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Tamara R. Piety*

INTRODUCTION

It is commonplace to hear legal scholarship derided as out of touch, too theoretical, low quality, unread, and of little practical impact.1 Chief Justice John Roberts reportedly asserted that he seldom reads or relies on law review articles.2

Pick up a copy of any law review that you see and the first article is likely to be, you know, the influence of Immanuel Kant on evidentiary approaches in 18th-century Bulgaria, or something, which I’m sure was of great interest to the academic that wrote it, but isn’t of much help to the bar.3

* Professor of Law, University of Tulsa. This Essay was written in conjunction with the Symposium at Northwestern. I want to thank Marty Redish for inviting me. I also thank Northwestern University Law School for funding my participation at the event which led to this Symposium. I apologize in advance for the very many wonderful works on legal scholarship that I failed to cite here. Nothing should be read into that but running out of time and fear of taxing the good offices of the wonderful editors at the William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal, in particular Emily Wagman and Katherine Lennon. Thanks also to my research assistants Lauren Colpitts, Katherine Dunning, Laurie Mehrwein, and L. Glenise Williams.

1 See, e.g., Richard Brust, The High Court vs. The Ivory Tower, ABA J., Feb. 2012, at 50 (legal scholarship not relevant to the practice); Adam Liptak, The Lackluster Reviews That Lawyers Love to Hate, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2013, at A15; see also Michael C. Dorf, Justice Scalia Suggests that the Legal Academy Is out of Touch: Is He Right?, FINDLAW (Mar. 8, 2010), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20100308.html [https://perma.cc/6ES2-NUQL] (reporting that the consensus amongst judges at a recent judicial conference was law reviews were not of much use, reporting that one judge said of law reviews: “No one speaks of them. No one relies on them.”; Dorf offers some rebuttal). But see Judith S. Kaye, One Judge’s View of Academic Law Review Writing, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 313, 319 (1989) (“It is hard to think of completing an opinion without venturing into the literature, and ideally I like starting an opinion with good briefs and articles.”); Matt Bodie, The Delaware Chancery’s Unusual Relationship with Academia, CONGLOMERATE (Nov. 16, 2011), http://www.theconglomerate.org/2011/11/the-delaware-chancerys-relationship-with-academia.html [https://perma.cc/VBJ4-MDHC].

2 See A Conversation with Chief Justice Roberts, C-SPAN (June 25, 2011), https://www.c-span.org/video/?300203-1/conversation-chief-justice-roberts [https://perma.cc/DWF6-KMJF] (“People ask me what the last law review article I read was, and I have to think very hard before coming up with one.”); see also Liptak, supra note 1, at A15.

3 Liptak, supra note 1, at A15 (quoting Chief Justice Roberts’s remarks at a judicial conference).
Judge Harry Edwards is likewise famously critical of legal scholarship. He has written a number of law review articles criticizing legal scholarship.\(^4\) In these articles, Judge Edwards claims that legal scholarship does not address the concerns of the profession because it has “little relevance to concrete issues, or addresses concrete issues in a wholly theoretical manner.”\(^5\) Perhaps most curiously, this critique


\(^5\) Edwards, The Growing Disjunction, supra note 4, at 35. We might take Judge Edwards’s most recent version of this criticism with a grain of salt, however. He was co-chair of the Committee tasked with looking at forensic science, see COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCI. CMTY. ET AL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD (2009) [hereinafter STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE], and so is surely aware that there is no shortage of legal scholarship on forensic science.

For example, there is a great body of literature criticizing expert testimony on fingerprints in light of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the case which announced the test for the admissibility of expert evidence. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Daubert purported to establish a more rigorous standard for admitting expert testimony, one that many legal scholars said testimony on fingerprints did not meet. See generally SIMON A. COLE, SUSPECT IDENTITIES: A HISTORY OF FINGERPRINTING AND CRIMINAL IDENTIFICATION (2001); Jennifer L. Mnookin, Fingerprint Evidence in an Age of DNA Profiling, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 13 (2001) (discussing the relatively uncritical acceptance of fingerprint testimony and how the challenges to DNA experts may provide a roadmap to challenging fingerprint experts); Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Validity of Latent Fingerprint Identification: Confessions of a Fingerprinting Moderate, 7 LAW PROBABILITY & RISK 127 (2008) [hereinafter Mnookin, The Validity of Latent Fingerprint Identification] (arguing that forensic science professionals should do more to implement tests that provide the sort of information courts need even if they cannot do strictly “scientific” testing). Some of that literature was cited in the report produced by Judge Edwards’s committee. See STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra, at 142 & n.28 (citing Mnookin, The Validity of Latent Fingerprint Identification, supra, at 127).

Yet fingerprint testimony continues to be an important part of the prosecutor’s toolbox.

In general, there is an overwhelming body of legal scholarship about Daubert, its pitfalls and problems, as well as the courts’ failure to apply the Daubert test as rigorously to forensic sciences as to other experts. See, e.g., JOHN M. CONLEY & JANE CAMPBELL MORIARTY, SCIENTIFIC AND EXPERT EVIDENCE 77–84 (2d ed. 2011) (discussing the scholarly criticism of Daubert, in particular the asymmetric application to forensic science). That work is quite
is one that academics themselves seem all too willing to embrace.6 Their willingness to do so may spring from a desire to do something, anything, (or at least to be seen as doing something) to address the return on the investment problem in legal education—something which became a crisis in the wake of the financial collapse of 2008 because law firm layoffs and declines in hiring, which were part of the fallout from that collapse, severely contracted the job market. That meant many graduates with an expensive law degree had no way to service the debt accumulated in acquiring the degree. Law schools were roundly, and in some cases justly, criticized for their marketing and admissions practices that perhaps oversold law as a career or did not do enough to discourage attendance amongst those who would not be able to find a job that paid enough to service their debt.

The criticisms of legal education (of which criticism of legal scholarship was only a small part), combined with soaring tuition and poor job prospects, had a catastrophic effect on law school enrollment.7 Thus, many of these criticisms of clearly relevant to practice. Much of this work argues courts should exclude expert testimony from certain categories of forensic experts. See Attorney General, FBI, District Attorneys Say They’ll Ignore President Council’s Report on Flawed Forensics, EVIDENCE PROF BLOG (Sept. 23, 2016), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/evidenceprof/2016/09/recently-the-executive-office-of-the-president-presidents-council-of-advisors-on-science-and-technology-pcast-issued-a.html [https://perma.cc/CK6N-UA2Z] (discussing AG’s commitment to continuing to rely on various experts criticized by a task force which found that they “lacked validity”). If the courts have not adopted academics’ recommendations, it is probably not because they are not “relevant” to practice. It is likely there are other factors at work.


7 People have various theories about what caused the catastrophic drop in enrollment, but there is no real question that the contraction in the market for legal jobs was one driver. See, e.g., Noam Scheiber, An Expensive Law Degree, and No Place to Use It, N.Y. TIMES June 17, 2006, at B1 (identifying a huge drop in applications between 2007 and 2009). However, another driver may have been the negative press. See generally, e.g., INSIDE THE L. SCH SCAM, http://www.insidethelawscam.blogspot.com [https://perma.cc/GW6X-9SA6].

Probably no one outside of legal academia has covered the law school problem more than David Segal at the New York Times. See, e.g., David Segal, Is Law School a Losing Game?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2011, at B1 [hereinafter Segal, Is Law School a Losing Game?]. Segal writes a column called The Haggler in which he investigates and tries to resolve consumer complaints. See, e.g., David Segal, The Haggler: A Bean Bag Blowout, and then a Deafening Silence, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2016, at BU3. He is an award-winning journalist, but it does not appear that he has a legal education. So it is understandable he relied on insiders who appeared to be acting as whistleblowers. See, e.g., Jennifer S. Bard, Failing Law Schools, 33 J. LEGAL MED. 417, 419 (2012) (book review) (describing Brian Tamanaha’s Failing Law Schools as the account of an “insider”).
scholarship are taking place in that larger context, one in which legal education is
treated like a product and law students like consumers.

However, most of these critiques, like Judge Edwards’s own, long predate the
2008 financial collapse and the resulting decline in law school enrollments. So, the
desire to respond to that crisis cannot be the whole answer for why even academics
are so critical of legal scholarship. Nevertheless, the crisis has given new bite to the
critique that legal scholarship is rarely relevant to practice, along with the newer
claim that it is expensive to boot—far too expensive to justify at all but the richest,
most prestigious institutions.

Not surprisingly, however, many other law professors disagreed with the critics; so they
were extremely critical of Segal’s coverage. See, e.g., Brian Leiter, David Segal’s Hatchet
Job on Law Schools . . . , BRIAN LEITER’S L. SCH. REPS. (Nov. 20, 2011), http://leiterlaw
school.typepad.com/leiter/2011/11/another-hatchet-job-on-law-schools.html [https://perma .cc/V63A-HVZF] (critiquing Segal and providing links to other critiques, including Orin
Kerr, What the NYT Article on Law Schools Gets Right, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Nov. 20, 2011),
-20s-then-work-till-youre-100.html; Brad Wendel, More on the NY Times Article, LEGAL
times-article.html [https://perma.cc/KCD8-FP2V]; see also Matt Bodie, A Recipe for Trashing
Legal Scholarship, PRAWFSBLAWG (Nov. 20, 2011), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfs
Perhaps the most compelling rebuttal to the claim that a law degree was not a good in-
vestment was an empirical one which itself generated a great deal of argument. See generally
Michael Simkovic & Frank McIntyre, The Economic Value of a Law Degree, 43 J. LEGAL
STUD. 249 (2014); Michael Simkovic & Frank McIntyre, Populist Outrage, Reckless Empirics:
TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS (2012)).

I am sympathetic to Segal’s consumer protection concern and I am perhaps less inclined
than some to fault him for relying on legal education’s critics; he had reason to think they were
experts. And the critics are not wrong that there is a real value problem for some students,
and generally a marketing problem, particularly when for-profit law schools are added into
the mix. Segal was understandably concerned about this value problem. This Essay does not
address those issues and is not meant as a defense of legal education more generally; my
focus here is just on legal scholarship.

See, e.g., David Hick & Victoria Salzmann, Why There Should Be Fewer Articles Like
This One: Law Professors Should Write More for Legal Decision-Makers and Less for
Themselves, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 761 (2005) (interdisciplinary incompetence, lack of rele-
vance to the practice); Kenneth Lasson, Commentary, Scholarship Anok: Excesses in the
Pursuit of Truth and Tenure, 103 HARV. L. REV. 926 (1990) (general critique); James Lindgren,
An Author’s Manifesto, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 527 (1994) (critiquing management of law reviews
by students, claiming they are “grossly unsuited for the jobs”).

See, e.g., TAMANAHA, supra note 7, at 56–57. Segal makes the dubious claim that forty
percent of faculty compensation is a “subsidy” for scholarship. See David Segal, What They
Don’t Teach Law Students: Lawyering, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2011, at A1. He appears to
This is a common criticism—that everyone is trying too hard to emulate Harvard and Yale. Faculty at lower-ranked institutions are advised to leave the production of scholarship to those at the top—those with the intellectual firepower and financial resources to be able to indulge in an enterprise of such uncertain utility. Similar critiques are launched in the press.

In this Essay, I would like to mount a qualified defense of legal scholarship as an enterprise. I say “qualified” because it is very difficult to draw definite, causal connections about the influence of scholarship on the law and society at large; so I cannot say any of the evidence I review is conclusive or might not have another

have reverse engineered this figure from Professor Steven Smith’s claim that a faculty which did not have to produce scholarship would be forty percent less expensive. See Steven R. Smith, *Gresham’s Law in Legal Education*, 17 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 171, 205–06 & nn.159–60 (2008). This calculation is based on all sorts of questionable assumptions, such as that the salary difference between tenured faculty (who have the duty to produce scholarship) and non-tenured faculty (who do not), is attributable to that duty. That is not an irrational proposition, but as Smith himself notes, it may not be accurate. *Id.* For a discussion of how complex the cost attribution is see Edward Rubin, *Should Law Schools Support Faculty Research?*, 17 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 141 (2008). Segal’s calculation, and his use of the term “subsidy,” are criticized in detail in the Leiter and the Bodie blog posts, see Bodie, *supra* note 7; Leiter, *supra* note 7. However, the forty percent figure overlooks that many (perhaps most) tenured faculty do not produce any scholarship. With the exception of small summer research grants and the like, faculty get paid the same amount whether they produce scholarship or not. And many of them do not. See Rubin, *supra*, at 142 n.12 (noting some faculty do not write at all). Of those who do, it is probably a smaller subset who dedicate forty percent of their time to it (although some devote more). Since, at least in theory, all faculty are supposed to produce scholarship, it would not represent any sort of “savings” if every faculty member simply stopped writing unless there was a corresponding increase in other duties, something which there is some pressure to do. Smith, *supra*, at 206 n.160 (faculty could be asked to teach more classes and do more governance administrative duties). A lively discussion of this issue took place in the comments to this post on The Faculty Lounge. Michael Risch, *What Good is Legal Scholarship?*, FAC. LOUNGE (Mar. 3, 2015), http://www.thefacultylounge.org/2015/03/what-good-is-legal-scholarship.html [https://perma.cc/L7MR-Y9PL].

10 See Segal, *supra* note 9, at A1 (“The problem is that with rare exceptions, all schools play the same scholarship-and-prestige game. Even professors in the lowest rungs churn out scholarship . . . .”).


reading. It is an impressionistic, not exhaustive, inquiry. But I think, taken altogether, these observations offer cogent reasons to reject the blanket dismissals of legal scholarship as worthless and irrelevant, even as an instrumental matter.

It may be just as hard to evaluate the merits or “utility” of a law review article as it is to evaluate the merits of a piece of art or a work of literature. As Judge Posner has said, “Scholarship . . . is a high-risk, low-return activity.” Legal scholarship is not primarily a profit-making enterprise, although it may sometimes have commercial value (more on this later). We engage in the production of legal scholarship for all sorts of reasons—the search for the truth, professional distinction, sheer pleasure, or compulsion—but for the most part, after tenure anyway, it is rarely directly for pecuniary reward. Indeed, the incentives for producing scholarship, such as they are, do not inspire anything like universal compliance on most faculties. Thus, if scholarship has any value, it would seem unwise to impose more disincentives on its production. Since we can’t always tell, ex ante, which work is valuable, asking legal scholarship to “pay its way” seems likely to deprive us of valuable work. However, there are reasons to believe the reports of its worthlessness are overstated.

I will use Professor Redish’s seminal 1971 article, The First Amendment in the Marketplace, to illustrate why many of the conventional methods for assessing scholarship’s value to the profession and to the development of the law are so inadequate and why the claims of legal scholarship’s irrelevance are overblown. To be sure, some scholarship does go unread, perhaps most of it. But there are many counterexamples. And until we can reliably distinguish which is which, beyond crude measures like institutional status of the review or author, it seems unwise to advocate for jettisoning its production. Here are some of these problems:

Moreover, as one might expect, there is a breathtaking body of work discussing the impact (or lack thereof) of legal scholarship on the law and judges, going back almost to the beginning of the institution and reflecting a wide range of viewpoints, a waxing and waning of influence. In short, there is far too much ground to cover in this tribute to Professor Redish. For a fairly comprehensive review of the literature, see Neil Duxbury, Jurists and Judges: An Essay on Influence (2001); see also Edwards, The Growing Disjunction, supra note 4, at 41 n.14 (collecting recent scholarship on legal scholarship).

Obviously, one could believe, as I do, that scholarship is intrinsically valuable and does not need to show it has additional “utility.” And a number of scholars have made that point. I won’t take that on here beyond saying that I agree. My point is merely that even if you think scholarship does need to have some instrumental value, it may be very hard to calculate that value in any reliable way.


This is a point Brian Leiter and others have made. See, e.g., Leiter, supra note 7.

Despite his calls for a great many law schools to stop asking their faculty to produce scholarship, Professor Tamanaha himself agrees that judges’ claims that they pay no attention to scholarship is “overblown.” See Tamanaha, supra note 7, at 56.

1. Critics often overlook fairly obvious counterexamples to legal scholarship’s supposed irrelevance. Professor Redish’s 1971 article is a case in point, as a number of scholars credit him with substantial influence on the development of the doctrine.\(^{19}\)

2. The criticisms rest on a false dichotomy between theory and practice. There is no such neat dividing line. Work proposing a theory is often the most influential. Professor Redish’s article proposed a theory about whether the First Amendment should protect commercial speech, and was nevertheless influential.

3. The claim that scholarship is less relevant to practice when it draws insights from other disciplines—literature, economics, sociology, philosophy, political science, psychology—either because it is less “practical,” or because law professors lack training in those disciplines, or both, again overlooks the many counterexamples. And it is hard to imagine how one could engage in comment on some, very practice-oriented issues—for example, the reliability of eyewitness testimony—without resorting to research in other fields like psychology. Moreover, some of the most important contributions to legal thought have come from academics without a law degree, yet I have rarely heard those contributions criticized on the grounds that, for example, Alexander Meiklejohn did not have a law degree. Again, Redish’s article is instructive because his argument builds on one made previously by economists—that advertising is valuable information—in order to argue that advertising should be constitutionally protected.

\(^{19}\) See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Autonomy and Free Speech, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 251, 272 n.33 (2011) (describing Redish as “long ago” establishing that if we characterize commercial speech as making a contribution of equal value to that made by speech in other areas, protection follows, citing the 1971 article); Frederick Schauer, Commercial Speech and the Architecture of the First Amendment, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1181, 1188 & n.32 (1988) (describing it as potentially “difficult” to draw a line between so-called “core speech and non-core commercial speech” and noting that Redish’s 1971 article and the Virginia Pharmacy opinion seem animated by this same concern); John T. Valauri, Smoking and Self-Realization: A Reply to Professor Redish, 24 N. Ky. L. REV. 585, 585 (1997) (describing Redish as “the prophet of constitutional protection for commercial speech”). These are more suggestive than conclusive, but it seems that the mere convening of this Symposium offers some support for my conclusion. In addition, Redish reports that in a talk he gave with Professor Burt Neuborne, Neuborne credited Redish with having a great influence on the ACLU’s position on commercial speech. E-mail from Martin Redish to Tamara Piety (Oct. 28, 2016, 06:46 AM) (on file with author).
4. There are reasons to distrust the data. Critics and legal scholars alike are not immune to psychological, cognitive, and perceptual biases. A great deal of the criticism of scholarship is not new, but the intensity of the criticism fluctuates; perhaps criticism of scholarship may itself be a “fad.” Certainly there is evidence that the criticisms are not always data-driven.20

5. If we judge by Professor Redish’s article, it may take an exceptionally long time for impact to be felt or acknowledged. Professor Redish’s seminal article, The First Amendment in the Marketplace, was written in 1971; but it was not until five years later that the Supreme Court appeared to adopt the views expressed therein, and several decades after that before it seemed that the courts were more fully embracing his argument.21 If it takes several decades for the impact of an article to be felt, it may be exceptionally difficult to tell which articles published today will still be valuable in the future. It may well be different ones than those most lauded when they were published.

6. It is also not clear how to measure “impact.” Number of citations is the tool frequently used, but it is a crude and imperfect measure of influence. And again, Professor Redish’s article is instructive: Even though the Court appeared to be adopting his argument, it did not cite to his article.

7. Finally, the charge that no one reads or relies on law reviews seems belied by the fact that there is what might be called a “market” for legal scholarship. It has recently come to light that a small, but nevertheless influential, number of law review articles have been commissioned, sponsored, or otherwise underwritten (by someone other than the law school).22 The mere existence of this market suggests that at least someone finds this enterprise valuable enough to underwrite it. That would hardly be the case if the sponsors really thought no one was reading it.

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20 For example, Judge Edwards rested some of his claims on a very limited sample. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction, supra note 4, at 42 n.15 (noting that he based his Michigan Law Review article on a survey of thirty former law clerks). As Judge Posner has observed, saying that this method does not produce “statistically reliable data,” Posner, supra note 15, at 1922 (quoting Edwards, The Growing Disjunction, supra note 4, at 42), is “an understatement.” id. at 1922.

21 See infra text accompanying notes 100–01.

There are probably other arguments, but these seem sufficient to question how seriously we should take the conventional criticism of legal scholarship. The criticisms of legal scholarship were sketched out in the Introduction, but it is worthwhile to flesh them out a bit more in Part I before turning to the evidence against these assertions in Parts II and III.

I. THE CRITICISMS

There is nothing new about the critique that legal scholarship is of low value. Fred Rodell, a Professor at Yale in the early twentieth century, famously said that there are only two problems with legal scholarship, its style and its content.23 So we might view with some skepticism the claim that it is modern scholarship that is unhelpful. Perhaps today’s critics simply do not take the historical view. Professor Daniel Farber has reported that such struggles over the legitimacy and value of legal scholarship date almost from its inception.24 How seriously should we take the modern critique?

Today the primary criticism of legal scholarship seems to be that it is of little relevance to the profession.25 This is the general thrust of Chief Justice Roberts’s quip,26 and it makes up the greater part of the criticisms made by Judge Edwards in his many articles written on the subject.27 The declining number of cites to legal scholarship is often offered as proof of this growing irrelevance.28 Judge Edwards directed his first broadside to what he called “the growing disjunction”29 between legal education and the practice of law. He claimed that “law schools—especially the so-called ‘elite’ ones—have abandoned their proper place, by emphasizing abstract theory at the expense of practical scholarship and pedagogy.”30 Although Judge Edwards claims that he does not scorn theory altogether, he writes: “Ideally, the ‘practical’ scholar always integrates theory with doctrine.”31 He nevertheless finds that too few law review articles achieve the right balance, and that most are too theoretical; in particular, he singles out “mediocre interdisciplinary articles”32 for criticism.

The criticism that law is “impractical” or of little use to the profession surely is partly based on the observation that there has been a growth in the number of

25 See Brust, supra note 1; Hrick & Salzmann, supra note 8.
26 See Liptak, supra note 1.
27 See sources cited supra note 4.
29 Edwards, The Growing Disjunction, supra note 4, at 34.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 35.
32 Id. at 36.
interdisciplinary journals and more enthusiasm for hiring people with PhDs and law degrees, or sometimes PhDs only, to teach in law school.\textsuperscript{33} Many people have observed this phenomenon—some approvingly,\textsuperscript{34} others, like Judge Edwards, less approvingly.\textsuperscript{35} The objection to hiring professors without law degrees is, predictably, that they are allegedly less focused on practical concerns of lawyers (it is not clear that this is true; more on this below); but then, ironically, the principal criticism of the interdisciplinary turn in publishing is that law professors too often lack formal training in these disciplines, so they make egregious and embarrassing errors, and their fondness for such work is often no more than a self-indulgent whim. “Our law reviews are now full of mediocre interdisciplinary articles. Too many law professors are ivory tower dilettantes, pursuing whatever subject piques their interest, whether or not the subject merits scholarship, and whether or not they have the scholarly skills to master it.”\textsuperscript{36} Proponents of interdisciplinary work, the “law and” movement, “generally disdain doctrinal analysis[,]”\textsuperscript{37} according to Judge Edwards. So, apparently law professors should not write interdisciplinary articles if they do not have adequate disciplinary credentials, but those with such credentials should not be hired by law schools lest they focus too little on law. This appears to be a catch-22.

Critics also accuse legal scholarship, at least as represented in the elite journals, as subject to fashions, with certain approaches seemingly in vogue at one point or another.\textsuperscript{38} Presumably, the notion of “fads” in scholarship is in conflict with the idea

\textsuperscript{33} See, e.g., Collins, \textit{supra} note 4, at 645 (“Law schools are also hiring an increasing number of professors who have PhDs in other fields. This is not a bad development, unless PhDs come in droves and uniformly spurn any interest in the law and in the issues facing the legal profession.”).


\textsuperscript{35} Some, like Judge Posner, appear to have mixed feelings about this development. \textit{Compare} Richard A. Posner, \textit{The Present Situation in Legal Scholarship}, 90 \textit{Yale L.J.} 1113, 1119–29 (1981) (generally critiquing the growth of interdisciplinary focus, although noting that there is a place for this sort of work), \textit{with} Posner, \textit{supra} note 15, at 1923–28 (describing much interdisciplinary work as making a positive contribution and law being unavoidably intertwined with other disciplines).

\textsuperscript{36} Edwards, \textit{The Growing Disjunction}, \textit{supra} note 4, at 36.

\textsuperscript{37} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{38} TAMANAHA, \textit{supra} note 7, at 56 (decrying legal scholarship as “[r]iding one intellectual fad after another”).
that it should be rigorously fact-based and rational, a position many advocate. And some critics suggest that academics do not just scorn the practice of law in their writing, but also do so in their teaching—that the lack of relevance of law review articles is a byproduct of what borders on contempt for practice on the part of most law professors.

Although these criticisms are too numerous to be dismissed out of hand, there are several, obvious rejoinders. To examine some of these claims and the rejoinders, I will start with what might be called the “big picture” issues raised by the first four observations I make above: There are so many counterexamples of scholarship that has influenced law that it seems that characterizing it as, in the main, worthless and exaggerated is misguided; the questionable theory/practice divide; and the special indictment of interdisciplinarity and empirical questions about the critiques. I then turn to what might be called more concrete issues: time and citation counts, and the existence of a market, as issues “on the ground.”

II. UNRELIABLE NARRATORS, THEORY, AND DISCIPLINARY COMPETENCE: THE “BIG PICTURE”

A. Counterexamples

The first rejoinder to the claim that legal scholarship is worthless and irrelevant is simply to point to the very many counterexamples. Indeed, coming up with the counterexamples could be something of a parlor game for lawyers since, although there are obviously a great many famous works known to most lawyers and law students (at least by repute), there are a number of less famous examples which may be known only to those who work in the area. Likewise, unless you work in the area, you may be unaware of where influence is being exerted. For example, Professor Matt Bodie, who teaches corporate law and blogs on this and other subjects on The Conglomerate, writes that the Delaware Chancery (the court which handles many corporate disputes for Delaware, where over half of America’s corporations are chartered) is “unusually” open to engaging with scholarly work.


40 Edwards, The Growing Disjunction, supra note 4, at 51–52 (describing what he sees as the “disdain for law practice” as “deplorable”).

41 I listed several more examples than I deal with here in a post on The Faculty Lounge. For more examples, see Tamara R. Piety, The Utility of Scholarship, FAC. LOUNGE (Feb. 6, 2013), http://www.thefacultylounge.org/2013/02/the-utility-of-scholarship.html [https://perma.cc/G6ER-VXY6].

42 Bodie, supra note 1. Granted, Bodie characterizes this relationship as “unusual.” Id.

Perhaps, though, these examples only serve to illustrate Judge Edwards’s point: in the old days legal scholarship was offered in service of the practice, but less so today. That seems belied, however, by more contemporary examples. As Professor Neil Buchanan points out, Elizabeth Warren’s work on financial services and bankruptcy was the driving force behind the creation of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.\footnote{Neil H. Buchanan, *Legal Scholarship Makes the World a Better Place*, JOTWELL 2014 CONFERENCE, http://jotwell.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Buchanan-Jotwell-Conference.pdf [https://perma.cc/CKZ2-RWV9]. In response to Buchanan’s piece, Professor Jeffrey Harrison objects that counterexamples are simply anecdotes and are of no use for analyzing the worth of the total investment. See Comment to Buchanan: *Legal Scholarship Makes the World a Better Place*, TAX PROF BLOG (Nov. 11, 2014), http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2014/11/buchanan-legal-scholarship-.html [https://perma.cc/T7DY-CSUC]. His critique is applicable here as well. However, as discussed in the rest of this Essay, it is the counterexamples, combined with the length of time it takes for influence to be felt, the (sometimes) need for deep familiarity with the field in order to be able to discern influence due to the inadequacy of citation counts as a proxy for influence, that, together, suggest the characterization of scholarship as mostly wasteful and a bad investment, overblown. And the soundness of the calculation for how much it costs is another issue. See Rubin, supra note 9, at 202–09.} I teach Evidence and Expert Evidence (among other things), so some of the examples which come most readily to mind for me are in these areas. For example,
Professor Richard Friedman’s work on the Confrontation Clause has informed the Court’s approach to that doctrine. However, if I were to try to do a comprehensive survey of all the influential works, this Essay would be much longer.

Rather than doing that, I will give an example drawn from what I write about—commercial speech—to underscore how it may be necessary to know both the case law and the literature very well to see the influence of a work, particularly if it is not initially cited. Most of my writing is on the First Amendment and the commercial speech doctrine. So naturally, Professor Redish’s work is one of the notable counter-examples with which I am most familiar.

1. The First Amendment in the Marketplace

Professor Redish’s influence is not by any means limited to First Amendment law. He has made important contributions in many areas. In an ironic twist, Chief Justice Roberts himself cited one of Professor Redish’s articles in an opinion on the cy pres doctrine. But his influence on the First Amendment is profound. As I have stated elsewhere, The First Amendment in the Marketplace was one of the first, if not the first major scholarly article arguing that commercial advertising ought to receive full First Amendment protection on the grounds that it was “expression” of no less value than other protected speech.

Only a few years earlier, Yale law professor Thomas Emerson, in writing his rather grandly titled Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, devoted


52 For example, Redish is the coauthor of casebooks on both civil procedure and federal courts. See RICHARD L. MARCUS, MARTIN H. REDISH, EDWARD E. SHERMAN & JAMES E. PFANDER, CIVIL PROCEDURE: A MODERN APPROACH (6th ed. 2013); MARTIN H. REDISH, SUZANNA SHERRY & JAMES PFANDER, FEDERAL COURTS (7th ed. 2011). He also has a dizzying number of publications in these and other areas. See Martin H. Redish, Curriculum Vitae (Mar. 9, 2006), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/faculty/assets/documents/cv-RedishMartinH_v2016-03-09;160058.pdf [https://perma.cc/P452-TZWB].


54 Tamara R. Piety, “A Necessary Cost of Freedom”?: The Incoherence of Sorrell v. IMS, 64 ALA. L. REV. 1, 19 & n.94 (2012). As I discuss in this Article, there were at least two articles that predated Redish’s 1971 article that advanced similar themes: a 1965 student note and a 1967 Developments in the Law comment in the Harvard Law Review, Id. at 19–20.

55 Thomas Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877 (1963). This title may have spawned any number of law review articles with “toward” in the title. A quick Westlaw search for articles with “toward” in the title and published in the last three years resulted in 599 documents. Although many of these articles could be
only a few paragraphs to the question of commercial speech. “[T]he problem of differentiating between commercial and other communication has not in practice[,]” he wrote, “proved to be a serious one.”

But ten years later, with the decision in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., the seeds were sown for a transformation of the doctrine that would call into question the soundness of that breezy dismissal. Redish’s article presaged that change. The arguments the Court used to justify protection for commercial speech in Virginia Pharmacy were the same ones Redish argued for—the value of commercial speech to listeners and thus to market operation generally. Yet the Court did not cite his article. And the Virginia Pharmacy opinion did not perfectly track his argument. Indeed, as Redish himself later argued, in crafting the intermediate scrutiny standard in Central Hudson Gas & Electrical Corp. v. Public Service Commission, the Court built something of an “escape clause” from the full implications of Redish’s argument for treating commercial speech just like any other protected speech, and in so doing may have created a problem. In any event, Redish’s seminal article offers a nice jumping off point for refuting some of the criticism of scholarship and is a way to celebrate its impact and its status.

B. The Utility of Theory

What Redish offered in The First Amendment in the Marketplace was a theory about why advertising should receive First Amendment protection: He argued that listeners were also entitled to First Amendment protection as listeners and that advertising was valuable to listeners as information, indeed perhaps more valuable than speech that was ordinarily assumed to be of the highest First Amendment value.
like political speech. This theory ultimately was adopted by the Supreme Court. But perhaps it is an exception.

Many of the examples offered in the first section were, of course, theories. It is often said that “[i]t takes a theory to beat a theory[.]”62 And no less an authority than the late Justice Scalia is said to have been a proponent of this idea. He certainly was a proponent of one of the most influential theories about constitutional interpretation—“originalism.” He wrote, “It is not enough to demonstrate that the other fellow’s candidate (originalism) is no good; one must also agree on another candidate to replace him.”63 It would be hard to overestimate how consequential the theories of originalism and textualism have been on the law.64 Perhaps this is the exception proving the rule, but many of the examples already listed were influential theories. And some of the most cited legal scholars are notable primarily for their contribution to theory.65

One does not have to think very hard or to look very long to come up with other examples of theorists who have had a profound influence on shaping the law or how we think about the law. Perhaps one of the most salient examples of legal theory that has shaped the law, given recent high profile cases66 and the issues raised in the presidential election,67 is Catharine MacKinnon’s proposal in her book, Sexual Harassment of Working Women, that sexual harassment was a compensable injury.68 MacKinnon’s efforts were critical to the conception of sexual harassment of women (and then later all persons) as discriminatory and as a compensable tort, rather than just a burdensome, but inescapable, inequity of everyday life.69 After MacKinnon,

65 Duncan Kennedy, for example. See Shapiro, supra note 46, at 424 tbl. 6.
69 For a discussion of the impact this work has had on the law and women’s lives, see
it was not necessary for every woman (or indeed, every person) victimized in this way to bring a lawsuit in order for her to feel vindicated; (arguably) the mere ability to name this behavior as a harm and the dawning (albeit halting) public recognition of it as such, started to be felt in changes in workplace conditions. Although, as recent events prove, we may still be far away from eradicating it.\textsuperscript{70}

In almost every substantive area of law one can find works of theory that have had profound influences on the law and how we use it. Consider Brandeis and his theory of a right to privacy;\textsuperscript{71} Charles Reich’s \textit{The New Property}, which offered a new way to think about government benefits;\textsuperscript{72} and Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. and \textit{The Path of Law}—a way to think about what judges do.\textsuperscript{73} It is not clear that even pure theory is irrelevant to practice. It just may not be immediately apparent what that relevance is.

\textbf{C. Disciplinary Competence and Cross-Fertilization}

Just as theory may get a bad rap, so too does interdisciplinarity. Again, there are a number of counterexamples of interdisciplinary work making significant contributions to practice. In Dean Martha Minnow’s “archetypal” guide to legal scholarship,\textsuperscript{74} while she does not create a separate category for interdisciplinary work, she lists many interdisciplinary works in several of the categories: Judge Guido Calabresi and Doug Melamed’s famous work on property;\textsuperscript{75} Russell Korobkin on bounded rationality;\textsuperscript{76} Robert Ellickson on social norms;\textsuperscript{77} William Forbath and his history of the labor movement;\textsuperscript{78} and Seanna Shiffrin’s work in law and philosophy.\textsuperscript{79} Of course, one of the earliest and most significant examples of borrowing from the social sciences was Justice Brandeis’s efforts on behalf of labor law reform. He

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{} Reva B. Siegel, \textit{Introduction: A Short History of Sexual Harassment} to \textit{DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW} (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2003).
\bibitem{} See sources cited \textit{supra} notes 68–69.
\bibitem{} Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., \textit{The Path of the Law}, 10 \textit{HARV. L. REV.} 457 (1897).
\bibitem{} Martha Minnow, \textit{Archetypal Legal Scholarship: A Field Guide}, 63 \textit{J. LEGAL EDUC.} 65, 65 (2013).
\bibitem{} \textit{Id.} at 66 & n.7 (citing Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, \textit{Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral}, 85 \textit{HARV. L. REV.} 1089 (1972)).
\bibitem{} \textit{Id.} at 66 & n.10 (citing Russell Korobkin, \textit{Bounded Rationality and Unconscionability: A Behavioral Approach to Policing Form Contracts}, 70 \textit{U. CHI. L. REV.} 1203 (2003)).
\bibitem{} \textit{Id.} at 67 & n.12 (citing ROBERT ELICKSON, \textit{ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES} (1994)).
\bibitem{} \textit{Id.} at 68 & n.28 (citing William Forbath, \textit{The Shaping of the American Labor Movement}, 102 \textit{HARV. L. REV.} 1109 (1989)).
\bibitem{} \textit{Id.} at 69 & n.32 (citing Seanna Shiffrin, \textit{Speech, Death, and Double Effect}, 78 \textit{N.Y.U. L. REV.} 1135 (2003)).
\end{thebibliography}
used social science data to support legal arguments for limitations on working hours for women, and in the process gave his name to such efforts: the Brandeis brief.\textsuperscript{80} The Brandeis brief has become a staple of advocacy before the courts, perhaps especially the Supreme Court, and such research has informed the outcomes in many famous cases such as \textit{Brown v. Board of Education}.\textsuperscript{81}

But maybe no discipline has had more influence on law than economics. In a response to Judge Edwards, Judge Posner reviewed several of these counterexamples, beginning, understandably enough, with law and economics.\textsuperscript{82} Posner reviews a broad range of areas which have been influenced or transformed by the application of economic thought to law: from antitrust to family law, from trusts and estates to labor and employment law, trademark law and many others.\textsuperscript{83} Interestingly enough for our purposes here, Judge Posner had this to say about its influence on commercial speech: “It has contributed to the increasing judicial favor for giving commercial speech constitutional protection.”\textsuperscript{84} Now, he may have had in mind the economists, like Ronald Coase,\textsuperscript{85} who argued that advertising constituted valuable “information.”\textsuperscript{86} And, Chicago economist Aaron Director proposed that advertising was informational to counter the idea that advertising, in particular, brand advertising, was anticompetitive.\textsuperscript{87} However, it is at least equally likely that Judge Posner was thinking of legal scholars like Redish,

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\textsuperscript{80} Louis D. Brandeis was hired to represent Oregon in the case of \textit{Muller v. Oregon}, 208 U.S. 412 (1908), which upheld various limitations on the hours women could be forced to work on the grounds that excessive hours could be injurious to women’s health. \textit{Id.} at 419, 423. In support of his argument to support the state’s limitations on women’s working hours, he submitted a voluminous brief with testimony from various doctors and social scientists about the ill-effect of long working hours on women. Brief for the State of Oregon, Muller \textit{v. Oregon}, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (No. 107), 1908 WL 27605. The full brief is available at https://louisville.edu/law/library/special-collections/the-louis-d.-brandeis-collection/the-brandeis-brief-in-its-entirety [https://perma.cc/8BYE-NTZ9].


\textsuperscript{83} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{84} \textit{Id.} at 1925.

\textsuperscript{85} See R.H. Coase, \textit{The Economics of the First Amendment: The Market for Goods and the Market for Ideas}, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 384 (1974). Coase himself credits Aaron Director for first suggesting that the market should be treated with the same \textit{laissez-faire} applied to speech. \textit{See id.} at 385 (citing Aaron Director, \textit{The Parity of the Economic Marketplace}, 7 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1964)).

\textsuperscript{86} \textit{See, e.g.}, George J. Stigler, \textit{The Economics of Information}, J. POL. ECON. 213, 220 (1961) (“Advertising is, among other things, a method of providing potential buyers with knowledge of the identity of sellers.”).

\textsuperscript{87} See generally Director, \textit{supra} note 85.
a fellow Chicagoan, whose work had been influenced by economic thought, since no one has been more identified with the advance of these economic views as they apply to commercial speech than Professor Redish.\textsuperscript{88}

This raises another complaint about interdisciplinary legal scholarship: Who is qualified to do it? It cannot be the case that, as with Professor Redish, the absence of formal credentials in the discipline is dispositive, because as with Redish, obviously much good work has been done by lawyers without economics degrees or psychology degrees or history degrees. But it is also surely true that the absence of formal training may make it more likely that a law professor will find himself in trouble and make an embarrassing mistake as a consequence of that lack of training. This is undoubtedly true. Moreover, the state of knowledge changes so that yesterday’s obvious truth becomes today’s embarrassment—ideas like eugenics come to mind. And ironically, the original Brandeis brief itself serves as a good illustration of the hazards of introducing social science research into legal argument, since it offered all sorts of dubious evidence about women’s supposed special vulnerability that no longer are viewed as valid.\textsuperscript{89}

But if scholars may make embarrassing errors, courts may as well. Courts must evaluate proffered experts in a range of fields and decide whether they are “qualified.” In her work on \textit{Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.}, Professor Susan Haack, a professor at Miami with a dual appointment in philosophy and law, exposed the shortcomings in the Supreme Court’s understanding of the philosophy of science—shortcomings that resulted in the Court making some fundamental errors and getting its Poppers and its Hempels mixed up in what she amusingly described as a \textit{faux pas de deux}.\textsuperscript{91}

Many great thinkers who have made the great contributions to knowledge, and who have made significant discoveries or contributions in multiple fields, did not necessarily do so by respecting disciplinary boundaries: Herbert Simon, Erving Goffman, Oliver Sacks, and many others. For example, Daniel Kahneman, a psychologist,

\textsuperscript{88} Redish was also an early proponent of the proposition that the commercial speech distinction represented a kind of content discrimination, and that content discrimination more generally was part of the problem that led to disarray in First Amendment doctrine. \textit{See generally} Martin H. Redish, \textit{The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis}, 34 STAN. L. REV. 113 (1981). The Supreme Court has adopted strong content neutrality positions in a number of recent cases: most notably for commercial speech in \textit{Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.}, 564 U.S. 552 (2011), but also \textit{Reed v. Town of Gilbert}, 576 U.S. 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015).

\textsuperscript{89} \textit{See} David E. Bernstein, \textit{Brandeis Brief Myths}, 15 GREEN BAG 9, 12 (2011). The science may not be particularly good or reliable. The research in \textit{Brown} itself has likewise been criticized, even if not the ruling. Attempts to improve on law’s understanding of expertise and matters of science have been met with limited success and some awkwardness. \textit{See generally} Susan Haack, \textit{An Epistemologist in the Bramble-Bush: At the Supreme Court with Mr. Joiner}, 26 J. HEALTH POL’Y & L. 217 (2001).

\textsuperscript{90} 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

\textsuperscript{91} \textit{See} Haack, \textit{supra} note 89, at 232.
won a Nobel Prize in economics and Bob Dylan, a musician, won one for literature.\footnote{Nobel Laureates and Country of Birth, NOBELPRIZE.ORG, https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/lists/countries.html [https://perma.cc/ST84-MFHB].} This is likewise true of law. But although critics decry incompetent law professors dabbling in fields in which they have no training, I have rarely heard the criticism in reverse for academics from other disciplines “dabbling” in law. This is a curious asymmetry. However, many scholars who have made some of the most important contributions to law, including First Amendment law, did not have law degrees.

As discussed above, Ronald Coase is a case in point. His rather off-the-cuff observation—that if a deregulatory environment worked so well in the First Amendment context and the so-called “marketplace of ideas,” why was it not equally good for the actual marketplace?—made for a rhetorically clever and compelling speech,\footnote{See Coase, supra note 85, at 384. This article memorialized Coase’s comments at the eighty-sixth annual meeting of the American Economic Association. R.H. Coase, Advertising and Free Speech, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1 (1977).} but was perhaps not informed by a full appreciation that it might be an oversimplification of First Amendment doctrine. Yet his viewpoint became very influential to commercial speech doctrine. If someone ever said, “What does Ronald Coase know about the First Amendment?” I am unaware of it.

Even closer to home, First Amendment–wise, one of the leading theorists of First Amendment theory, housed in a law school, Alexander Meiklejohn, was apparently not trained as a lawyer. (I learned this from Redish’s article.\footnote{Redish, supra note 18, at 434.} Although I had read the article many times, I either forgot this point or had overlooked it.) Perhaps Meiklejohn’s training as a philosopher accounts for his rather austere theory of the First Amendment, one later famously championed by Judge Bork—that the First Amendment was intended to protect only political speech, a theory which had some difficulty accounting for First Amendment protection for art and literature.\footnote{ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948) (arguing the First Amendment only protected political speech).}

Or perhaps not. But it is worth observing that many law schools have faculty members without law degrees. For example, Elizabeth Loftus,\footnote{See Elizabeth F. Loftus, U. CAL. IRVINE SCH. L., http://www.law.uci.edu/faculty/full-time/loftus/ [https://perma.cc/S4VQ-WX7V].} a faculty member at U.C. Irvine, is a psychologist whose work on false memories has been extremely valuable to practicing lawyers.

D. Unreliable Narrators?

Given the judges like Leo Strine who do rely on scholarship, and the evidence of citation even from critics like Chief Justice Roberts, why do so many lawyers and judges seem to think legal scholarship is irrelevant? Perhaps it is an example of
“narrow-minded populism that characterizes societies in their declining years.”  
Populism and anti-intellectualism do seem particularly prominent in American society right now. However, a less malignant explanation may be simply the operation of psychological factors such as cognitive biases, and limitations of memory on our ability to recall examples. Or, perhaps the hostility to legal scholarship is itself a fad that waxes and wanes, generated by the well-known bandwagon effect. If “everyone” agrees that legal scholarship is not very useful, then counterexamples are just a case of the exception proving the rule. There may be a lot of “exceptions,” but each one is encountered as if it were an anomaly. And when criticism comes from such distinguished members of the bench and bar, there is some influence of authority. The critique may also be more salient than one’s experience because the critique gets prominent news coverage, while one’s experience may be something that is operating in the background. And any of us who have ever written can attest that we often have imperfect memories of where we first encountered an idea. In short, there is reason to think that psychological phenomena may affect our impressions.

III. TIME, CITATIONS, AND MARKET: ISSUES “ON THE GROUND”

A. Time

Obviously, one of the problems we face is defining what constitutes “impact” or relevance. But let us suppose that one aspect of its utility or relevance is its influence on legal decisions. There are just a couple of problems with trying to measure influence on legal decisions. In the first place, what is the appropriate time horizon? The First Amendment in the Marketplace was published in 1971. It was not until five years later, in 1976, that we see the Supreme Court in Virginia Pharmacy adopting a similar approach, questioning the appropriateness of a blanket exclusion of commercial advertising from First Amendment protection. But we do not see a more

97 Rubin, supra note 9, at 169.
98 This idea that people “leap on the bandwagon” simply because they see others doing so is referred to by several names and may be due to similar, but not completely overlapping, influences. It has been discussed long ago as a possibility in economics literature. See generally H. Leibenstein, Bandwagon, Snob, and Veblen Effects in the Theory of Consumers’ Demand, 64 Q.J. ECON. 183 (1950). There may be multiple causes. One is related to social pressure, a desire to conform one’s behavior to that of one’s society. This is also labeled the Asch conformity effect. See generally Solomon E. Asch, Opinions and Social Pressure, 193 SCI. AM. 31 (1955).
99 A related phenomenon may be the tendency to defer to an authority. Milgram famously documented this effect. See STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: AN EXPERIMENTAL VIEW (1974); see also ROBERT CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSUASION (1984) (describing various psychological phenomena such as deference to authority or perceiving that something is popular).
robust adoption of Redish’s continued promotion of the proposition that subjecting commercial speech to a separate standard is a species of content discrimination until 1993, with the City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc. decision.

And arguably, it is only in the last few years, say from 2010 forward—in a panoply of decisions that seem to wholeheartedly embrace this content-discrimination approach to questions of the regulation of both commercial speech and the status of the speaker most implicated in commercial speech, the corporate speaker—that we are witnessing perhaps the full flowering of the position first advocated by Professor Redish, even if it was later advocated by many others as well. If it takes forty-plus years for the full effect of an argument to bear fruit, that would seem to be a gestation period that far exceeds the time horizons contemplated by most observers. At the very least, it suggests that trying to measure the impact of today’s scholarship may be completely speculative without a very long wait.

B. Measurement

In addition, the seemingly favorite measure of impact is citation—citation by courts for preference. But “although citations are often the best proxy that we have for assessing influence, they may offer an incomplete or distorted picture.” Citations are a crude and unreliable measure of the influence of an article. In the first place, as is obvious, and as Brian Leiter and many others have pointed out, a work can be cited as an example of a misguided or wrong-headed expression of work. If one subscribes to the theory that “any publicity is good publicity,” this may nevertheless represent “influence,” but I suspect most legal scholars, judges, and practicing lawyers would be reluctant to embrace that definition.

Even putting aside the problem of the citation of an article as a negative example, it should be obvious that raw citations do not offer much insight into the work’s acceptance or influence, except perhaps at the high ends. And there may be some

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102 I date the emergence of a consensus on Professor Redish’s approach, albeit not necessarily one that has been explicitly articulated, from the Citizens United v. FEC decision, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), for reasons that are discussed in the article on the Sorrell case. See Piety, supra note 54, at 17–47; see also Tamara R. Piety, Citizens United and the Threat to the Regulatory State, 109 Mich. L. Rev. First Impressions 16 (2010).
104 DUXBURY, supra note 13, at 35.
105 See, e.g., Leiter, supra note 7.
knowing suppression of articles published in lower ranked journals because they do not add prestige or have less weight in contrast to those published by prominent academicians and in a top law journal.

Within the American law schools . . . the Matthew effect [the rich get richer] tends to loom large. Just as the most prestigious law schools dominate the production of the nation’s law professorate, so too the law reviews of those schools are cited far more frequently by law professors than are all other academic legal publications. There is evidence that judges too, in so far as they are inclined to cite academic writings, tend to rely on the elite journals. The fact that these journals acquire the lion’s share of judicial citations may well indicate that they are the academic-legal authorities which most influence the courts. Alternatively it may indicate that judges, like academicians, are often attracted to badges of distinction and that, when judges rely on academic opinion, they generally prefer to be seen relying on a recognized name rather than on a relative unknown. More plausibly, the operation of the Matthew effect might in this instance be partially attributable to the initiatives of law clerks: that is, “the exceptional number of citations to the ‘elite’ reviews may be due, in part, to the fact that judicial clerks”—most of whom hail from the most prestigious institutions—“are likely to cite their own schools’ journals.”

There is an even more difficult problem. As noted previously, sometimes courts do not cite an article even though they have read it or been influenced by it. But there is simply no way to tell this unless the judge’s papers reflect it, or the judge says so. Here again we encounter the problem of memory. A judge (or anyone for that matter) may forget where they first saw something. To discern influence we may have to do a close reading.

Again, Professor Redish’s article offers a good example. In 1971, The First Amendment in the Marketplace made an argument that commercial speech had a claim to contribute to individual and social welfare in much the same way as other protected speech, and that its exclusion from coverage could not be justified.

107 See Kaye, supra note 1, at 313 n.2 ("I read a great many more law review articles than I cite in my opinions . . . .").
108 Redish, supra note 18, at 432.
Although, in the article, Professor Redish did devote some attention to the argument that ad men (and presumably ad women) were engaged in expressive activities (but for which they did not usually get authorship attribution or copyright, unlike novelists),

for the most part, the arguments were directed at the value of this speech to the listener and society at large.

Only a few years later, in 1976, when the Court decided *Virginia Pharmacy*, it too spent almost no time on speaker interests and instead focused almost exclusively on the benefits of commercial speech to listeners and society at large. Of course, since it was the listeners who sued in *Virginia Pharmacy*, this was understandable. Nevertheless, much of the argument in *Virginia Pharmacy* seems to come right from *The First Amendment in the Marketplace*. One of the animating concerns in the majority opinion was that advertising should not be treated as categorically lacking the sort of value that other speech was thought to have:

> Advertising, however tasteless and excessive it sometimes may seem, is nonetheless dissemination of information as to who is producing and selling what product, for what reason, and at what price. So long as we preserve a predominately free enterprise economy, the allocation of our resources in large measure will be made through numerous private economic decisions. *It is a matter of public interest* that those decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed. To this end, the free flow of commercial information is indispensable.

The Court wrote that a consumer’s “interest in the free flow of commercial information . . . may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day’s most urgent political debate.”

This rejection of categorical denial of protection, as well as linking First Amendment protection of commercial speech with the public interest, and focus on the listener, were all themes developed in Redish’s article.

However, for whatever reason (perhaps for the simplest one, that none of the justices read it), the *Virginia Pharmacy* Court did not cite Professor Redish’s article. Yet, it has been identified by many legal scholars as one of the most important pieces of scholarship, if not the most important, to the establishment of the modern

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110 Redish, *supra* note 18, at 432.
112 *Id.* at 765 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
113 *Id.* at 763.
commercial speech doctrine.\(^{114}\) So a focus on citation counts, at least in Supreme Court opinions, immediately after the opinion was issued, would have missed this influence.

**C. A Market for Law Reviews?**

Finally, the last indication that the criticism of legal scholarship’s worthlessness may be exaggerated is the existence of a market for it. Recently, it has come to light that some legal scholarship may have been commissioned.\(^ {115}\) One way of measuring worth is to see how much someone is willing to pay. But since law reviews have not had a regular practice of financial disclosures, this information is not readily available. The absence of regular disclosure practices means we often do not know how to discover which articles may have been sponsored, let alone for what price. There is reason to believe that some articles currently in print were commissioned. For example, it appears that some scholarship related to punitive damages was sponsored by Exxon, even as Exxon’s case on punitive damages was being considered by the Supreme Court.\(^ {116}\) And Professors Lisa Lerman and Ron Collins report that, according to the *Washington Post*, the National Rifle Association funded scholarship that helped to shift the Court from rather more tolerance of regulation to rather less.\(^ {117}\)

It is surely relevant to the question of how much scholarship is worth to see how much is being offered from external sources for its production, even if this category

\(114\) See sources cited supra note 19.

\(115\) See Barday, supra note 22. In fact, this practice is not as new as I had originally supposed. Justice Douglas inveighed against the practice of articles written by undisclosed advocates as early as 1965. William O. Douglas, *Law Reviews and Full Disclosure*, 40 WASH. L. REV. 227, 228–30 (1965). Justice Douglas’s experience before coming on the Court was with the Securities and Exchange Commission. *Id.* at 233. He recounted that in opposing antitrust laws it appeared, from Congressional reports, that scholarly arguments had been created by “hireling professors financed by ‘the defenders of price discrimination, basing-point pricing practices, and other monopolistic practices.’” *Id.* at 230–31 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 2966, at 31 (1956)). In response to these trends, Justice Douglas proposed that the first footnote should disclose whether the author had been paid to write the article. *Id.* at 232. Almost fifty years later, the *Washington Law Review* picked up this challenge and adopted a disclosure policy, although it did not limit its disclosure requirements to the disclosure of financial interests. See, e.g., Ronald K.L. Collins & Lisa G. Lerman, *Disclosure, Scholarly Ethics, and the Future of Law Reviews: A Few Preliminary Thoughts*, 88 WASH. L. REV. 321 (2013).


is a small percentage of published articles. But when we look at the volume of scholarship produced in support of expansive protection for commercial speech, it is undeniable that a great deal of this scholarship has been produced by practicing lawyers who do not appear to have been writing as an entrée into law teaching or as simply a desire for self-expression, but rather to advance client interests or as business development, or by lawyers employed by think tanks, whose job is to lobby for particular positions. It is possible that these authors view publication in law reviews as the least relevant method of law reform; but that they bother to produce these articles at all suggests they think the value of doing so is more than zero.

CONCLUSION

The development of the commercial speech doctrine, from commercial speech as not being protected at all, to being offered limited protection, to being offered something that is fast approaching strict scrutiny or very nearly, is undeniably tied to the scholarly work which preceded it, particularly that of Professor Redish. His work suggests that the practice/theory divide is artificial, as theory often informs practice; that critics use too narrow a time frame to assess impact; that citations as a measure of influence is insufficient; that criticisms of legal scholarship, such as Chief Justice Roberts’s, may be exaggerated given the obvious counterexamples; and that the concern about disciplinary competence seems likewise exaggerated. It has not checked the influence of other disciplines on the development of legal thought; and the criticism of legal scholarship’s worthlessness overlooks what seems to be a small, but nevertheless discernable, market for its production.

Scholarship—doctrinal, interdisciplinary, theoretical, and every combination thereof—can be shown to have influenced the law. To be sure, the number of articles which have influenced the law are probably few in comparison to the number of articles produced. But as Judge Posner observed, we really do not know how to assess “waste” if we don’t know how much needs to be produced ex ante to produce

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the important work.\textsuperscript{120} History has clearly adjudged \textit{The First Amendment in the Marketplace} as a significant and important work of the kind that is consistent with the educational and social mission of the university. It, and the whole body of Professor Redish’s work, stands as a powerful refutation of the claim that scholarship is not relevant to practice, is irrelevant to law reform, or cannot change the world. It has, and it does.

\textsuperscript{120} See Posner, supra note 15, at 1928.