years and three months younger than himself).
357. Moore, supra note 316, at 201.
358. Id. (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-4 (West 2008)).
359. Id.
360. Id. at 202.
362. Id.; see supra notes 250-315.
Proponents of this legislation believed tough laws regulating teen sex needed amendment to focus on predators, not teenagers. The belief that juvenile offenders were less likely than adult sex offenders to commit another offense and were more susceptible to rehabilitation, was another basis for amending laws regulating teen sex.

A common misconception concerning statutory rape is that states strictly define only one age of consent, meaning intercourse with any individual below this statutorily prescribed age is illegal, without regard to any other factors. This was the prevailing view at one point. Under this structure, even if the male is the same age as the female, or younger, and they are both below the age of consent, prosecution for felony statutory rape is a likely outcome.

In actuality, this represents a very small minority of state statutory rape laws. Statutory rape laws no longer solely criminalize male conduct. Furthermore, the vast majority of states consider various factors such as “age differentials, minimum age of the victim, and minimum age of the defendant,” as mitigating factors. Lawmakers and prosecutors commonly refer to these mitigating circumstances as “Romeo and Juliet” exceptions to statutory rape. “Romeo and Juliet” laws mitigate penalties or completely exculpate consensual teen activities when both are close in age, yet one is below the legal age of consent. Thirty-nine states use “Romeo and Juliet” exceptions to decriminalize punishment for voluntary sexual interactions among teens of similar age and maturity. For example, a state will typically set a minimum age for a possible defendant, commonly sixteen or seventeen, and specify the behavior is not criminal if the defendant is no more than a certain number of years older than the victim, typically between two and four years. Additionally, forty-five states and Washington D.C. mitigate at least the punishment for statutory rape from a felony to a misdemeanor based on the age span between the two teens.

363. Koch, supra note 361 (citing Texas, Oklahoma, Arizona, Florida, Oregon, Connecticut, and Indiana as states that had mitigated punishment for consensual sexual acts among teens in response to Wilson and SORNA).
364. Id.
365. Id. (citing Allison Taylor, executive director of the Texas Council on Sex Offender Treatment).
368. Id.
369. GLOSSER ET AL., supra note 366, at 7.
370. COCCA, supra note 318, at 22.
371. GLOSSER ET AL., supra note 366, at 7.
373. Id. at 225-6.
374. GLOSSER ET AL., supra note 366, at 7. The eleven states without “Romeo and Juliet” exceptions are: California, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire, New York, and Wisconsin. Id. at 6-7.
376. Cohen, supra note 324, at 734.
377. Id. at 734, n.119. These statutes are: ALA. CODE § 13A-6-62(a)(1) (West 2009); ALASKA STAT. §§
Reflective of the current status of statutory rape laws, in which the vast majority do not criminalize consensual teen sex, most Americans would agree that consensual teen sex is not worthy of criminal sanction. The fact that victimization is not a product of consensual teen sex explains why many no longer consider criminal sanctions necessary. Comparably, a teen that takes a nude, or semi-nude, picture of themselves and sends it to their significant other is not victimized by their own conduct. Likewise, this conduct requires decriminalization.

As discussed previously, the impetus for charging teens with sexting offenses is deterrence of teen sexual encounters, as evidenced through The Welfare Reform Act. The Welfare Reform Act similarly spurred zealous enforcement of state statutory rape laws in order to receive large amounts of state funding, thus furthering the government’s goal of discouraging teen pregnancy and teen sex. It took the cases of Genarlow Wilson and others like his to make states realize that punishment for teen sex victimized the teen, not the sex itself. The overwhelming majority of state legislatures determined the need to protect teens from excessive punishment surpassed their desire to

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deter teen sex through the enforcement of statutory rape laws.\textsuperscript{388} Hopefully, the same realization, as manifested through cases such as Miller, will force every state legislature to follow the lead of the few states that have addressed sexting and amended their child pornography laws.\textsuperscript{389}

Statutory rape has had hundreds of years to evolve and conform to the current state of societal norms concerning teen sex.\textsuperscript{390} Sexting is an extremely new phenomenon by any standard.\textsuperscript{391} Accordingly, child pornography statutes should draw guidance from statutory rape statutes and similarly take into account the age of the producer of the image when criminalizing conduct.\textsuperscript{392}

2. A Guideline for States Based on “Romeo and Juliet” Exceptions and the Recent Actions of States

To ensure the intended purpose of child pornography laws remains intact, the amendments must consider multiple factors.\textsuperscript{393} The age of the producer of the image most certainly should be a factor in determining criminal liability for the production and possession of child pornography.\textsuperscript{394} Analogously to statutory rape, if the producer of the image is below the age of eighteen, production and possession of the image does not justify criminalization.\textsuperscript{395}

As the dissent in A.H. v. State explains, when criminalizing the dissemination of the image, the teen producer’s intent should be a controlling factor in assigning criminal sanctions to the conduct.\textsuperscript{396} If the teen producing the sexting image sends it to only one person, namely another teen of similar maturity level, then neither the dissemination nor the production of the image warrants criminal penalty.\textsuperscript{397} However, a teen like Jesse Logan’s boyfriend, who disseminated an image he did not produce to a large group of people, deserves criminal punishment for his actions.\textsuperscript{398} This conduct is worthy of criminal punishment because the victimization and exploitation of the minor subject resulting from this type of behavior is the precise consequence child pornography laws were enacted to prevent.\textsuperscript{399}

The recent legislative amendments in response to sexting are useful guidelines to
states in many aspects. Legislation by states such as Utah and Ohio, downgrades punishment from a felony to a misdemeanor based on the age of the person either producing or disseminating the image. Although positive steps, such legislation fails to differentiate between the intent of the producer and the intent of the disseminator. Nebraska’s affirmative defense decriminalizing minor possession of an image if the image depicts only one child, is not coerced, and is not disseminated, more adequately assigns the appropriate level of punishment based on the intent of teens. Vermont’s sexting legislation moving teen sexting offenses to juvenile courts is another necessary change in light of SORNA’s expansive reach.

In sum, the teen producer of a sexting image is not worthy of criminal punishment if the image is voluntarily produced, sent to one or no persons, and depicts solely the teen producer. If the state decides to punish the teen producer, a separate child pornography offense adjudicated in juvenile court is necessary to bolster the likelihood the teen will not face sex offender registration. On the contrary, a teen who did not produce the sexting image and subsequently sent it to multiple people in an effort to exploit and ridicule the subject is worthy of whatever punishment the state deems fit, due to the abuse and irreversible harm this conduct inflicts on the teen subject.

IV. CONCLUSION

Sexting provides a telling look into the private, sexual lives of teens. This insight disturbs both parents and law enforcement officers alike. Sexting displays a reckless, possibly immoral, attitude towards sex among today’s youth. However, the underlying beliefs pertaining to the sexuality of the teen producer do not require rectification by the state. Parents are the archetypes of sexual mores and behavior for their teen children. Consequently, teen education concerning the appropriateness of sexual behavior should primarily be delegated to parents in the home. Child pornography laws are not intended as a state-endorsed vehicle to educate teens concerning the proper role of sex in teen life. The state’s decision to charge teens for producing sexually suggestive images under statutes designed to mitigate coercive acts of adults, shows the state’s motivation is regulation of teen sexual interactions, not...
diminishment of child abuse. This improper motivation, coupled with the far-reaching and irreversible effects of sex offender registry, demonstrate the necessity of amendment to child pornography laws to reflect the age and intent of the teen producer.

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