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Notes & Comments

PROBLEMS IN THE REGULATION OF TENDER OFFERS: THE WILLIAMS ACT, STATE TAKEOVER STATUTES, AND SEC RULES

I. INTRODUCTION

Problems have developed in the interpretation of the various regulations of tender offer takeover bids. Such tender offers are described as "publicly made invitations addressed to all shareholders of a corporation to tender their shares for sale at a specified price," and are regulated by federal and state statutes, and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) guidelines. Confusion in the regulation of tender offers has stemmed from the varied application of such regulations and from recent court decisions relating to takeover bids. This confused state of the various regulatory guidelines has been magnified by the increased use of tender offers, now one of the most popular ways of taking over a company.

1. R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION 936-37 (3d ed. 1972). The consideration offered may be cash or other securities. Id. The terms "cash tender offer" and "exchange tender offer" (or "exchange offer") are generally used to distinguish between the different forms of consideration. See, e.g., Sowards & Mofsky, Corporate Take-Over Bids: Gap in Federal Securities Regulation, 41 ST. JOHNS L. REV. 499, 500-02 (1967); Note, The Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer" under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1250, 1251 nn.7 & 8 (1973) [hereinafter cited as "Tender Offer" under the S.E.A. of 1934]; cf. ALI FED. SEC. CODE §§ 299.9 (Tent. Draft Nos. 1-3, 1974) (using the term "tender request").


4. See Appelton, The Proposed S.E.C. Tender Offer Rules, 32 BUS. LAW. 1381, 1381 (1977), reporting that "in fiscal 1970 there were only 34 [tender offers]." But see E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN, & G. BERLSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL VI (1977)
The tender offer takeover bid and its proclivity to squeeze out minority shareholders of the target company may be the most important corporate law issue of current concern because of the number of American and European companies jumping into the takeover market, the enormous dollar amounts which are usually involved in a tender offer, and the confusion which exists in their regulation.

This article will discuss current problems in interpreting the regulations which attempt to control tender offer takeover bids in light of

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[hereinafter cited as DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS], showing that the rate of recent tender offer filings is increasing, as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Tender Offer Filings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. A recent discussion of the growing number of corporate chieftains that are shopping for merger and acquisition possibilities through the use of a takeover bid appears in the WALL ST. J., April 11, 1978, at 1, col. 6, and states that:

In 1977, there were 41 transactions valued at $100 million or more, up from 39 in 1976 and only 11 in 1975. . . . Last year, 193 merger proposals were made to publicly held companies, excluding 74 offers that later were canceled, up 18% from 1976 and the highest total since the merger binge of the late 1960s . . . .

But the big transactions are only part of the activity. The vast majority of the 2,224 mergers and acquisitions last year were purchases of small businesses or divisions that the large company buyers think will speed up the rate of earnings growth.

With hundreds of U.S. companies seeking acquisitions to speed their profit growth, and more foreign buyers jumping into the market, the takeover wave has pushed up the asking price for many privately held concerns, and is sparking bidding contests for publicly traded merger targets. Sellers are prospering, but some buyers are paying prices that may make it hard to get the expected rate of return on investment . . . .

the conflicts between state and federal regulations. Recent case law dealing with the standing to sue of parties to a tender offer contest, and the possibility of federal preemption of state takeover statutes will also be discussed. Finally, the future use of the tender offer as a corporate takeover technique will be analyzed in a review of proposed SEC Tender Offer Rules.

II. USE OF A TENDER OFFER BID AND THE NEED FOR REGULATION

There are a number of ways by which an individual or a corporation can acquire control of another corporation. Among these are the proxy method, the stock-for-stock exchange offer, and the cash tender offer or “takeover bid.” The first method, which involves the solicitation of proxies by the person or group interested in gaining control from the stockholders of the target corporation, will not be considered in this article.\(^7\) The second method is an offer by an outsider to take stock from all or some of the target company's stockholders in exchange for the stock or other securities of the offeror. Such an offeror may be either an individual or a corporation, and the exchange may be for part securities and part cash.\(^8\) The third way of acquiring control of the target corporation is to make a tender offer for sufficient shares of stock of the target company to insure voting control, and agree to pay cash to those stockholders who tender their shares.\(^9\) This is the conventional use of a tender offer as an acquisition technique. Although the tender offer was used in the 1960's primarily as a means by which a corporation could repurchase its own securities rather than as a method of taking over another company, today it is the most significant corporate takeover weapon, and has supplanted the proxy contest.\(^10\)

The second and third methods of acquiring control mentioned above are best illustrated by an analysis of a hypothetical tender contest where control of target company, \(T\), is being sought by two tender offerors, \(A\) and \(B\).

\(^7\) For consideration of the proxy method, see Annot., 6 A.L.R. Fed. 906, 909 nn.4 & 6 (1971).

\(^8\) Id.

\(^9\) The respective advantages and disadvantages, as well as the mechanics of these three methods, are discussed extensively in several articles, See, e.g., Cohen, \(A\) Note on Takeover Bids and Corporate Purchases of Stock, supra note 6, at 149; Fleischer & Mundheim, Corporate Acquisition by Tender Offer, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 317 (1967); Schults & Kelly, Cash Take-over Bids— Defense Tactics, 23 BUS. LAW. 115 (1967); see also VI LOSS, SECURITIES REGULATION 3655 (Vol. 3, 2d ed. Supp.).

\(^10\) “Tender Offer” under the S.E.A. of 1934, supra note 1, at 1253.
T is controlled principally by members of one family, who own thirty percent of the outstanding stock. Offeror A attempts to secure voting control of T through cash and exchange tender offers for T's common stock. Meanwhile, a new offeror, B, enters the picture also seeking to gain control of T; but with the support of those presently in control. The struggle begins when A makes cash purchases of common stock of T. At first, A is able to acquire only a small percentage of the outstanding shares, and therefore A announces a cash tender offer at a premium price. T's management opposes offeror A's tender offer, and after so advising its stockholders by letter, sells authorized but unissued stock to a third party, thus increasing the amount of stock necessary for offeror A to secure control. Offeror A continues to acquire shares of stock.

While offeror A's tender offer is pending, the family sells thirty percent of its stock to favored offeror B, but at an inflated price. At the conclusion of both offers, offeror B owns a total of forty-five percent of T's stock while offeror A has only forty percent, with fifteen percent remaining in the hands of the public.

As the price of the stock continues to rise, offeror A eventually gives up the takeover attempt having paid top dollar for non-controlling shares. There has been a year-long battle for control, and B has also been forced to pay an increased price for the shares required to gain control. Offeror A, when it appears the battle for control is lost, sues T, alleging that B gained control of the target corporation as a result of violations of federal securities laws. If B had lost, the same allegation in a suit against T would probably be made. If T had been in danger of losing control of its shares to the undesirable offeror, A, then a suit to enjoin the takeover by offeror A would probably have ensued. Hence, the term "tender contest" is employed. Many suits, such as those above, arise out of bids to take over another company.

This hypothetical tender contest illustrates the problems the parties to such a contest face when more than one bid for control of the target company is made, or when the takeover is fought by the target company. The parties involved must confront the issue of whom the regulations are meant to protect in such a contest, and who has standing to bring suit under federal or state regulations. Some of the other complexities which must be analyzed in such situations include time constraints placed upon the takeover attempt, the effect of delay from adherence to regulations such as disclosure requirements, and the prac-
tical effects of the uncertainties generated by regulatory constraints placed upon tender offers.

Despite these obvious difficulties afflicting the parties to a tender contest, the number of quality companies which are willing to consider a proposition of corporate takeover through the use of a tender offer continues to grow. 11 This is especially true where the cash tender offer is compared to alternative methods of changing a company's structure, such as corporate merger or acquisition. 12 More popular uses of the tender offer include the takeover of: (1) a potential target company with weak management, (2) a company with widespread stock ownership where there is no large family block or no stock in management bonds, (3) a company where stock is widely and freely traded with a good deal of liquidity, (4) a company with little debt or one that is earning money but selling at a reasonably low price-earnings ratio, or (5) a company with tangible book value assets of a non-technological nature that may be managed without expertise. 13

The tender offer may be used to purchase all of a company's outstanding shares, or simply enough shares to give the purchaser control. The purchaser may or may not attempt to buy the shares of minority holders, yet the majority shareholders may get a handsome premium for their shares. However, when the latter event occurs, several theories have been used to require majority sellers to share the premium price received for their controlling shares or to pay damages to the minority shareholders. 14 Liability to minority shareholders under such theories may result if misrepresentation, breach of a fiduciary duty, sale of a corporate office, circumvention of corporate action, or diversion of a corporate opportunity has occurred in the takeover. 15 A seller of control through a tender offer must therefore confront the problem that such control may be considered a corporate asset, and any premium paid for that control should go to the corporation's treasury. 16 The right to a special profit simply as a price paid to the controlling shareholders for relinquishing control has also been theorized. 17 But the fact that this

12. Corporate Takeovers, supra note 6, at 1299.
13. See id.
15. Id. at 190.
16. Id. at 198. See also Perlman v. Feldman, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955); Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952); see also Jennings, Trading in Corporate Control, 44 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 31, 38-39 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Jennings].
17. See Perlman v. Feldman, 219 F.2d 173, 178, which states: We do not mean to suggest that a majority stockholder cannot dispose of his controlling
control is the holder’s ability to dominate property which in equity also belongs to others, including minority shareholders, causes many minority freeze-out problems.\textsuperscript{18} Subsequent discussion will evaluate whom the tender offer regulations attempt to protect, the conflict among various sources of regulation which purport to control the use of tender offers, and the feasibility of continued use of the tender offer as a corporate takeover technique.

### III. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FEDERAL REGULATION OF TENDER OFFERS

The tender offer has become in increasingly popular device for taking control of a corporation away from present management.\textsuperscript{19} As a result, in 1968 Congress passed the Williams Act,\textsuperscript{20} which extends the disclosure and antifraud provisions of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 to protect investors suddenly confronted by a tender offer.\textsuperscript{21} Prior to the enactment of the Williams Act, a shareholder was often forced to make a hasty decision, although he was unaware of the identity of the prospective purchaser, its plans for the company upon gaining control, or its financial ability to carry out its program.\textsuperscript{22} These

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block of stock to outsiders without having to account to his corporation for profits or even never do this with impunity when the buyer is an interested customer, actual or potential, for the corporation's product. But when the sale necessarily results in a sacrifice of this element of corporate good will and consequent unusual profit to the fiduciary who has caused the sacrifice, he should account for his gains. So in a time of market shortage, when a call on a corporation's product commands an unusually large premium, in one form or another, we think it sound law that a fiduciary may not appropriate to himself the value of this premium. Such personal gain at the expense of his coventurers seems particularly reprehensible when made by the trusted president and director of his company.

\textit{See also Jennings, supra} note 16, at 38; North & Co. v. Huffines, 416 F.2d 1189, 1190 (2d Cir. 1969).

18. F. O'NEAL, supra note 6, § 3.10, at 107.

19. See the chart at note 5, supra, showing the annual increase in use of tender offers for the years 1973-1977. \textit{See also DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS, supra} note 6, at vi.


However, other takeover devices previously had been reached by federal disclosure requirements. \textit{See S. REP. NO. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 521, 523}. An exchange offer, since it entails an issuance of the offeror's own
concerns posed a threat to the shareholders’ accrued equity ownership in stock.

Section 14(d) of the Williams Act\(^23\) requires a tender offeror seeking to acquire more than five percent\(^24\) of any class of equity security to make an advance disclosure of specific information about the tender offer directly to the shareholders at the time the offer is announced.\(^25\) This section is intended to provide the offeree shareholders an opportunity to make a well-informed decision.\(^26\) In addition, section 13(d) of the Act\(^27\) provides that a person who, by any means, has acquired more than a five percent interest in any equity security must, within ten days, make a similar disclosure.\(^28\) This is an after-the-fact disclosure in contrast to the restrictions on proposed takeovers in section 14(d). Finally, section 14(e) of the Act\(^29\) prohibits all persons from making “untrue statement[s] [or misleading omissions, and from] engag[ing] in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative . . . practices . . . in connection with any tender offer.”\(^30\)

The Williams Act has been considered an attempt to remove the advantage of surprise in the tender offer takeover technique\(^31\) through its requirement of a comprehensive advance disclosure by those mak-

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\(^24\) The designation of five percent of any class of equity security under 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1976) and 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1976), as opposed to the ten percent designation which appears in the original Act, S. 510, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 2(d)(1), 3(d)(1), reprinted in [1968] U.S. Code & Ad. News 521, 523, appears to be somewhat arbitrary. Nevertheless, the effect of a tender offer is the same at five percent as it is at ten percent of a class of stock.

\(^25\) See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-1(c) (1977). The Act also requires that such advance disclosures be made to the S.E.C. and to the issuer of the securities—the target corporation.


\(^28\) This provision covers both open market and negotiated purchases of shares and requires the preparation and filing of S.E.C. Schedule 13D. Schedule 13D requires the purchaser to set forth, \textit{inter alia}, his identity and background, his means of financing the acquisition the purpose of the transactions and, if he seeks working control of the issuer, his plans upon successful completion of the takeover. See Schedule 13D, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (1977). These disclosures must be made to the issuer, the S.E.C., and the exchanges where the security is traded. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1976).


\(^30\) \textit{Id.} This provision is broader in scope than are the general anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws, which protect only purchasers and sellers of securities. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976) with 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977) (Rule 10b-5). “In effect [section 14(e)] applies Rule 10b-5 both to the offeror and to the opposition . . . .” Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 940 (2d Cir. 1969); see Bromberg, The Securities Law of Tender offers, 15 N.Y.L. F. 462, 471 (1969).

\(^31\) Hayes & Taussig, \textit{supra} note 6, at 137.
ing a tender offer. The Act has also been viewed as serving an overall congressional purpose of closing the "gap" in takeover attempt disclosure by providing shareholders with substantial and timely disclosure whenever shares are being acquired in what might be a potential takeover situation. However, a close examination of the original bill, proposed by Senator Williams, reveals some confusion as to whom this Act purports to protect: the minority shareholders, the management of the target company, potential investors, or all participants in the tender contest. Senator Williams explained the purposes of the bill as follows:

I have taken extreme care with this legislation to balance the scales equally to protect the legitimate interests of the corporation, management, and shareholders without impeding cash takeover bids. Every effort has been made to avoid tipping the balance of regulatory burden in favor of management or in favor of the offeror. The purpose of this bill is to require full and fair disclosure for the benefit of stockholders while at the same time providing the offeror and management equal opportunity to fairly present their case. . . . This bill will put all on an equal footing with respect to the availability of significant facts about a tender offer. . . . All will be able to deal in the securities markets knowing that all the pertinent facts are available.

The Williams Act has indeed given a substantial amount of protection to minority shareholders in the tender contests which have oc-

   It shall be unlawful for any person . . . to make a tender offer for, or a request or invitation for tenders of, any class of any equity security . . . if, after consummation thereof, such person would, directly or indirectly, be the beneficial owner of more than 5 per centum of such class, unless at the time copies of the offer or request or invitation are first published or sent or given to security holders such person has filed with the Commission a statement containing such of the information specified in section 13(d) of this title . . . .

As written, the statute anticipates that one must first classify a transaction as a tender offer before one determines (by reference to the five percent condition) whether the disclosure requirement will apply.

33. "Tender Offer" under the S.E.A. of 1934, supra note 6, at 1257 n.41.


35. See S. Rep. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 1,3; H. R. REP. 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 1,4, 113 CONG. REC. 854, 856, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE & AD. NEWS 2811, 2813; See also Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 67-68 (1977) (Stevens J., dissenting), where Stevens states that: [It is indispensable to] protecting shareholders. . . . Thus, the most realistic deterrent to fraud on shareholders is a damages suit brought by the opposition in the tender contest. Moreover, disallowing such suits creates an incentive to violate the Act in retaliation for violations by the other side. When no effective judicial remedy is available, self help is more attractive. Finally, a damages remedy for the tender offeror is necessary for the protection of one particular class of shareholders: those shareholders of target corporations who accept an exchange offer and thereby become shareholders of the tender offeror.
curred since its enactment, and the current trend is toward more scrutiny of tender offers in order to prevent minority freeze-outs. Prior to the Williams Act, stockholders who were confronted with tender offers for their stock usually had to rely on their own ingenuity and resources in determining the merits of an offer, since the offeror was not bound to, and often did not, disclose all the facts which the offerees needed or wanted to know in deciding whether to accept or reject the offer. But since the passage of the Act, courts have also allowed the Act to be asserted as a shield to protect against unwanted tender offers. Such a position by the courts has provided protection for shareholders’ management and investors.

The first case attempting to ascertain which group the Williams Act purported to protect came in the form of a judicial expansion of the meaning of the term “tender offer.” In Cattlemen’s Investment Co. v. Fears, a coordinated series of negotiated purchases from a large number of shareholders during a relatively short period of time was held to constitute a tender offer for purposes of sections 14(d) and 14(e). The district court argued that a “remedial statute” like the Williams Act should be “interpreted liberally” to fulfill the purposes of Congress, which included disclosure of material information concerning “any effort to acquire control,” and relief of pressure on shareholders to make hurried decisions “as to whether to dispose of or retain their securities.” Specifically, the court stated that the purpose of Congress in passing the Act was clearly

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42. 343 F. Supp. at 251 (citing Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967), and Marriott v. National Mut. Cas. Co., 195 F.2d 462, 466 (10th Cir. 1952)).
43. 343 F. Supp. at 1251.
to provide investors who hold equity interests in public corporations material information with respect to the potential impact of any effort to acquire control of a company, sufficient time within which to make an unhurried investment decision as to whether to dispose of or retain their securities, and to assure fair treatment of the investors.44

The classes of investors who were intended to benefit from the tender offer legislation is open to an interpretation which would include both majority and minority shareholders, and would also encompass the management of the target company who might seek to avoid an unwanted takeover bid. Therefore, the groundwork is present for the use of the Williams Act by any participant in a tender contest to prevent any other participant from achieving an unwanted takeover of the target company, if proper information has not been filed with the SEC as required.45

In J. I. Case Co. v. Borak,46 the United States Supreme Court held that a derivative suit on behalf of the corporation could be brought under section 14(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934,47 although it seems clear that the primary beneficiaries of that section were intended to be individual stockholders rather than corporations.48 The rationale given was that authorizing individual shareholders to bring an action for rescission or damages for a violation of section 14(a) was essential for the protection of investors.49 Although Borak was a proxy

44. Id. (emphasis added).
45. The information required by 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(A)-(E) (1976) to be filed with the S.E.C. in reference to tender offers includes the following: (1) the identity and background of persons on whose behalf the purchases are being made; (2) the source and amount of funds to be used and a description of financing arrangements; (3) the purposes of the purchase, and if one such purpose is to acquire control, a description of plans or proposals relating to any major change in the company; and (4) any contracts, arrangements, or understanding with respect to any of the securities to be acquired.

The Rule has additional provisions designed to afford further protection to a tender offeree. For example, it gives a right of withdrawal of tendered shares for seven days after the first publication or transmission of the tender offer and at any time after 60 days from the date of the original offer, provides for pro rata acceptance of securities tendered within the first ten days of the offer (where more securities have been deposited than the tender offeror is bound to take up); and requires that any increase in the tender price shall be paid to all persons whose securities are taken up. Cattlemen's Inv. Co. v. Fears, 343 F. Supp. 1248, 1251 (W.D. Okla. 1972); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1976).
48. The purpose of §14(a) is to prevent management or others from obtaining authorization for corporate action by means of deceptive or inadequate disclosures in a proxy solicitation, thus protecting the stockholder first and foremost. Such a purpose is to control the conditions under which proxies may be solicited with a view to preventing the recurrence of abuses which frustrate the free exercise of the voting rights of the stockholders. See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 427 (1964); H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 13 (1934).
49. 377 U.S. at 426.
contest rather than a tender offer contest, its rationale has been argued to be equally applicable so as to give a tender offeror who is also a shareholder-investor a position within the class protected by tender offer legislation. However, in the recent Supreme Court opinion, Piper v. Chris Craft Industries, Inc., the purpose of the Williams Act was held to be the protection of investors who are confronted with a tender offer, without including a private cause of action for damages by one of several contending offerors against a successful bidder or by a losing contender against the target corporation. The Piper case suggests the possibility of applying the Williams Act not only to minority shareholders in a tender contest target company, but also to the rival contestants for control. In denying standing to the tender offeror to claim damages for statutory violations, the majority of the Court in Piper indicated that the Williams Act was not intended to benefit tender offerors, but only the shareholder-offerees. This conclusion is not entirely supported by the language of Senator Williams, who stated that the purpose of his bill was “to protect the legitimate interests of the corporation, management, and shareholders without impeding cash takeover bids.”

The Piper ruling that a tender offeror does not have standing under the Williams Act to bring suit for damages against a competing tender offeror or against the target corporation is contrary to virtually all prior decisions, which gave unquestioned standing to every interested party to a tender offer. Several earlier court decisions had specifically given tender offerors standing to sue under the Williams

52. 430 U.S. at 25.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. 430 U.S. at 26; see also Cort v. Ash, 426 U.S. 66 (1975).
Act.\textsuperscript{58} It seems clear from the Court's discussion of the legislative history of the Williams Act that the Court believed only shareholder-offerees, not tender offerors or target corporations, were those for whose special benefit the Act was adopted.\textsuperscript{59} However, even though there is no specific legislative history to indicate that Congress intended to so limit standing to sue for damages, the standing of every party to a tender offer to bring suit under the Williams Act had been virtually unquestioned until the \textit{Piper} decision.\textsuperscript{60} Therefore, with the standing issue somewhat unsettled because of the questions left unanswered by \textit{Piper},\textsuperscript{61} it is somewhat premature to expect certainty with respect to precisely which parties are to be given standing to sue under the Williams Act. Additionally, the relief to which those parties will be entitled, and under what circumstances, remains unclear.\textsuperscript{62}

Even though \textit{Piper} has restricted the offeror's standing to sue, it may be interpreted as leaving a right for offerors to seek injunctive relief against misstatements made by the target's management.\textsuperscript{63} Such relief for an offeror, unlike an award of money damages, is fully


\textsuperscript{59} 430 U.S. at 35.

\textsuperscript{60} See Aranow, \textit{Standing to Sue}, supra note 39, at 1755. Only two court decisions had held that standing to sue was restricted where tender contest participants were concerned. See Applied Digital Data Systems, Inc. v. Milgo Elec. Corp., [1977] \textit{FED. SEC. L. REP.} (CCH) ¶ 95,824 (broad standing to sue); Royal Indus., Inc. v. Monogram Indus., [1976] \textit{FED. SEC. L. REP.} (CCH) ¶ 95,863 (broad standing to sue). \textit{Cf.} Kaus v. Hi-Shear Corp., 528 F.2d 225, 232 (9th Cir. 1975) (restricting standing); Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1974) (restricting standing). In neither \textit{Kaus} nor \textit{Sargent}, however, were there harmful misrepresentations to the protected shareholders. In \textit{Kaus}, the tender offeror was the one misled, and in \textit{Sargent}, the issue was actually whether the offeror had violated any duties it had toward the plaintiff shareholder. \textit{But see} Piper v. Chris Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977) (denying standing to sue to an offeror).

\textsuperscript{61} \textit{Piper} leaves the question of who has standing to sue under the Williams Act somewhat open when it held merely that tender offerors do not have standing. See 430 U.S. 1,55 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

\textsuperscript{62} Aranow, \textit{Standing to Sue}, supra note 39, at 1769.

\textsuperscript{63} See Humana, Inc. v. American Medicorp, Inc., 46 U.S.L.W. 2416 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 1978). The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York held that tender offerors have standing to seek injunctive relief against competing tender offerors and against the target company's management for violation of the provisions of the Williams Act. Misrepresentations concerning the original tender offer, which the target's management opposed, and a competing offer approved by management, justified the issuance of a preliminary injunction. Management breached its obligation to furnish its shareholders with all information it had so that the shareholders could intelligently decide between the two competing offers. Shareholders are likely to rely heavily on management as corporate insiders, the court indicated, and management's failure to fulfill its responsibilities justified the injunction against misrepresentations concerning both offers. \textit{See also} Aranow, \textit{Standing to Sue}, supra note 39, at 1766; Note, \textit{Tender Offer Regulation-Injunction Standards Under the Williams Act}, 45 \textit{FORDHAM L. REV.} 51 (1976).
consistent with the underlying purposes of the Williams Act and is not detrimental to the interests of the target's shareholders. In *Piper*, the Supreme Court stated that "the Williams Act cannot consistently be interpreted as conferring a monetary remedy upon regulated parties, particularly where the award would not redound to the direct benefit of the protected class."64 This language would not restrict the right to injunctive relief for the offeror seeking to enforce the requirements of the Williams Act. Further, the target's shareholders would be protected, and the purposes of the Act would be served by insuring that the shareholders could evaluate both the tender offer and the opposition to it based upon accurate statements of all material facts. Unlike a damage award, a grant of injunctive relief would not harm either the shareholders who tendered their shares, or those who did not.65

Although *Piper* raises some questions as to the standing of any party other than shareholders in a tender contest, regardless of the relief sought, tender offerors' standing to seek injunctive relief is essential to insure that shareholders receive complete and accurate information concerning tender offers from the management of the target as well as from the offeror. Practically speaking, the tender offeror is the only party likely to be able to seek relief in order to protect the target's

64. 430 U.S. at 28.

65. Injunctive relief has been recognized in a series of cases beginning with *Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Control Corp.*, 409 F.2d 937, 944-46 (2d Cir. 1969) (target companies held to have standing to seek injunctive relief under sections 14(d) and 14(e), where materially violated). However, guidelines for asserting injunctive relief have been set in a series of related cases. In *Sonesta Int'l Hotels Corp. v. Wellington Assoc.*, 483 F.2d 247 (2d Cir. 1973), a preliminary injunction was issued where the plaintiff had made a strong showing of irreparable harm, but had not clearly demonstrated probable success on the merits. Conversely, where a strong showing of probable success has been made, the plaintiff need show only the possibility of irreparable harm. *Id.* at 250; *Checkers Motors Corp. v. Chrysler Corp.*, 405 F.2d 319, 523 (2d Cir.), *cert. denied*, 394 U.S. 999 (1969); *Dino Delaurentis Cinematografica, S.P.A. v. D-150, Inc.*, 366 F.2d 373, 375 (2d Cir. 1966); *Hamilton Watch Co. v. Bemus Watch Co.*, 206 F.2d 738, 740 (2d Cir. 1953). A number of cases, however, have suggested that a tender offer that violates the Williams Act is "unlawful" and probably should be enjoined with little or no direct discussion of irreparable harm. See *Gulf & W. Indus., Inc. v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co.*, 476 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1973) (requiring that only a probable material violation be shown); cf. *Elco Corp. v. Micronet, Inc.*, 360 F. Supp. 741 (D. Del. 1973) (preliminary relief justified by threatened irreparable harm to the target plaintiff). See also *General Host Corp. v. Triumph American, Inc.*, 359 F. Supp. 749 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). More recently, *Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp.*, 422 U.S. 49 (1975) reaffirmed the need for a showing of irreparable harm as a prerequisite for injunctive relief to a private litigant, but did not directly address the issue of materiality espoused in *Electronic Specialty Co.* Cases after *Mosinee* have followed a somewhat less strict test for granting injunctive relief. See *Stecher-Traung-Schmidt Corp. v. Self*, 529 F.2d 567 (2d Cir. 1976) (*per curiam*) (issuance of a preliminary injunction, at the behest of the target, of a potential takeover bid where the plaintiff had shown merely a likelihood of sustaining irreparable damage). An even greater departure from the strict interpretation of *Mosinee* came in *Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Aztec Oil & Gas Co.*, 406 F. Supp. 910 (N.D. Tex. 1976), where the court found that merely an interest of the target's shareholders in receiving full disclosure justified injunctive relief.
shareholders and himself when the tender contest is at a preliminary stage where an injunction would be appropriate and where misstatements made by the parties may be corrected or enjoined.

The Tender Offer and the Business Purpose Test

On September 23, 1977, the Supreme Court of Delaware, in Singer v. Magnavox Co., 66 applied a "business purpose test" in formulating a rule first utilized in an earlier case 67 to evaluate whether a tender offer action by majority shareholders had as its primary purpose the "freezing out" of a minority interest, without regard to the fairness of the price. In applying this test, Singer held that the majority stockholders and management of Magnavox violated their respective fiduciary duties by their participation in a tender offer to the minority stockholders of Magnavox, pursuant to a merger with T.M.C. Development Corporation. The violations occurred when the majority shareholders and the management agreed to the terms of a tender offer wherein a grossly inadequate cash price was offered for the shares of Magnavox. The Court said:

A Delaware Court will not be indifferent to the purpose of a merger when a freeze-out of minority stockholders on a cash-out basis is alleged to be its sole purpose. In such a situation, if it is alleged that the purpose is improper because of the fiduciary obligation owed to the minority, the Court is duty-bound to closely examine that allegation even when all of the relevant statutory formalities have been satisfied. 68

The Court in Singer considered an earlier case in which the plaintiff shareholder alleged that the dominant shareholder caused the issuance of new shares to impair plaintiff's minority interest and to force him out of the corporation. 69 The equitable doctrine, whereby corporate officers, directors, 70 and controlling shareholders 71 owe the corporation and its minority shareholders a fiduciary obligation of honesty, loyalty, good faith and fairness, was applied. 72 The legal propriety of the motives of the controlling stockholders is judged according to this fiduciary standard. Singer illustrates that evaluation of the propriety of a tender offer is within the responsibility of a court of equity. Such a

66. 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
court will scrutinize corporate acts closely when it is alleged that their purpose violates the fiduciary duty owed to minority stockholders. 73 Those who control the corporate machinery owe a fiduciary duty to the minority in the exercise of that control, and the use of such power merely to perpetuate control is a violation of that duty. 74 Singer held that "[a] merger, made for the sole purpose of freezing out minority shareholders, is an abuse of the corporate process; and the complaint, which so alleges in this suit, states a cause of action for violation of a fiduciary duty." 75 The court went even further and stated that although a proper business purpose is found to exist, "the fiduciary obligation of the majority to the minority stockholders remains and proof of a proper business purpose, without more, will not necessarily discharge it. 76

The concurring opinion in Singer argued that the "business purpose" test was too vague and that a more concrete test would be to require the takeover bidder to show a compelling corporate need to "go private." 77

Consideration should be given to the "economic necessity, desirability and feasibility involved, [the] evidence of self-serving [actions], manipulation, or over-reaching, and all other relevant factors of intrinsic fairness or unfairness." 78

In a March 23, 1977 United States Supreme Court decision, Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 79 the Court also followed the business purpose test and held that in a "going-private" situation, 80 where no claim of misrepresentation was made, no remedy was available to a complaining shareholder under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act. 81

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74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 980.
77. In a lecture by Professor F. Hodge O'Neal, given at the Symposium on Minority Shareholder Squeezeouts, in Tulsa, Oklahoma (Nov. 16, 1977) (transcribed tape recording in Tulsa Law Library), discussing Singer and the term "going private," Professor O'Neal described the concept as the reverse of going public. Basically, the company is seeking, through a tender offer, to buy back its shares at a certain price. Purchases of shares are usually obtained from minority shareholders and at a premium price so that the corporation may obtain a high percentage of the shares. The ultimate goal is to get the number of shareholders below 300 so that the company need no longer adhere to the S.E.C. Act regarding disclosure and registration requirements under 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(4) (1976). The minority shareholder is threatened by a squeezeout in this instance by the lack of protection from the securities laws and by the fact that no public market would ultimately exist for their shares if retained. What shares the corporation does not obtain through the tender offer may then be obtained through additional squeezeout procedures such as a reverse stock split, or by a consolidation of existing shares by amendment of the corporate charter.
80. For a detailed discussion of "going private," see Note, Going Private, 84 Yale L.J. 903 (1975).
holder in *Green* claimed that insiders had caused the corporation to engage in a squeeze-out merger for no valid business purpose but solely to eliminate minority shareholders. The Court stated that such a shareholder had to look to state law for any possible remedy. Thus *Green* gave a renewed importance to state takeover laws by leaving the responsibility of governing the internal affairs of corporate life to the states.  

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**Current Trend in Tender Offer Regulation by State Takeover Statutes**

Several states have recently passed what have come to be known as takeover statutes. The principal purpose of these statutes is to provide advance warning to management and shareholders of a tender offer, and many of these new laws provide for hearings before the states’

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83. See DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS, supra note 4, at 207; Royalty, State Takeover Statutes and New Takeover Strategies—A Panel, 32 BUS. LAW. 1459 (1977); Robinson, Tender Offers; Some Facts & Fancies (pt.2), 175 N.Y.U.L. REV. 96 (1976); Wilner & Landy, Tender Trap, supra note 3, at 3-4; Subcommittee on Proxy Solicitations and Tender Offers, Federal Regulation of Securities Committee, American Bar Association, STATE TAKEOVER STATUTES AND THE WILLIAMS ACT 5-6, reprinted in 32 BUS. LAW. 187, 189 (1976).


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securities department. This statutory protection for management involved in a tender contest contradicts the construction which many courts have given to the Williams Act. 84 These courts have applied the state takeover acts principally to prevent attempts to freeze out minority shareholders. Although these statutes have been said to support weak management,85 shareholders have also used them to their benefit.86 The main impact of such statutes has been to prevent what have come to be known as "Saturday night specials,"87 where tender offers are consummated within the minimum possible time under the Williams Act—as little as one week—and effectively deprive both management and stockholders of the target company of the opportunity to respond intelligently to a tender offer. Management was unable to discharge its duties when confronted with such a "blitz offer," and shareholders were being stampeded into accepting questionable or inadequate offers because there was insufficient time to obtain a better offer. Therefore, the states set out to draft their own protection, custom-tailored to remedy defects that were perceived in the Williams Act. 88

The legitimacy of such statutes may be questionable on constitutional grounds as a violation of the commerce clause89 or on grounds that the statutes are preempted by the Williams Act.90 Recently a federal district court found such preemption of a state takeover statute in Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell,91 where the Idaho takeover stat-

84 See, e.g., cases cited, supra note 36.
86 Id.
88 Arsh, Delaware Takeover Statute, supra note 87, at 1462.
89 See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970); Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960); see generally DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS, supra note 4, at 225-32; Wilner & Landy, Tender Trap, supra note 3, at 15.
90 Wilner & Landy, Tender Trap, supra note 3, at 23; DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS, supra note 4, at 225-32.
91 439 F. Supp. 420, 437 (N.D. Tex. 1977) held that:
There is a conflict of purpose between the Williams Act and the Idaho statute: the Williams Act regulates the making of tender offers for the benefit of shareholders, while the Idaho statute regulates the making of tender offers primarily for the benefit of the management of the target company. By weighing the scales so heavily in favor of management of target companies, the Idaho statute has destroyed the delicate balance reached
ute was said to conflict with the clear purpose of the Williams Act. Nevertheless, these conflicts can easily be avoided by the passage of a mild take-over regulation statute which does not call for burdensome disclosure beyond that already required by the Williams Act. Delaware has recently passed the mildest of all state takeover statutes; the Delaware Act is a notice-type statute. It does not provide for a hearing by any state administrative agency, nor is there even a required filing of the proposed tender offer with a state office. Delaware eliminates the possibility of a “Saturday night special” by requiring that the tender offer remain open for a period of at least twenty days after it is made to the holders of the equity securities, during which period any shareholder may withdraw any of the securities tendered to the offeror. Further, a written statement of the offeror’s intention to make the tender offer must be delivered to the corporation at its registered office. Such provisions indicate a strong legislative intent to give corporate directors time to react intelligently to a proposed tender offer without narrowly limiting the scope of the protection to the prevention of minority shareholder squeezes. The directors should use the time provided to do what is in the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders.

The state takeover statutes’ most obvious effect is delay, particularly if a state securities commission hearing is required. Although a state securities commission may ultimately approve the tender offer, the target company will have succeeded in eliminating the offeror’s critical advantages of surprise and speed. This may be illustrated by the Indiana takeover statute which requires that a hearing be held within twenty days of the hearing order (which can be issued within twenty days of filing by the offeror), and that a determination must be made within sixty days of the hearing’s conclusion. Therefore, a target company could conceivably delay the tender offer by approximately three and one-half months simply by requesting a hearing. The target company may exercise this option in the hope of causing the tender offer to

by the Williams Act. Because of the conflict that exists, this court is of the opinion that the Idaho takeover statute is preempted by the Williams Act.

See also Comment, State Takeover Statutes Versus Congressional Intent: Preempting the Maze, 5 Hofstra L. Rev. 859, 860 (1977).

93. Id.; Delaware Takeover Statute, supra note 87, at 1462.
die a natural death, or as a delaying tactic to gain time to develop a defense to the tender offer.98 This gives a target company a very effective parry, stalling for time, and allows market forces to make it economically undesirable for shareholders to relinquish their securities.99 Such delay can also increase the likelihood of wide price fluctuations in the target company's stock. Sufficient fluctuations in the market sometimes cause the SEC to halt trading in the target security between the time the offer is filed and when it is published.100 Thus, uncertainty and conflict among the provisions of present takeover statutes have already caused delays, price fluctuations, and possible suspensions of trading. The enactment of takeover statutes by more states may well impede the SEC's control and supervision of the market, and increase the uncertainty of shareholders.101 This uncertainty generated by the state statutes is most easily demonstrated by a review of a few recent cases which have applied the statutes.

Prior to 1975, only one unfriendly tender offer had been substantially delayed because of a state takeover statute.102 But now, the of-

99. Ruthlessness by the Rules, 117 FORBES 24, 28 (Feb. 1, 1976) (urges statutory delays); Robinson, Tender Offers: Some Facts and Fancies, 175 N.Y.L.J. 1 (1976). Such delay time may be used advantageously by target company management, since public announcement of a tender offer will stimulate open-market purchase of the target's securities by present shareholders or speculators expecting to realize a quick profit on their short term investment. See E. Aroow & H. Einhorn, Tender Offers for Corporate Control 173-91 (1973). Indeed, arbitrageurs may have a decisive role in the success of tender offers. See Ruthlessness by the Rules, id. at 25. Active trading will raise the price of the target's securities, and, as the market price draws closer to the tender offer price, the economic incentive for shareholders to sell their stock fades. See WALL ST. J., Aug. 20, 1968, at 32, col. 1. As a result, when the margin narrows between the market tender offer prices, shareholders may be more receptive to management's appeals not to sell and to support the status quo through a combination of loyalty and lack of economic incentive. See Comment, Commerce Clause Limitations Upon State Regulation of Tender Offers, 47 So. CAL. L. REV. 1133 (1974).
102. See In Re E Z Painter Corp. & Newell Cos., Inc., [1973] 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) ¶ 71,063, where an offer was first filed in Wisconsin on December 5, 1972. After a review and five
feror in a tender contest must be concerned with one or more state
takeover statutes which may have an adverse delaying effect upon the
offer. In *Copperweld Corp. v. Imetal*, the shareholders of Copperweld, a Pittsburgh-based producer of specialty steel, were tendered an offer for their shares by Societe Imetal, a French concern. Copperweld was not required to be licensed to do business in Ohio merely because of its ownership of shares in two Ohio corporations, nor because it was the owner of operating assets in Ohio. Although it did have two Ohio subsidiaries, approximately a year after their incorporation Copperweld itself surrendered its license to transact business as a foreign corporation in Ohio.

At the time the tender offer was made by Imetal, Copperweld “fought hard to stave off a takeover . . . [;] Copperweld executives opposed the bid in court, [and] employees staged placard-waving demonstrations pleading that the company stay American-owned.” But the Ohio takeover statute was by far the strongest weapon the target had, and the statute was used to obtain considerable delays.

The Ohio takeover statute covers tender offers for a company which has either incorporated in Ohio or has its principal place of business in Ohio, and which has substantial assets within Ohio. Therefore, it can be argued that the statute was inapplicable in this case, since the target company, Copperweld, was not incorporated in Ohio nor had its principal place of business nor substantial assets in the state. Even so, the attorney general of Ohio sued to enjoin Societe Imetal from pursuing its tender offer until it complied with the Ohio statute.

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108. Suit was commenced in the Court of Common Pleas, Ohio v. Imetal, No. 75 Civ. 09-3868 (C.P. Franklin County, Ohio, Oct. 9, 1975). At the time this suit was instituted, a suit based upon federal law was being litigated in the Federal District Court in Pittsburgh, Copperweld Corp. v. Imetal, 403 F. Supp. 579 (W.D. Pa. 1975). Although Societe Imetal was successful in the federal case, the tender offer was delayed pending the adjudication of the Ohio suit.
Copperweld was able to invoke Ohio's jurisdiction because the company's substantial assets and operations of its two subsidiaries were considered tantamount to the principal place of business of the parent.109

In a similar case where a state statute was asserted to delay a tender offer, Otis Elevator Co. v. United Technologies Corp.,110 applied the Indiana takeover statute. United Technologies Corp. made a tender offer for fifty-five percent of the shares of Otis Elevator Company, a New Jersey corporation, after Otis had filed a motion for a preliminary injunction in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The motion alleged violations of the Williams Act, namely, failure to disclose the plan of merger.111 The Indiana takeover statute was invoked because a “substantial portion of the total assets” of United was located in the state.112 Numerous motions and orders were pursued in state and federal courts in Indiana,113 but the applicability and constitutionality of the Indiana statute had still not been adjudicated, and eventually, United announced termination of its offer and its intent to make a new offer at a higher price.114

In another case illustrating the impact of the Ohio state tender offer statutes, In re Thrall Car Mfg. Co., The Youngstown Steel Door Co.,115 Thrall made a tender offer for Youngstown and was defeated. Thrall's proposed offer was for fifty-two percent of Youngstown's stock at a thirty percent premium over the market price of the shares. Thrall filed information with the Ohio Division of Securities as required by the Ohio statute, but the next day, Youngstown's management re-

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109. This argument was apparently based upon a test set forth in Kelly v. United States Steel Corp., 284 F.2d 850, 854 (3d Cir. 1960). However, in Kelly, the issue was location of defendant's principal place of business, and the court resolved the question by looking to the place where most executive decisions were made. The court did not mention the existence or location of subsidiaries.


113. These motions and orders included: (1) a deese and desist order by the Indiana Securities Commissioner, (2) a lawsuit commenced by Otis in state court resulting in a temporary restraining order, (3) an action by United in the federal district court challenging the constitutionality of the Indiana statute, (4) a subsequent ruling by the Indiana Securities Commissioner dissolving the cease and desist order on the ground that the statute did not apply to Otis, (5) an action by Otis in state court to review the Commissioner's ruling, (6) the expiration of the state court's temporary restraining order, (7) United's removal of all state court proceedings to the federal district court in Indianapolis, and (8) the remand of Otis' action to the state court to review the Commissioner's ruling.

114. Troubh, Purchased Affection: A Primer on Cash Tender Offers, 1976 HARV. BUS. REV. 79, 82-83 (July-Aug.).

115. Ohio Dept. of Commerce, Division of Securities, File No. 041-10 (Aug. 2, 1976); see also DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS, supra note 4, at 222-25, 254-55.
quested that the Division of Securities hold a hearing to investigate the offer. The hearing lasted nearly a month. Finally, sixty days after Thrall had filed its proposals with the division, and on the last day permitted by statute, the Division of Securities issued its order. The Division found that the offeror’s ten-day limit was “inherently unfair” to shareholders, that the price offered for the Youngstown shares was inadequate because it bore “no relationship to the intrinsic value of the [Youngstown] stock,” and that the offer had not been shown to be fair and equitable.

The disclosures made by Thrall were also found to be deficient for several reasons, and based upon those findings the Division of Securities ruled that the tender offer violated the Ohio tender offer statute. The Ohio Commissioner of Securities informed Thrall that proposed amendments to its offer should be submitted to Youngstown for comment, and that hearings would be held to determine whether the amended offer complied with the Division’s order. Thrall then filed suit in the Federal District Court for the Southern District of Ohio seeking a declaratory judgment that the Ohio tender offer statute was unconstitutional and an injunction restraining enforcement of the statute in connection with Thrall’s tender offer.

Twenty-five days after the Commission issued its order against Thrall’s tender offer, the management of Youngstown received an announcement of another tender offer for 55.8 percent of its shares from Lamson & Sessions Company, at a price slightly higher than that offered by Thrall. However, Lamson gave Youngstown a shorter period of time within which to tender the shares. Since the second tender offer was supported by the management of Youngstown, it was exempt from regulation by the Ohio Division of Securities and was allowed to become effective, despite the fact that it contained a number of the same deficiencies that were found in the Thrall offer. Ultimately, Lamson & Sessions Co. purchased ninety-two percent of the Youngstown shares, making futile any attempt by Thrall to continue with its own

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117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.041(A)(1)(d) (Supp. 1976) stating that a takeover bid does not include any tender offer or request or invitation for tender to which the target company consents, by action of its board of directors, if such board of directors has recommended acceptance thereof to shareholders and the terms thereof, including any inducements to officers or directors which are not made available to all shareholders, have been furnished to shareholders.
proposed offer.\textsuperscript{121}

Although the offerors in \textit{Imetal}\textsuperscript{122} and \textit{United Technologies}\textsuperscript{123} were both eventually successful in their takeover efforts, they illustrate, as does \textit{Youngstown Steel Door},\textsuperscript{124} the practical effects of the state statutes’ elimination of secrecy and speed, two traditional virtues of the tender offer technique of acquiring corporate control.\textsuperscript{125} As these three cases illustrate, state takeover statutes remain unclear in their application and effect; yet they operate as a strong deterrent to potential offerors\textsuperscript{126} and protect management from unwanted takeover bids. Another obvious effect is the delay that occurs, particularly if a state agency hearing procedure is invoked. Such delay may result in upward price fluctuations in the shares of the target company. Consequently, potential offerors are hindered in their takeover attempts, and the target remains protected from unwanted acquisition attempts.

As states continue to enact more restrictive takeover statutes, the use of this technique to acquire a company will become less attractive.\textsuperscript{127} Eventually, the tender offer tactic may become useless, as an offeror may be forced to comply with the most restrictive of the state acts to avoid injunctions and other penalties.\textsuperscript{128}

\textsuperscript{121} A similar result occurred in the tender offer by Bethlehem Copper Corp. for Valley Camp Coal Co. \textit{See Quaker State Oil and Valley Agree on Merger}, \textit{WALL ST. J.}, Mar. 9, 1976, at 2, col. 2; \textit{Bethlehem Copper Drops Valley Camp Tender Offer}, \textit{N.Y. TIMES}, Mar. 13, 1976, at 37, col. 4.


\textsuperscript{125} When a delay is obtained, more options become available to the target. In a recent bid delayed by the Ohio procedure, Microdot, Inc. was able to arrange a friendly merger with a third party at $21 per share while the tender offer of General Cable at $17 per share was still in court. \textit{N.Y. TIMES}, July 6, 1976, at 42, col. 4. Similarly, a target has greater opportunity to mount a propaganda campaign of its own against the offeror’s motives and abilities. \textit{See e.g.}, \textit{N.Y. TIMES}, July 14, 1976, at 53, Col. 1-2; advt., \textit{id.} at 57 (campaign in opposition to exchange offer, which was required to be announced before its effective date).

\textsuperscript{126} \textit{N.Y. TIMES}, July 6, 1976 at 42, col. 4.

\textsuperscript{127} \textit{See e.g.}, \textit{WALL ST. J.}, March 18, 1976, at 26, col. 2, where it is stated that the tender “[o]ffer is not being made to . . . holders of [s]hares in any jurisdiction of the United States . . . in which the [o]ffer or the acceptance thereof would not be in compliance with the securities laws of such jurisdiction.” \textit{Cf. WALL ST. J., Nov. 21, 1975, at 33, col. 2} (an offeror gave its opinion, as part of advertised offering information, that the Indiana takeover statute was not applicable to the offer); \textit{see also} \textit{N.Y. TIMES}, July 6, 1976, at 42, col. 4.

\textsuperscript{128} Some acts, indeed, purport to apply even where an offeror makes some kind of disclaimer. For example, the Ohio act was criticized in testimony before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs by SEC Commissioner Philip A. Loomis, Jr. The Commissioner in essence that the statute seemed “designed to prevent an offer from being made outside of Ohio unless and until the Ohio Act has been complied with if there are shareholders in Ohio.” [1976] \textit{FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)} No. 630 (Feb. 25, 1976). \textit{See also, e.g.} the Indiana act, which provides that “[a]n offeror may not make a take-over offer involving a target company
In addition, the application of state takeover statutes creates a myriad of constitutional problems relating to the overlapping of the state statutes with the federal legislation in the area. When constructing a state takeover statute, courts must now consider whether the statute is in violation of the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution, and whether the Williams Act has preempted the states’ authority to regulate the area.

IV. FUTURE REGULATION OF TENDER OFFERS: THE SEC TENDER OFFER RULES

Tender offer regulation has been developing with a common aim to provide the target company advance notice of the proposed offer and to require the bidder to make additional disclosures.

The SEC's proposed tender offer rules, published in the summer of 1976, take into consideration the original purpose of the Williams Act to require full and fair disclosure of material information not only for the benefit of shareholders, but also for the benefit of the bidder and the target. Although recent cases appear to apply the Williams Act only in favor of minority shareholders, the SEC proposals hopefully will re-establish a balance of protection, as well as result in additional

which is not made to the owners of equity securities of the target company who are residents of this state.” IND. CODE § 23-2-3-5(e) (Supp. 1976).

129. See Wilner & Landy, Tender Trap, supra note 3, at 15-25; accord, Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (applying a legitimate local public interest test to state statutes which affect interstate commerce). See also DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS, supra note 4, at xix, 232-33, stating that state tender offer statutes “are an unfortunate step backward in the orderly development of the federal securities laws.”

130. See Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 439 F. Supp. 420 (N.D. Tex. 1977); see also Wilner & Landy, Tender Trap, supra note 3, at 23.

131. See 15 U.S.C. § 8a (1976) (This act, entitled the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, places certain filing requirements, waiting periods and notice requirements in the premerger stages of a tender offer contest); see also State Takeover Statutes, cited at note 83 supra.


133. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14d-1 to 14d-101 (1977). The SEC also plans to regulate a company's purchase of its own shares. Such rules would parallel the proposed SEC regulations of offers for the stock of another company. The proposal includes the following requirements: (1) a tender offer would have to remain open for at least fifteen business days; (2) a shareholder holding his stock would have the right to withdraw within the first ten business days after the offer is announced and after forty business days following the announcement; (3) and officers, directors and major shareholders of the offering company would have to disclose all of their transactions in the company's stock during the forty business days before the purchase offer. See WALL. ST. J., Dec. 9, 1977, at 5, col. 1.

disclosures, adequate communications to shareholders, and a longer time in which to evaluate the tender offer. Such improvements would benefit shareholders, management, and investors alike. The proposals contain important changes, including:

1. Communication of a cash tender offer by full advertisement or mailing to shareholders.  
2. Notice to shareholders of the tender offer bid in the form of a direct mail communication to all shareholders whose identity is available to the bidder.  
3. As to past relationships, transactions or negotiations with the target company during the three-year period prior to the tender offer, new disclosures are required which are intended to further the purposes of the Williams Act. This may include disclosure of conflicts of interest and disclosure of the nature and approximate dollar amount of business relationships, including transactions between bidder and the target company or its affiliates, plus a description of contacts, relationships, transactions or negotiations between such persons concerning a merger or consolidation with, or acquisition of, the target or any of its subsidiaries. Such disclosures apply to a tender offer for, or acquisition of, the target or any of its subsidiaries; a tender offer for, or other acquisition of, securities of the target; an election of directors of the target; and the sale or other transfer of a material amount of assets by the target or any of its subsidiaries.  
4. Disclosures concerning the source and amount of funds or other consideration to be used by the bidder in the tender offer are to be increased. This would require disclosure of material terms and conditions of any loan agreements if any part of the funds or other consideration is to be borrowed, directly or indirectly, as well as a description of any plans or arrangements to finance or repay such loans.  
5. Disclosure is to be required whether control of the target company is sought or not. This would require disclosure of a bidder’s plan regarding any extraordinary corporate transaction involving the target or any of its subsidiaries such as: a sale or transfer of a material amount of the assets of the target or any of its subsidiaries; changes in the present board of directors or management; material change in the present capitalization, dividend policy, business or corporate structure;

135. Appelton, Proposed Rules, supra note 132, at 1383.  
136. Id.  
137. Id. at 1388.  
138. Id.
and delisting of a class of securities from a national securities exchange or termination of the registration of a class of securities. Such disclosures will apply not only to bidders but also to any executive officer, director, affiliate or subsidiary of such person.

(6) A materiality test is to be applied to determine whether an average prudent investor ought reasonably to be informed of such information in deciding whether to sell, tender, or hold the securities being sought.

V. Conclusion

In the aftermath of the decisions in Piper v. Chris Craft Industries, Singer v. Magnavox Company, and Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, wherein the courts construed the main purpose behind the Securities and Exchange Act to be the protection of minority shareholders from squeezouts by tender offerors, and with the increasing number of state and federal regulations of tender offer takeover bids, the tender offer may soon become extinct as a form of corporate takeover. One of the easiest ways to restrict the use of a certain procedure is to make compliance with the rules and regulations controlling such a procedure so complex and confusing that the average company will choose another alternative to avoid the threat of litigation or the expense of compliance. What was once the most convenient and expeditious method of acquiring another company is now fraught with uncertainties. The validity of the sale is subject to question by federal law, state statutes, inconsistent court decisions, and SEC rules.

Congress must clarify which groups of persons are to be given standing to bring suits under the Williams Act and provide corrective legislation to insure that enforcement is accomplished uniformly and in a manner calculated to effectuate the original purposes of the Act. If partial or total frustration of the federal laws is to be avoided, the SEC and its state counterparts must cooperate to assure more coordination and less conflict in the interpretation and administration of tender offer regulation. If these ends are not accomplished, Congress should pass legislation, expressly following the district court decision in Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, to preempt conflicting state regulation of tender offers. Such legislation will prevent increasing litigation concerning tender offer regulation and dispell some of the mounting hesi-

139. Id. at 1388-89.
140. Id.
tation which corporate investors have toward engaging in tender contests.

_Everette D. Hull_